





THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
SKEPTICISM:  A RECOVERY AND PRELIMINARY EVALUATION 
Louis Michael Seidman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over two centuries after its ratification, most Americans are still 
infatuated with their Constitution.1  At the beginning, few would have 
predicted this outcome.  The Constitution was born out of bitter con-
flict.2  For many Anti-federalists—perhaps a majority of the country3—
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1   See, e.g., GfK Roper Pub. Affairs & Corporate Commc’ns, The AP-National Constitution 
Center Poll, August, 2012, at 5 (2012), available at http://constitutioncenter.org/media/
files/data_GfK_AP-NCC_Poll_August_GfK_2012_Topline_FINAL_1st_release.pdf (find-
ing that almost seven in ten Americans agree that “[t]he United States Constitution is an 
enduring document that remains relevant today”). 
2   See generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787-1788 (2010); WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2007); Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 475 (1995). 
3   For a claim that “something like half the citizenry opposed [ratification],” see HOLTON, 
supra note 2, at 249 &  n. 56.  There is no way to know the views of the many women, 
people of color, and people lacking property, who could not participate in elections for 
the state conventions.  At a number of ratifying conventions, delegate selection districts 
were gerrymandered so as to overstate the power of the Constitution’s supporters.  See id.; 
MAIER, supra note 2, at 115–16.  Supporters of the Constitution cleverly structured voting 
rules so that the conventions were faced with a stark choice between ratification of the 
document as a whole or continuation of the unpopular Articles of Confederation.  See 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 96 (1996).  Many people who ultimately supported the Constitution would 
have preferred a middle position involving amendments to the original draft.  See MAIER, 
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the Constitutional Convention amounted to a counterrevolution, a 
renunciation of everything that the War for Independence had been 
fought to secure.4  The ratification process was arguably illegal5 and 
unquestionably marred by serious procedural irregularities,6 various 
political shenanigans,7 blatant coercion,8 and outright violence.9  Rati-
fication almost didn’t happen at all, and the process left many Anti-
federalists angry and disillusioned. 
 
supra note 2, at 50–69, 261, 395–96.  Rhode Island, the last state to ratify the Constitution, 
did so only after Congress threatened a trade embargo against the state, and a majority of 
delegates to the convention disobeyed explicit instructions from their constituents.  See 
Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 2, at 538–39. 
4   See, e.g., MAIER, supra note 2, at 91 (quoting Luther Martin’s charge that delegates from 
Virginia and other “large states” sought to destroy the states and establish a monarchy).  
For a comprehensive collection of Anti-federalist rhetoric, see THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
5   Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation provided that  
the Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and 
the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be 
made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the 
[U]nited [S]tates, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every 
[S]tate.   
  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. XIII,  para. 1.  Article VII of the Constitution 
violated these legal requirements in numerous ways.  It authorized scrapping the “per-
petual Union” provided for under the Articles upon approval of only nine states, upon 
approval of state conventions rather than state legislatures, and without the agreement of 
Congress.  U.S. CONST. art. VII.  For a comprehensive discussion, see Ackerman & Katyal, 
supra note 2, at 479–87.  For a claim that the Constitution was legal on the ground that 
the Articles were a treaty that had been violated and were therefore no longer binding, 
see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited:  Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).  For a rebuttal, see Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 2, at 539–
57. 
6   See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 2, at 517 (arguing that the rushed election of delegates 
to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention violated the Pennsylvania Constitution);  id. at 
526 (noting that Federalists “precipitated riots at polling places, allowing them to run off 
with some ballot boxes”). 
7   For example, in Massachusetts, supporters of the Constitution falsely claimed that dele-
gates would not be paid unless they voted in favor of ratification.  See HOLTON, supra note 
2, at 252.  It is doubtful that the Constitution would have been ratified if Massachusetts 
had voted “no,” and its “yes” vote was crucially influenced by Governor John Hancock’s 
endorsement.  The endorsement was apparently secured by the promise of leading Fed-
eralists to support his candidacy in the next gubernatorial election.  See MAIER, supra note 
2, at 192–98. 
8   For a discussion of the pressure put on Rhode Island to ratify the Constitution, see 
Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 2, at 538–39; see also supra note 3. 
9   See MAIER, supra note 2, at 100 (recounting a mob attack against the opponents of the 
Constitution). 
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The Federalists had promised to fix some of the problems with 
the document by enacting amendments,10 but when Madison pur-
ported to make good on his promise by introducing a Bill of Rights in 
the first Congress, many Anti-federalists felt betrayed again.  Madi-
son’s Bill of Rights fell far short of what the Anti-federalists wanted 
and did nothing to cure what they viewed as the Constitution’s most 
serious defects.11 
Surprisingly, despite all of this, and within a very short time, the 
new Constitution found wide acceptance.  Perhaps because the econ-
omy quickly recovered,12 or perhaps because the new Constitution did 
little to obstruct what they wanted to accomplish,13 its opponents 
gracefully accepted their defeat and acceded to the binding force of a 
document they had recently and viciously attacked.14 
On conventional accounts, in the years since, the Constitution has 
served as the sacred text of our civil religion.15  People have fought 
passionately about what it means, but its authority and goodness have 
served as common ground.  It has come to symbolize the possibility of 
government limited by law and the ability of an ethnically, politically, 
and culturally diverse populace to come together for the common 
good.  To oppose the Constitution is to oppose the American exper-
 
10  See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 171, 173 
(1955) (discussing how the leading Federalists agreed to accept amendments “as a con-
cession to the opposition”). 
11  For example, after Madison introduced his proposals, William Grayson, Virginia’s Anti-
federalist Senator, wrote to Patrick Henry that it was “out of [his] power to hold out to 
you any flattering expectations on the score of amendments.”  16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  4 MARCH 1789-3 
MARCH 1791, at 759 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992).  After the amendments 
had been ratified by Congress, Grayson and Richard Lee, Virginia’s other Senator, wrote 
to the Virginia General Assembly that the Amendments were “far short of the wishes of 
our Country” and that Grayson and Lee had been unsuccessful in “bring[ing] to view the 
Amendments Proposed by our Convention and approved by the Legislature.”  5 THE 
ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1186 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980). 
12  See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF:  THE CONSTITUTION IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 14–15, 70 (1986) (noting the attribution of improved economic 
conditions to the adoption of the Constitution). 
13  See id. at 72 (“By the mid-nineteenth century, the term ‘constitutional’ . . . had become a 
convenient camouflage for moral compromise and political expediency.”). 
14  See MAIER, supra note 2, at 432 (“After Congress declared the Constitution ratified and 
called the first federal elections, the country rallied behind the new Constitution.”). 
15  See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (noting 
that the Constitution has been “virtually from the moment of its ratification, a sacred 
symbol”); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (2011) (quoting Irving Kristol’s 
statement that the flag, the Constitution, and the Declaration of Independence “consti-
tute the holy trinity of what Tocqueville called the American ‘civil religion’”). 
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iment itself, and to oppose America is to be outside the realm of rea-
sonable discourse.16 
And yet, through two centuries of hagiography for the Founders 
and worship of the text that they produced, atheists and agnostics 
have survived.  Skeptics have continued to challenge the goodness, 
enforceability, legitimacy, and workability of the Constitution.  It is 
startling how deep this counter-narrative runs.  Skepticism even man-
aged to worm its way into the Federalist Papers, which the Supreme 
Court often treats as the Talmud of our constitutional Bible.17  Since 
then, and throughout our history, many of our most revered political 
figures have expressed doubts about the Constitution.  Constitutional 
skepticism has been at the heart of some of our most important polit-
ical battles, and it has preoccupied some of our leading political 
thinkers.  It is as American as apple pie. 
The aim of this Article is to recover and reevaluate the tradition of 
constitutional skepticism.  More is at stake here than merely compli-
cating the historical record.  The argument for the Constitution itself 
hangs in the balance.  In part this is true because, on the merits, the 
skeptics have a point.  Perhaps more significantly, however, a revival 
of the skeptical tradition makes it possible to talk seriously about 
whether they have a point or not. 
To see why this is so, we need to rehearse how the argument over 
skepticism has gone so far.  On the face of things, it seems bizarre to 
bind ourselves to a very old and difficult-to-amend text, full of idio-
syncrasies, and written by people who had no inkling of the econom-
ic, political, material, and moral climate of twenty-first century Amer-
ica.18  Paradoxically, constitutional obedience violates the first three 
words of the Constitution itself.  Instead of empowering “We the [liv-
ing] People,” it empowers They the dead People. 
Despite these obvious problems with constitutional obedience, 
modern skeptics rarely get anything like a full hearing.  To the extent 
that anyone pays attention to them at all, they are considered cranks, 
too far outside the mainstream to take seriously.  This reaction is 
more of a predisposition than anything resembling a refuting argu-
ment, but a few defenders of constitutionalism have turned the pre-
disposition into an argument.  They insist that the long tradition of 
past respect for the Constitution counts as a reason for present re-
 
16  See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 15, at 252–54. 
17  See infra text accompanying notes 97–117. 
18  I make an extended argument for this proposition in LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012). 
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spect.  On this view, and despite what Jefferson claimed,19 prior gen-
erations are not like a foreign country exercising imperialist power 
over the present.  On the contrary, they are a (concededly construct-
ed) part of “us” because political identity, like personal identity, 
makes sense only diachronically.  There is a continuing, coherent 
constitutional narrative that extends backward to the moment of 
founding.  “We the People” includes people living and dead because 
living peoples are necessarily formed by practices, institutions, and 
habits of thought inherited from past generations.  It is just this in-
heritance that defines a People, gives it autonomy, and separates it 
from other Peoples.20 
If our constitutional tradition forms the backbone of our national 
identity and gives meaning to our collective existence over time, then 
insisting that we give up on it is asking quite a lot.  But need we con-
ceive of constitutionalism this way?  The starting point for this Article 
is that there is usually a choice about how we construct our past.  The 
choice is not boundless, or at least it is not boundless given contin-
gent cultural constraints on our imagination at any particular mo-
ment.  It is hard for us presently to imagine our history as defined by, 
say, the gradual emergence of a Confucian social order immanent in 
founding choices.21  But even if constrained, there is more freedom 
than we often realize.22 
Constitutional skepticism offers an alternative way to construct 
our history—a construction that is also consistent with the historical 
data and within the possibilities of imagination, or at least so I argue.  
This Article is intended as a first stab at fostering this reimagination.  
To be clear, I make no claim that this narrative is the only way to 
make sense of our past.  My project is “constructivist” in the sense that 
it chooses one of many interpretations so as to make the best of our 
history.23  Of course, reasonable people will disagree with my norma-
tive assessment of which interpretation makes that history the “best.”  
 
19  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in VI THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 8 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (“[B]y the law of nature, one gener-
ation is to another as one independent nation to another.”). 
20  For the best articulation of this view, see generally JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME:  A 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001). 
21  But cf.  Michael Sean Quinn, The Analects for Lawyers:  Variations upon Confucian Wisdom,  
34 TEX. TECH. L.  REV. 933 (2003). 
22  See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES:  REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN 
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991). 
23  In this sense, but perhaps only in this sense, my project parallels Ronald Dworkin’s fa-
mous effort to provide a constructivist account of law.  See generally RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
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My aim is to lay the groundwork for just such a discussion—a discus-
sion that cannot take place so long as the prevailing narrative of con-
stitution-worship is the only one available.  What follows, therefore, is 
not so much an argument for constitutional skepticism as a necessary 
prolegomenon to such an argument. 
Part I consists of a brief history of skepticism running from before 
the founding to the modern period.  In some of my examples, im-
portant historical actors themselves have advocated or justified consti-
tutional disobedience.  In others, even though the actors have 
claimed to be constitutionalists, modern reflection on what they said 
and did contributes to a skeptical narrative.  In both cases, my aim is 
not to provide anything like a complete description of the actors, 
texts, and events that I discuss.  Instead, I link together familiar epi-
sodes and arguments that stretch across our history so as to demon-
strate that they are part of a common narrative that has been crucial 
to our self-identity. 
A fair objection to this enterprise is that I have lumped together a 
variety of arguments that are in fact separate and unrelated.  Part II 
responds to this worry by disentangling the various strands of skepti-
cal argument.  People who have had doubts about the Constitution 
have not always shared the same doubts.  Some skeptics have argued 
that the Constitution produces evil outcomes and ought to be resist-
ed to the extent that it is evil.  A related, but analytically distinct claim 
is that the Constitution binds us to the “dead hand” of the past and, 
so, is fundamentally undemocratic.  Other critics have focused on the 
means of constitutional enforcement.  They have claimed that judi-
cial review is deeply undemocratic and inconsistent with rule by “We 
the People.”  Still other critics have made something like the opposite 
point—that the Constitution cannot be enforced and constitutes no 
more than “parchment barriers.”24 
There is at best a complex relationship between these claims.  
Perhaps they even contradict each other.  Moreover, there is a simi-
larly complex relationship between the various strands of constitu-
tional skepticism and a more global skepticism about law and about 
morals.  Despite this complexity, the argument of Part II is that the 
various strands of constitutional skepticism share a common core.  At 
base, all forms of constitutional skepticism rest on doubts about 
whether moral and political disagreement can be bridged by a legal 
text.  Those doubts, in turn, are grounded on a rejection of global 
 
24  See infra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
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moral skepticism and on deep strands of American thought that em-
phasize the possibility of moral knowledge. 
In Part III, I very briefly suggest some preliminary conclusions 
about how we should view constitutional skepticism.  I argue that 
there are reasons to think that a dose of constitutional skepticism 
might mitigate some of our current political dysfunction. 
I conclude with the suggestion that the mere recognition of the 
possibility of constitutional skepticism undermines one of the main 
arguments against it. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SKEPTICISM 
As I hope to demonstrate in the Part that follows, the United 
States enjoys a rich tradition of thought and action grounded in skep-
ticism about constitutionalism in general, about the worth of the 
American Constitution, or various provisions in the American Consti-
tution, in particular, and about modes by which the American Consti-
tution might be interpreted and enforced.  Before exploring this tra-
dition, however, I must emphasize several limitations of my project. 
First, my aim is not to provide a comprehensive account of this 
tradition.  I have tried to be accurate and to avoid oversimplification, 
but a comprehensive account would require book-length treatments 
of every topic that I cover below.  Instead, my goal is to link together 
a group of disparate individuals and episodes so as to tell a coherent 
story about our national ethos.  Accordingly, I have emphasized those 
thinkers and events that evince common themes useful for the organ-
ization of skeptical thought. 
Second, the tradition that I describe, while vibrant and important, 
has also often been subterranean.  Because it undermines the official 
narrative, it sometimes finds expression in things said softly or indi-
rectly or in things left entirely unsaid.  Only occasionally, but at none-
theless dramatic and important historical moments, does it receive 
full-throated endorsement.  More usually, one has to read texts and 
events carefully, but, I hope, not tendentiously, to find a submerged 
message. 
Third, except with reference to the modern period, I have made 
little effort to recount popular attitudes toward the Constitution.25  
This failure is only partially attributable to my lack of the methodo-
logical skills necessary to accomplish this task.  For better or worse, 
 
25  But see infra text accompanying notes 405–16.  For the leading history of popular attitudes 
toward the Constitution, see KAMMEN, supra note 12. 
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unifying national myths and narratives tend to be formed by recollec-
tion of great episodes in our history and of the great men and women 
who made them.  Because I am interested in reconstructing a nation-
al narrative, I have concentrated my attention on the sorts of people 
and events that have formed it. 
Fourth, I make no claim that the actors I describe below were be-
having in a disinterested fashion or always advanced a global critique 
of constitutionalism.  Virtually all challenges to the American Consti-
tution have been politically located.  Most politicians are not political 
philosophers.  Few of them formulated arguments against American 
constitutionalism in general.  Their challenges were usually to specif-
ic constitutional limitations and came in contexts where they thought 
that the Constitution limited their power and got in the way of doing 
things that they thought needed to be done.  The argument for and 
against constitutionalism ultimately turns on how we evaluate these 
acts of disobedience—whether we think of them as self-interested 
power grabs or as great acts of statesmanship. 
This leads to the final point.  It is worth emphasizing again the 
constructivist nature of this project.  The skeptical narrative that I re-
late is one of many that can be made to fit the historical data.  The 
data can demonstrate that this narrative possibility exists, but cannot 
alone tell us which historical events we should celebrate and which 
we should regret. 
A.  Constitutional Skepticism before the Constitution 
Even before there was a Constitution, there was constitutional 
skepticism.  The pre-Revolutionary period was marked by the growth 
and vibrancy of constitutional theory.  Spurred by the emergence of 
enlightenment rationality and the decline in the legitimacy of divine 
rights monarchs, political thinkers such as Locke, Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Burlamaqui, Vattel, and Rutherford developed the idea of a system of 
natural rights that would define and limit government power.26  The 
fundamental and powerful idea was that people could formulate a set 
of basic principles that would serve to regulate and control ordinary 
politics and, so, legitimate and limit the exercise of coercive govern-
ment power.  In colonial America, these ideas were given concrete in-
stantiation with the writing of corporate charters creating the various 
 
26  See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:  Fundamental Law in American 
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 860–65 (1978). 
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colonies27—charters that eventually morphed into state constitu-
tions.28 
It was natural that when tensions emerged between colonial 
America and England, Americans expressed their dissatisfaction in 
constitutional terms.  Although they did not rely on a written consti-
tution, they insisted that the “rights of Englishmen” trumped ordi-
nary positive law and that neither Parliament nor the King had un-
limited power over them.29  Even before independence was achieved, 
the first impulse of the colonial states was to reduce to writing their 
understandings of how government would function.  The result was 
the Articles of Confederation.  Around the same time, there was a 
flurry of constitution writing at the state level. 
1.  Hobbes 
At the very moment when constitutional creativity was in full 
bloom, though, various strands of skepticism emerged, each of which 
finds voice even today.  Much of the skepticism has its roots in social 
contract theory itself.  At least conventionally, the theory begins with 
Thomas Hobbes’ famous description of an anarchic and brutal state 
of nature.30  In the Hobbesian tradition, even the strong have an in-
terest in coming to an agreement on a government that would con-
trol otherwise unconstrained violence.31  But, importantly, Hobbes 
 
27  See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL 
CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004). 
28  For a discussion, see LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 50–55 (2004).  For a brief history of the devel-
opment of state constitutions, see George W. Carey & James McClellan, Editors’ Introduc-
tion, in THE FEDERALIST xxiii-xxxi (George W. Carey &  James McClellan eds., Gideon ed. 
2001). 
29  See generally Grey, supra note 26, at 844, 849–56 (discussing the Aristotelian and English 
conceptions of fundamental law and how such conceptions were wrought in American 
constitutional discussion). 
30  In a well-known passage, Hobbes wrote that in a state of nature 
there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain:  and conse-
quently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving 
and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of 
the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst 
of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 
  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN:  OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH 
ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962). 
31  See Murray Forsyth, Hobbes’s Contractarianism:  A Comparative Analysis, in THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS 39 (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds., 1994) (stating 
that in Hobbes’s theory, the state is necessary to meet people’s practical earthly needs). 
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did not believe that the social contract provided many important lim-
its on government power.  On the contrary, he thought that a gov-
ernment powerful enough to constrain violence would have to be 
powerful enough to control the lives of its citizens.32  On the Hobbes-
ian account, the trade was worth it so as to avoid the nightmare of 
universal depredation. 
The Hobbesian account supports a familiar argument in favor of 
constitutionalism.  If the Constitution is treated as an instantiation of 
the social contract, then the commonly expressed fear that society 
would devolve into chaos if constitutional obligation eroded has clear 
Hobbesian roots.  But Hobbes’s analysis also undermines a key part 
of the standard story.  An essential element of the ideology of consti-
tutionalism is that constitutions constrain government power and, so, 
prevent not only chaos, but also tyranny.33  Hobbes forces us to ask 
skeptical questions about whether and how constitutions can serve 
this function.  How, exactly, will words on a piece of paper stop self-
interested rulers vested with the power necessary to prevent a war of 
all against all from turning into tyrants? 
This worry runs throughout the skeptical tradition, finding ex-
pression, for example, in Madison’s34 and Hamilton’s35 belittling of 
“parchment barriers,” in Holmes’s insistence that judges should not 
try to use the Constitution to obstruct “the natural outcome of a dom-
inant opinion,”36 in Learned Hand’s warning that the Constitution 
could not be expected to safeguard liberty,37 and in the work of mod-
ern scholars like Daryl Levinson,38 who doubt that respect for consti-
tutional law meaningfully constrains government actors, and Adrian 
 
32  See id. at 41 (noting that Hobbes’s state is granted full autonomy); Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-
Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1504 (1985) (asserting 
that although rulers would use their power for selfish purposes, “life with the Leviathan 
would [still] be better than life without it”). 
33  See, e.g., Gordon J. Schochet, Introduction:  Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and the Study of Poli-
tics, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) (stat-
ing that the fundamental principle uniting all theories of constitutionalism is that “gov-
ernments exist only to serve specified ends and  properly function only according to 
specified rules”). 
34  See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 256 (James Madison), in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 
28(arguing against trust in “parchment barriers”). 
35  See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 
28 (asserting “the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation”). 
36  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
37  LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY:  PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
LEARNED HAND 190 (3d ed. 1960) (“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it 
dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it . . . .”). 
38  See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics:  The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
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Vermeule,39 who explore the “second best” constitutionalism that ac-
tors must adopt when other actors fail to follow constitutional norms. 
2. Locke 
John Locke’s version of social contract theory was more optimis-
tic.  For Locke, people in a state of nature live in freedom and inde-
pendence40 and resolve their disputes by resort to reason.41  However, 
the obligation we owe to God, to each other, and to ourselves to pre-
serve mankind cannot be fully met in the absence of civil authority.  
When individuals join society, they consent to give up some of their 
rights so as to ensure meaningful enforcement of other rights.42 
Unlike the Hobbesian account, the Lockean social contract has 
strong limits.  Whereas Hobbes saw government as no more than a 
means of establishing earthly peace, for Locke it was superimposed 
on the kingdom of God that already existed in the state of nature.  
Whereas Hobbes therefore treated the political order as essentially 
omnipotent, Locke thought that government power was conditional.  
It is premised on the continuing consent of the governed,43 and when 
the state no longer protects the rights it was intended to preserve, the 
consent is vitiated.44  When governments violate those rights, its citi-
zens have the right to take up arms.45 
There can be no doubt that Locke’s constitutional contractualism 
influenced the framing of the American constitution, but the impli-
cations it held for future constitutional obligation are more ambigu-
ous.  Locke himself was doubtful that law could or should entirely 
constrain executive power.  He recognized an executive prerogative 
to act in violation of the law when necessary to deal with unanticipat-
 
39  See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword:  System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7, 
17–23 (2009). 
40  See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 122 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (in the 
state of nature, all men are in “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dis-
pose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of na-
ture, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man”). 
41  See id. at 125 (stating that reason is the law of nature). 
42  Id. at 163–64. 
43  See id. at 179 (“It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any . . . natural subjection 
that they were born in to one or to the other that tied them without their own consents to 
a subjection to them and their heirs.”). 
44  See id. at 186 (“[T]he power of the society . . . can never be supposed to extend further 
than the common good . . . .”). 
45  See id. at 200 (“[I]n all states and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority is 
to oppose force to it.  The use of force without authority always puts him that uses it into 
a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly.”). 
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ed events or pressing necessities.46  No doubt, he thought that these 
circumstances were exceptional, but this leaves open the famous 
problem of who gets to define the exception and whether, once this 
power of definition is granted, the power can be constrained.47 
The problem is not merely theoretical.  It has taken concrete form 
throughout American history.  As we shall see, many American Presi-
dents have asserted a power to transcend normal constitutional limits 
when there are strong pragmatic reasons to do so.48  Of course, these 
Presidents often (but importantly not always) attempted to reconcile 
these powers with the Constitution by reading emergency powers into 
the document.  But this reconciliation comes with a necessary price:  
It weakens the claim that constitutions meaningfully constrain execu-
tive discretion and so feeds back into Hobbesian skepticism. 
Even putting aside the problem of the executive prerogative, 
Locke’s theory has the potential to destabilize existing constitutions.  
Because the theory rests on a consent that could always be withdrawn 
and on the potential gap between government that actually exists and 
the ends of God,49 it provides more obvious support for revolution 
than for constitutional obedience.50  It is therefore no surprise that 
Locke is more extensively paraphrased in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence than in the Constitution. 
Moreover, the most obvious connection between Lockean theory 
and the Constitution’s framing history actually undermines constitu-
tional obligation.  At the beginning of the Philadelphia convention, 
the Framers were faced with the embarrassment that the congres-
sional resolution authorizing the proceedings had permitted them to 
meet for “the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of 
Confederation.”51  Worse yet, the Articles themselves required that 
 
46  See id. at 200–01 (“Constant, frequent meetings of the legislative . . . could not but be 
burdensome . . . .  What then could be done in this case to prevent the community from 
being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard . . . ? . . . [I]t naturally fell into the 
hands of the executive . . . as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might re-
quire.”). 
47  The seminal work is CARL SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP (Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward 
trans., English ed. 2014). 
48  See infra text accompanying notes 170–83, 241–72, 323–40. 
49  See LOCKE, supra note 40, at 305 (“The rules that [legislators] make for other men’s ac-
tions must . . . conform[] to the law of nature─i.e., to the will of God, of which that is a 
declaration─and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no 
human sanction can be good or valid against it.”). 
50  See supra note 45. 
51  See I JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 155 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES]. 
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amendments be adopted unanimously by all thirteen state legisla-
tures.52  Nonetheless, in the earliest days of the convention, the Fram-
ers determined to scrap the Articles entirely.  By the end of the con-
vention, they had decided that the new constitution would be 
deemed ratified when adopted by state conventions (not state legisla-
tures) in only nine of the thirteen states. 
The Framers’ justification for this blatant constitutional violation 
was drawn directly from Locke.53  For example, at the convention, 
Roger Sherman objected to the proposed form of ratification on the 
ground that “the Articles of Confederation [provided] for changes 
and alternations with the assent of [Congress] and the ratification of 
State Legislatures.”54  George Mason responded that constitutions are 
derived from the people and that “this doctrine should be cherished 
as the basis of free Government.”55  James Wilson later made a similar 
point when defending the Constitution before the Pennsylvania rati-
fying convention:  Because government rests on popular consent, 
“[t]he people have a right . . . to form . . . a general govern-
ment. . . This is the broad base on which our independence was 
placed -- on the same certain and solid foundation [the new constitu-
tion] is erected.”56 
It is dangerous for defenders of constitutional obligation to traffic 
in this argument.  Two destabilizing possibilities are immediately ap-
parent.  First, whereas the Hobbesian social contract was justified 
solely on the ground that it avoided chaos, the Lockean contract was 
meant to protect other goods.  It follows from this Lockean premise 
that preservation of social order alone might be insufficient to justify 
constitutional obedience.  There might be a gap between any particu-
lar constitution and the aims that legitimate it, and this gap might 
warrant departure from constitutional obligation.  Thus, because the 
Articles of Confederation were no longer serving the ends they were 
written to achieve, the Framers felt justified in ignoring them.57  But 
 
52  See supra note 5. 
53  The justification overlaps with the argument for an unconstrained “constituent power” 
associated with thought that developed during the French Revolution.  For a discussion, 
see Mark Tushnet, Constitution-Making:  An Introduction, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1983, 1985–91 
(2013). 
54  I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 122 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
55  II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 54, at 88. 
56  III DEBATES, supra note 51, at 426–27. 
57  In essence, this is the argument that Madison made in Federalist 43 when he responded 
to the complaint that the Articles of Confederation, “the solemn form of a compact 
among the states,” was being superceded without the unanimous consent of the parties to 
it.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 229 (James Madison), in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28.  
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the very argument the Framers used to support their new constitution 
might also be advanced to defy it,58 as indeed both southern seces-
sionists and northern abolitionists did during the run up to the Civil 
War.59 
Second, arguments from popular consent raise difficulties about 
how the consent is manifested and how we know when it is with-
drawn.  If the actual American Constitution is conceptualized as the 
social contract, then there are obvious problems with its democratic 
pedigree.  No women or people of color and few people without 
property voted for it.60  And the problem runs deeper than this.  Da-
vid Hume, Locke’s contemporary who probably influenced the 
Framers more than Locke himself, rejected social contract theory in 
part on the ground that even a contract consented to by contempo-
raries could not bind future generations.61 
On one interpretation, Locke’s social contract was an actual his-
torical agreement that brought governments into being.  Hume was 
almost certainly right in rejecting this version of the theory, not just 
because of the inter-generational problem, but also because it is an 
inaccurate account of how governments actually arise.62  Locke’s posi-
 
The . . . question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the 
case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature 
and of nature’s God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society, are 
the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institu-
tions must be sacrificed. 
  Id. 
58  As one opponent of the new Constitution argued, “the same reasons which you now urge 
for destroying our present federal government, may be urged for abolishing the system which 
you now propose to adopt.”  HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 
7–8 (1981). 
59  See infra  text accompanying notes 198–226. 
60  See supra note 3. 
61  See DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in DAVID HUME’S POLITICAL ESSAYS 47 (Charles 
W. Hendel ed., 1953) (“[B]eing so ancient and being obliterated by a thousand changes 
of government and princes, it cannot now be supposed [that the original contract re-
tains] any authority. . . [B]esides that this supposes the consent of the fathers to bind the 
children, even to the most remote generations—which republican writers will never al-
low— . . . it is not justified by history or experience in any age or country of the world.”). 
62  Hume is not unambiguous on this score.  At one point, he writes that 
[i]t is probable that the first ascendant of one man over multitudes began during 
a state of war, where the superiority of courage and of genius discovers itself most 
visibly. . . The long continuance of that state, an incident common among savage 
tribes, inured the people to submission; and if the chieftain possessed as much 
equity as prudence and valor, he became, even during peace, the arbiter of all 
differences and could gradually, by a mixture of force and consent, establish his 
authority. 
  HUME, On the Origin of Government, in DAVID HUME’S POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 61, at 
41.  But in another essay, he writes that 
 
Oct. 2014] AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SKEPTICISM 15 
 
tion might be rescued from Humean skepticism if the contract is 
conceptualized instead as a thought experiment.  Perhaps the con-
tract is what reasonable people would agree to in a state of nature.  
But this merely hypothetical consent hardly constitutes the sort of ro-
bust justification provided by actual consent from “We the People.”63  
Moreover, this version of the theory again opens up the possibility of 
a dangerous gap between a hypothetical social contract and any actu-
al, real-world constitution.  If it is the hypothetical contract that pro-
vides legitimacy, then any real constitution that departs from this 
contract is illegitimate.  And matters are made only worse by the fact 
that in a diverse society, even people who believe in social contract 
theory are bound to disagree among themselves about what terms 
must be included in the contract. 
3. The Contestable Constitution 
These difficulties in grounding contemporary ideas about consti-
tutionalism in Locke go some way toward explaining what otherwise 
seems paradoxical about how eighteenth century Americans thought 
about constitutional law.  On the one hand, they took constitutional-
ism and constitutional violation seriously.  Rhetoric of the period is 
full of constitutional claims and assertions of constitutional rights.64  
Yet on the other hand, Americans seemed quite content with a system 
that lacked a clear means of constitutional enforcement or authorita-
tive resolution of constitutional controversy.  As Larry Kramer sum-
marizes the prevailing zeitgeist: 
[The] constitutional system . . . was self-consciously legal in nature, but in 
a manner foreign to modern sensibilities about the makeup of legality. . . 
Eighteenth-century constitutionalism was less concerned with quick, clear 
resolutions.  Its notion of legality was less rigid and more diffuse—more 
willing to tolerate ongoing controversy over competing plausible inter-
 
When we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in 
their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education, we must necessarily al-
low that nothing but their own consent could at first associate them together and sub-
ject them to any authority. . . If this, then, be meant by the original contract, it cannot 
be denied that all government is, at first, founded on a contract and that the most 
ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that principle. 
  HUME, Of the Original Contract, supra note 61, at 44–45 (emphasis in original). 
63  For a detailed argument along these lines, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 11–30 (2004). 
64  See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 
259–62 (1969). 
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pretations of the constitution, more willing to ascribe authority to an idea 
as unfocused as “the people.65 
No American thinker better embodied this conception of consti-
tutionalism than Thomas Paine.  Paine famously claimed that “In 
America, THE LAW IS KING,”66 and there can be no doubt that he 
thought that the Constitution was the law.67  Yet Paine also believed in 
unfettered representative democracy.  He followed Hume68 and fore-
shadowed Jefferson69 in insisting on the fundamental illegitimacy of 
one generation binding another.70  How can these positions be rec-
onciled? 
Paine’s work is maddeningly vague,71 but on at least one under-
standing, it takes the destabilizing potential of Lockean theory very 
seriously.  On this view, the Constitution is indeed law, but it main-
tains that status only so long as it has the active consent of the people.  
This means that the Constitution is always revisable and subject to 
continual contestation.  Ultimately, it is the guardian of, rather than 
the enemy of, full-throated representative democracy. 
This is constitutionalism of a sort, but it is a constitutionalism at 
war with the standard story as we have come to understand it.  Paine’s 
constitution provided neither settlement nor hierarchical ordering.  
It was a site for contestation and civic engagement, not a means of 
permanently resolving disputes and defusing destabilizing controver-
sy. 
As foreign as it may seem to us today, this view of constitutional-
ism seems to have been quite common in the late eighteenth century.  
For example, it was a “common assumption” that state constitutions 
 
65  KRAMER, supra note 27, at 31. 
66  THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in PAINE:  COLLECTED WRITINGS 34 (Eric Foner ed., 1995). 
67  See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man:  Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French 
Revolution, 1791, in PAINE:  COLLECTED WRITINGS, supra note 66, at 468, 574; Robin West, 
Tom Paine’s Constitution, 89 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2003) (noting that Paine “repeatedly 
characterized the Constitution as ‘law’”). 
68  See supra note 61. 
69  See supra note 19; see infra text accompanying notes 147–52. 
70  See, e.g., PAINE, Common Sense, supra note 66, at 438–39, 594–95.  As Robin West character-
izes his position, 
Paine’s faith in unfettered representative democracy was . . . robust and uncom-
promising; he believed fervently that we, meaning each generation, should be 
ruled by our own representatives, rather than by our ancestors.  He despised the 
idea of rule of the living by the dead as much as he despised monarchy . . . . 
  West, supra note 67, at 1415. 
71  For a description of a seeming contradiction in his work and an argument that resolves it, 
see id. at 1418. 
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could be drafted and amended by ordinary legislative means,72 and 
some leading authorities believed that they could be repealed by stat-
ute.73  Constitutional enforcement was not the job of politicians or 
judges, but of the people themselves.  Popular enforcement, in turn, 
was facilitated by the very short terms of office for legislatures, narrow 
jurisdiction for courts, and truncated powers for executives.74 
Eighteenth century Americans were able to conceptualize consti-
tutionalism in this way because they lived in an era of constitutional 
creation, rather than constitutional obedience.  The act of creating a 
constitution is exhilarating and liberating.  It is an assertion of gener-
ational autonomy.  As John Adams observed, 
How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making 
an election of government, more than of air, soil, or climate, for them-
selves or their children!  When, before the present epocha, had three 
millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish 
the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive.75 
So long as Americans were creating constitutions for themselves, 
there was no contradiction between constitutionalism on the one 
hand and popular sovereignty on the other.  But a problem arises 
when, as Adams mentions, constitutional creators began writing not 
just for themselves but also for their children.  When constitutional 
aspirations have congealed into a text and been immunized from easy 
revision, the struggle for generational autonomy begins to seem like a 
zero-sum game.  Autonomy for one generation is gained at the ex-
pense of subservience of another, and constitutionalism becomes an 
exercise in domination as well as liberation.  The efforts by the 
founding generation to deal with this problem gave to rise to a new 
justificatory story, as well as new varieties of skepticism. 
B.  Skepticism at the Founding 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, American constitution-
alism was founded on a contradiction.  Late eighteenth century 
America was a revolutionary state.  When the Framers met in Phila-
delphia, memories of the uprising against British rule were still fresh.  
Importantly, and despite the colonists’ assertion of the “rights of Eng-
 
72  See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 97 (1996).  See also KRAMER, supra note 28, at 57. 
73  Both Jefferson and John Adams apparently took this view.  See KRAMER, supra note 28, at 
57. 
74  See, e.g., Id. at 59. 
75  John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in I AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE 
FOUNDING ERA 1760–1805, at 408–09 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
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lishmen,” that uprising was illegal under then-existing law.  It there-
fore had to be justified by theories that rejected the binding force of 
that law—theories like the one outlined in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.76  These theories did not magically disappear with the vic-
tory at Yorktown.  A generation formed by rebellion against British 
authority was not about to accept meekly the claims of new rulers.  
Hence, the free-form, populist, nonauthoritarian constitutionalism 
that dominated America’s early years. 
But the country needed stability to grow and thrive.  It therefore 
could not avoid the dilemma faced by all revolutionary states:  How 
does one establish that the revolution is over?  How can law and or-
der be reestablished once it has been disrupted?77  Ruling elites 
somehow had to make clear that rebellion against the British was one 
thing, but rebellion against the new status quo—Shays’ Rebellion, for 
example—was another thing altogether.  The country had to find a 
way to suppress, compartmentalize, or rationalize the illegality of its 
own birth in order to establish the new legality. 
On conventional accounts, the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution resolved this contradiction.  Popular ratification put an 
end to the fluidity and destabilization of revolutionary constitutional-
ism and legitimated rigid rules that established fixed boundaries be-
tween different branches, governments, and spheres.  Writing within 
a decade of ratification, Justice James Iredell explained how text con-
gealed the law and put an end to disputation: 
It has been the policy of all the American states, . . . and of the people of 
the United States, . . . to define with precision the objects of the legisla-
tive power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled bound-
aries.  If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those 
constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void. . . If, on the other 
hand, the Legislature of the Union or the Legislature of any member of 
the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitu-
tional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because 
it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice.78 
No doubt, some of the Constitution’s framers hoped that constitu-
tional text would produce this sort of certainty and stabilization.  
Their success in accomplishing this goal is less clear.  In fact, the ef-
fort to fix constitutional discourse had something like the opposite 
effect.  For all its imprecision and destabilizing potential, pre-
 
76  See supra note 64. 
77  For a general discussion of the problem, see Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:  Dis-
covering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1019–20 (1984). 
78  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). 
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ratification constitutionalism reconciled the demands of popular sov-
ereignty and constitutional law.  When the Constitution was stabilized 
by a legal text and immunized from easy revision, this reconciliation 
unraveled.  The result was the emergence of a variety of worries, cri-
tiques, and contradictions that remain with us today.  This Section 
examines the way in which these problems influenced the debate 
over ratification, the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and the thought 
of Thomas Jefferson. 
1. The Anti-federalists   
The Anti-federalist campaign was the most sustained and 
unambiguous attack on the American Constitution in our history.  As 
the political scientist Herbert Storing meticulously demonstrated,79 it 
was also one of the great lost causes in American history.  Leaders of 
the campaign created a huge volume of argument and theory, some 
of which deserves to be ranked among the classics of political 
thought.80  And the campaign almost succeeded.81 
It is no surprise, then, that the Anti-federalist campaign produced 
a treasure trove of argument against the Constitution—argument that 
still resonates some two centuries later.  The Anti-federalist distrust of 
the federal power, celebration of localism and decentralization, worry 
about militarization and high taxes, and fear of a remote political 
class82 all play an important role in modern American politics.83 
But although Anti-federalist writing provides a sustained critique 
of the Constitution, most of it was not explicitly directed against con-
stitutional obligation per se.  If anything, Anti-federalists complained 
that the Constitution was insufficiently binding—that its vague and 
sweeping language constituted an open invitation to the federal gov-
ernment to seize vast swaths of power.84  Ironically, though, if one 
looks carefully beneath the surface, these complaints not only un-
dermine the particular constitution written in Philadelphia but also 
 
79  See generally STORING, supra note 58. 
80  It is collected in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
81  See MAIER, supra note 2, at 115–16 (2010) (recounting a contemporary view that ratifica-
tion was “a lost cause”). 
82  See, e.g., STORING, supra note 58, at 15–23 (localism); MAIER, supra note 2, at 110, 425 
(taxes); id. at 264–65 (representation); id. at 245 (standing armies). 
83  See STORING, supra note 58, at 3 (“The political life of the community continues to be a 
dialogue, in which the Anti-Federalist concerns and principles still play an important 
part.”). 
84  See, e.g., MAIER, supra note 2, at 81 (noting the objection that constitutional grants of 
power to Congress were “so open-ended that it was meaningless to say its powers were 
carefully defined and limited”). 
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raise important skeptical questions about the constitutional enter-
prise itself. 
First, Anti-federalists complained repeatedly and vociferously 
about the problem of constitutional origin.85  As discussed above, the 
constitutional convention ignored the legal requirements imposed by 
the Articles of Confederation.86  The problems of fairness and legality 
grew only more serious as the ratification process proceeded.  Indi-
vidual state conventions were marred by serious irregularities, efforts 
to short-circuit or terminate debate and deliberation, and, in a few 
cases, violent intimidation.  After a critical mass of states had voted to 
ratify the Constitution, the holdouts were threatened with economic 
retaliation and collapse if they did not go along.87 
Of course, the Constitution’s opponents focused on the particular 
problems with the measure they opposed, but the origins problem 
they identified is generalizable.  All constitutions break with the legal 
past, and all of them therefore raise questions about their own legal 
legitimacy.88  In our own case, throughout American history, the orig-
inal sin of the Framers has destabilized the myth of immaculate con-
ception.  As Bruce Ackerman has forcefully argued, there is no rea-
son to suppose that only one generation had the wisdom and 
intelligence to engage in the task of constitutional invention.89  The 
ratification process therefore raised deeply destabilizing questions 
about whether we should emulate the Framers’ own example of diso-
bedience to others, or slavishly follow their hypocritical insistence on 
obedience to them. 
The substantive complaints of the Anti-federalists feed a second, 
more general constitutional skepticism.  It is a mistake, made too of-
ten in modern scholarship, to reduce the fight over the Constitution 
to a simple ideological clash.  There were many cross-cutting inter-
ests—some of them quite narrow and ugly—that influenced the posi-
tions people on both sides took on ratification.  Still, the most basic 
objection to the new Constitution—that it expanded federal power at 
the expense of local politics—had a clear ideological valence. 
 
85  See STORING, supra note 58, at 7 (noting that the Anti-Federalists “often objected even to 
entering into debate on the Constitution because of legal irregularities in the Proceed-
ings of the Philadelphia Convention”). 
86  See supra note 5. 
87  See supra notes 6–9. 
88  For a subtle discussion of this point, see Frank I. Michelman, Always Under Law?, 12 
CONST. COMM. 227 (1995). 
89  See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering the Constitution, supra note 77, at 1039 (cele-
brating occasions when the American people “after sustained debate and strug-
gle…hammer out new principles to guide public life”). 
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In the late eighteenth century, American government was re-
markably responsive to the views of the electorate.  The federal gov-
ernment was very weak, and most power was exercised on the state 
level.  State legislators, in turn, served very short terms, and, by mod-
ern standards, executives and courts were relatively powerless.90    
These arrangements were justified by belief in republican governance 
and the sort of free-form constitutionalism described above.  On this 
view, politics was something more than a spectator sport.  Direct and 
regular involvement in the institutions of government built civic vir-
tue and contributed to the good life.91 
There can be no doubt that one of the aims of the Constitutional 
Convention was to change this state of affairs.  On the specific level, 
the Constitution’s framers and supporters were deeply frightened by 
the threats to property and contract posed by state governments.  On 
the more general level, they disparaged direct popular rule and be-
lieved that democracy led inevitably to faction and denial of minority 
rights.92 
In one sense, this argument was not so much about constitutional-
ism as about the kind of constitution the United States should have.  
As noted above, most Anti-federalists did not think of themselves as 
opposed to constitutional governance.  They opposed only the Phila-
delphia Constitution precisely because it provided insufficient consti-
tutional guarantees for local, popular democracy. 
But in a paradoxical and deeper sense, the Anti-federalist critique 
of the Philadelphia Constitution meshed seamlessly with a complaint 
about constitutionalism in general.  Because all formal and written 
constitutions channel politics and constrain the range of possible 
outcomes, they are all enemies of the sort of freeform, participatory 
democracy that some Anti-federalists favored.  If one truly believes in 
republican deliberation—in the ability of the people to transcend 
their differences and engage in self-rule—then fixed constitutional 
commands that predetermine outcomes and control politics are an 
evil. 
It is no accident, then, that the Constitution’s defenders doubted 
the ability of average citizens to engage in direct deliberation and 
 
90  See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 
139–43(1969) [hereinafter WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC]; GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 187–89 (1991) [hereinafter 
WOOD, RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION]. 
91  See WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 90, at 53–70. 
92  The classic statement of this position is in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43 (James Madison), 
in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28. 
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that its opponents feared that its ratification would presage a return 
to aristocratic governance.  Nor is it a coincidence that James Madi-
son, the Constitution’s principal author, opposed easy constitutional 
revision and thought that constitutional creation should be limited to 
“great and extraordinary occasions,”93 while Thomas Jefferson, a sup-
porter of the Constitution who was nonetheless much more sympa-
thetic to Anti-federalist thought, believed that constitutions should 
last for only a generation.94 
Finally, Anti-federalist opposition inevitably raised vexing ques-
tions about constitutional authority.  If, as the Anti-federalists insist-
ed, the new Constitution was not only illegal but also substantively 
evil, why should anyone feel obligated to obey its commands?  Put dif-
ferently, if there is a gap between the Constitution and the demands 
of substantive justice, why should we give precedence to the Constitu-
tion?  Remarkably, this question seems to have remained mostly un-
asked in the period immediately following ratification.95  As we shall 
see, however, the question reemerged with a vengeance as various 
factions seized upon the Constitution to advance arguments and 
causes strongly opposed by others. 
2. The Federalists   
The Federalists supported the new Constitution and, of course, by 
extension, constitutionalism as well.  Their writing therefore seems 
an unlikely place to look for constitutional skepticism, and indeed 
the tracts they produced contained detailed defenses of the new 
Constitution.  Once again, though, another, competing story emerges 
if one looks beneath the surface.  For example, on careful reading, 
the Federalist Papers, doubtless the most sophisticated defense of the 
Constitution, contain important seeds of constitutional doubt. 
This doubt finds its clearest expression in Madison’s and Hamil-
ton’s dismissal of what they called “parchment barriers.”96  Hamilton 
justified the refusal of the Framers to provide for a bill of rights par-
tially on the ground that mere textual guarantees were worthless.97  In 
 
93  THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 261 (James Madison), in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28. 
94  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 19. 
95  See supra notes 12–14. 
96  See supra notes 34–35. 
97  Hamilton made the point with reference to the failure of the Constitution to protect lib-
erty of the press: 
What is the liberty of the press?  Who can give it any definition which would not 
leave the utmost latitude for evasion?  I hold it to be impracticable; and from this 
I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any consti-
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a letter to Jefferson during the ratification struggle, Madison seemed 
to agree.  Experience with state constitutions demonstrated that “re-
peated violations of these parchment barriers have been committed 
by overbearing majorities.”98 
In the Federalist Papers, Madison extended this argument and 
made it central to his defense of the Constitution more generally.  
Because men were not angels, he insisted, they were unlikely to re-
spect limits on their power simply because of legal commands.  In-
stead, these limits had to be bolstered by self-interest.  This could be 
achieved, Madison insisted, by setting ambition against ambition and 
building conflict between self-interested actors into the structure of 
government.99 
This classic argument in favor of the American Constitution also 
serves as the starting point for a skeptical critique.  The argument 
suggests that constitutions are either ineffective or unnecessary.  Gov-
ernment officials who are public spirited enough to obey constitu-
tional commands will also be public spirited enough not to use their 
power to oppress others.  In a world where men are angels, constitu-
tions are unnecessary.  The source of concern is about government 
officials who are not angels and who will be tempted to misuse their 
power.  But officials of this sort will also be tempted to disobey consti-
tutional commands.  They will not be restrained by mere “parchment 
barriers,” and, so, for them, the constitution will be ineffective.100 
In Federalist 78, Hamilton argued that this problem might be 
remedied by an independent judiciary with authority to invalidate 
unconstitutional acts.101  The argument is the source of an enduring 
puzzle.  The judiciary had to be independent, Hamilton argued, if it 
was to resist pressure from the other branches of government and 
from the public to trample on constitutional rights.102  But unless we 
are to suppose that judges are angels, this very independence meant 
that these judges would be free to defy rather than enforce the Con-
stitution.  As an anonymous Anti-federalist using the pseudonym Bru-
 
tution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the gen-
eral spirit of the people and of the government.  And here, after all, as intimated 
upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights. 
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28. 
98  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 295, 297 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1977). 
99  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 267–72 (James Madison), in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28. 
100  See generally Levinson, supra note 38. 
101  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 401–08 (Alexander Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST, supra 
note 28. 
102  Id. at 403. 
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tus wrote, a powerful judiciary lodged power “in the hands of men 
independent of the people, and of their representatives, . . . [with] 
no way . . . left to controul them but with a high hand and an out-
stretched arm.”103 
Hamilton’s response to this worry was to point out that a judiciary 
with “no influence over either the sword or the purse” and possessed 
of “neither FORCE nor WILL,” was “the least dangerous” branch.104  
But at best this observation demonstrates only that judges acting 
alone would not themselves threaten liberty.  It does not explain why 
they might not form a coalition with another branch to do so, how 
they could enforce the Constitution when they had neither force nor 
will, or what motive they would have to attempt such enforcement. 
Madison’s effort to deal with the problem of enforcement was at 
once more sophisticated and more skeptical.105  Instead of trusting 
any particular institution or group of people to act in a public-
spirited fashion, he argued for structural protections.  The Constitu-
tion’s byzantine system of overlapping and conflicting powers provid-
ed built-in mechanisms to discipline official misconduct.  On his view, 
officials responsible to different constituencies and elected at differ-
ent times will have different interests.  These interests will inevitably 
conflict with each other and provide an incentive for different 
branches of government to check each other.  In this fashion, “the 
private interest of every individual [would] be a centinel over the 
public rights”106 and the Constitution would become self-enforcing. 
Madison’s theory has been strongly criticized on a variety of 
grounds, but for our purposes, the important point is that it is in se-
rious tension with the usual arguments for constitutionalism.  First, 
notice that the theory says nothing about direct constitutional protec-
tion for individual rights, about judicial review, or about the en-
forcement of the legal minutiae contained in all constitutions.  Madi-
son’s point is that the broad structures of the American Constitution 
will protect public rights, not that enforcement of specific commands 
 
103  II THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 80, at 442 (emphasis in original).  See gen-
erally Shlomo Slonim, Federalist No. 78 and Brutus’ Neglected Thesis on Judicial Supremacy, 23 
CONST. COMM. 7 (2006). 
104  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28. 
105  Madison might be read as rejecting an independent judiciary as a solution to the problem 
when he writes that “creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that 
is, of the society itself . . . is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the 
society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the 
minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 
(James Madison), supra note 99, at 270. 
106  Id. at 269. 
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is either possible or necessary.  Put differently, his argument has 
nothing to do with, for example, the constitutionalization of issues 
about affirmative action, gay rights, abortion, or racial discrimination.  
Nor does it speak to enforcement of specific constitutional com-
mands about questions like when the President’s term of office be-
gins or what the line of succession should be in the case of presiden-
tial death or incapacity.  In short, it has nothing to do with the prin-
principal role that the Constitution plays in contemporary American 
life. 
Of course, modern constitutional issues occasionally arise about 
the general structure of government.  But here, too, Madison’s ar-
gument is at best ambivalent about the role of constitutional text.  A 
common modern argument for constitutional obedience rests on the 
value of stability and predictability.107  But Madison argued for a fluid, 
ill-defined government structure that would invite contestation be-
tween the branches and, so, counteract ambition with ambition.108 
Finally, Madison never successfully resolved the “parchment barri-
ers” problem.  This phrase first appears in Federalist 48, which starts 
with the observation that “powers properly belonging to one of the 
departments, ought not be directly and completely administered by 
either of the other departments.”109  Madison then turns to the ques-
tion of how to enforce this requirement.  Recall that James Iredell, 
reflecting the standard defense of constitutionalism a decade later, 
claimed that the Constitution “define[d] with precision the objects of 
the legislative power, and [restrained] its exercise within marked and 
settled boundaries.”110  Remarkably, Madison used almost identical 
language to reject this ambition.  “Will it be sufficient to mark, with 
precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of 
the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the 
encroaching spirit of power?”111  he asked.  His response was a re-
sounding “no.”  “This is the security which appears to have been 
principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American consti-
tutions.  But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision 
has been greatly overrated.”112 
 
107  See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). 
108  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 99, at 268. 
109  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 256 (James Madison), in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28. 
110  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). 
111  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 109, at 256. 
112  Id. 
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Madison then proceeded to provide numerous contemporary ex-
amples of the failure of constitutional law to constrain the evils he 
identifies.  The next several Papers address other inadequate mecha-
nisms of enforcement, including constitutional amendment and 
popular democracy.113  Finally, in Federalist 51, he asked the question 
again and purported to provide an answer: 
To what expedient then shall we finally resort, for maintaining in prac-
tice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as 
laid down in the constitution?  The only answer that can be given is, that 
as all the exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must 
be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as 
that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the 
means of keeping each other in their proper places.114 
This “answer” is more than a little puzzling.  Madison started out 
by saying that the new government with its structure of overlapping 
powers will protect liberty and the public interest.  He recognized 
that these good outcomes were dependent upon this structure re-
maining intact and asked how the structural rules could be enforced.  
But his answer leads to a circle:  The structural provisions, he says, 
will be enforced by the structural provisions. 
The failure of this answer, offered by the most sophisticated con-
stitutional thinker of his generation, is itself evidence in favor of con-
stitutional skepticism.  It points to the unavoidable fact that ultimate-
ly constitutional limits depend for their efficacy on the willingness of 
powerful, self-interested actors to exercise restraint.  The doubt that 
they will do so remains with us still. 
But even if we focus on the parts of Madison’s argument that were 
more successful, his writings provide powerful arguments against 
conventional constitutionalism.  It is worth emphasizing that Madison 
was deeply skeptical of text as a source of constraint, believed in fos-
tering conflicts between the branches of government rather than us-
ing the Constitution to demarcate clear limits, and, at least at the 
time of the framing, thought that direct constitutional protection for 
civil liberties was unnecessary and unwise.115 
Some historians have overestimated the influence of the Federalist 
Papers on contemporary debate.  There is no reason to believe that 
they reflected views of most Americans or even of most of the Consti-
 
113  See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 48–50 (James Madison). 
114  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 99, at 267. 
115  See supra text accompanying notes 96–100. 
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tution’s drafters.116  Madison and his co-authors are more important 
because of how they are viewed today than because of their influence 
at the time of the framing.  For better or worse, the Federalist Papers 
have become a central part of our constitutional narrative.  For pur-
poses of this project, it matters that they are part of our counter-
narrative as well. 
3. The Bill of Rights   
On conventional accounts, the most important, defining attribute 
of American constitutionalism is the textual protection and judicial 
enforcement of individual rights.  According to these accounts, the 
American Bill of Rights is widely admired and copied throughout the 
world and symbolizes limited government and individual freedom.  It 
is central to the story that constitutionalists tell about the American 
experiment. 
There are many reasons to doubt these accounts.  In fact, many 
modern constitutions depart substantially from the American Bill of 
Rights model, in particular by providing for positive as well as nega-
tive rights.117  Moreover, many contemporary constitutional scholars 
have shown that judicial enforcement of Bill of Rights protections did 
little to preserve civil liberties when they were challenged in times of 
crisis.118  It has been less widely noted, however, that the writing and 
adoption of the Bill of Rights also support a more skeptical account 
of our constitutional history. 
As already noted, the original Constitution contained no bill of 
rights and many of the Framers thought that textual protection for 
civil liberties was either unwise or unnecessary, or both.  The people 
who wanted a bill of rights were not the authors of the Constitution, 
 
116  See Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience,  112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 611, 637 (1999) (arguing 
generally that James Madison’s theories were unifluential at the time; because “most lis-
teners,” “when presented with a truly innovative idea, . . . hear only the conventional ar-
guments they expect to hear,” “Madison’s argument, particularly those aspects that are 
important to theorists today, played essentially no role in shaping the Constitution or its 
radification”). 
117  See, e.g.,  David S. Law & Milsa Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitu-
tion, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012); Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the 
Judicial Role:  Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 435 (2002). 
118  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1 (1996); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).  Cf. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1789 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004). 
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but their opponents.119  Moreover, even the opponents tended to fa-
vor a bill of rights that applied only to the federal government.  For 
most Anti-federalists, a bill of rights was a means to limit federal pow-
er and, therefore, to leave the states free to protect or restrict the 
rights as they choose.120  This conception is far removed from the 
modern idea of textual protection for the individual against all of 
government. 
The battle for ratification was closely contested, and some Federal-
ists—most prominently, James Madison—promised promptly to 
amend the Constitution once it had been adopted.121  Historians disa-
gree about whether Madison authentically changed his mind and 
came to favor such amendments or whether his sponsorship of them 
was motivated solely by the political necessity of winning reelection to 
Congress and persuading North Carolina and Rhode Island to join 
the union.122  Whatever his personal motives, though, it is clear that 
the amendments he proposed made no one happy. 
Madison himself apparently doubted the usefulness of a bill of 
rights.  Only months earlier, he had written to Jefferson that “experi-
ence proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when 
its controul is most needed.”123  The Federalists who dominated the 
new Congress were even more skeptical.  Madison was repeatedly 
 
119  See HOLTON, supra note 2, at 253 (“It is a remarkable but rarely noted irony that Ameri-
cans owe their most cherished rights . . . not to the authors of the Constitution but to its 
inveterate enemies.”). 
120  See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission:  The Tenth Amendment, Popular 
Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1915–18 (2008); 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1202 
(1992).  The point is most obvious with regard to the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment which, far from guaranteeing religious freedom, was understood to protect 
state establishments against federal interference.  See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adop-
tion of the Establishment Clause:  The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1085, 1091–92 (1995).  Cf.  Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255 
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
121  See RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 159 
(2006); RUTLAND, supra note 10, at 171–73. 
122  See MAIER, supra note 2, at 446 (quoting Madison’s letter to Jefferson just before the start 
of the first Congress stating that he favored a bill of rights “to extinguish opposition [to 
the Constitution] or at least break the force of it, by detaching the deluded opponents 
from their designing leaders”)  Cf. HOLTON, supra note 2, at 257 (noting that Madison 
“probably could not have been reelected” had he reneged on his promise to introduce a 
bill of rights, but that the energy he “brought to the fight for the Bill of Rights indicated 
that he had developed a deep personal commitment to the cause”). 
123  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), supra note 98.  In the 
letter, Madison claimed that he had “always been in favor of a bill of rights” but had “nev-
er thought the omission a material defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by subse-
quent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
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frustrated in his efforts to get the House of Representatives even to 
consider the amendments.  Members thought that they had more 
important matters to attend to.124  When debate finally started, many 
voiced strong opposition125 and, ultimately, adopted the provisions 
only grudgingly.126 
One might suppose that passage of the provisions therefore 
amounted to a victory for the Anti-federalists.  In fact, though, many 
Anti-federalists felt betrayed by the proposals that Madison advanced 
and that Congress adopted.127  They had hoped that that the Consti-
tution would be revised so as to more clearly limit federal power in 
general.  In particular, they favored provisions that would have lim-
ited federal taxing power, banned a federal standing army, and made 
clear that there were no implied federal powers.  What they got in-
stead was nothing at all with regard to taxes, a pale, indirect, and in-
effective reference to standing armies in the Second and Third 
Amendments, and a plainly inadequate Tenth Amendment that, far 
from limiting implied powers, seemed to invite them.128 
The Tenth Amendment was especially galling.  The analogous 
provision in the Articles of Confederation had limited the federal 
government to powers expressly granted.  Tellingly, Madison’s pro-
posal left out the word “expressly.”  Congressman Thomas Tucker 
tried to remedy this alleged defect by inserting this word,129 but Madi-
son opposed the change on the ground that it was “impossible to 
confine a Government to the exercise of express powers; there must 
necessarily be admitted power by implication.”130  Tucker’s amend-
ment was defeated.131  The upshot was language and legislative history 
that could easily be read to expand rather than restrict federal power. 
 
124  Many federalist congressmen, including Jackson, Sherman, White, Vining, Goodhue, and 
Livermore objected to even discussing a bill of rights until Congress had accomplished 
what they thought of as more important tasks.  See I ANNALS OF CONG. 439–65 (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1834); THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:  PRIMARY SOURCES 446–51 (Bruche Frohnen 
ed., 2002). 
125  For example, James Jackson of Georgia argued that a bill of rights “[i]f not dangerous or 
improper, . . . is at least unnecessary.”  I ANNALS OF CONG. 459–60 (Joseph Gales ed., 
1834).  John Vining of Delaware complained about the “uncertainty with which we must 
decide on questions of amendment, founded merely on speculative theory.”  Id. at 447. 
126  For an account, see MAIER, supra note 2, at 455. 
127  For example, Congressman Burke claimed that rather than “those solid and substantial 
amendments which the people expect,” the proposals were “whip-syllabub,” a dessert that 
was “frothy and full of wind, formed only to please the palate,” or “like a tub thrown out 
to a whale” that sailors used to divert the whale from attacking a ship.  Id. at 452. 
128  For examples of Anti-federalist disappointment, see supra note 11. 
129  I ANNALS OF CONG. 790 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
130  Id. 
131  Id. 
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Thus, neither side attached much significance to the Bill of 
Rights.  Instead, both sides seem to have had doubts about the im-
portance or efficacy of textual protection for individual rights—
doubts reinforced by what happened in the years following ratifica-
tion of the amendments.  Although the antebellum Court invalidated 
more federal statutes than commonly supposed,132 it did not use the 
Bill of Rights to invalidate a major piece of legislation until over half 
a century after ratification when it decided the infamous Dred Scott 
case.133  The Court did not invalidate a statute under the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment until 1965.134 
Controversy surrounding the Ninth Amendment further illus-
trates the skepticism of the founding generation.  The Amendment 
provides “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”135  Although the meaning of the Amendment remains ob-
scure and disputed, the history behind it is clear.  In the run up to 
ratification of the Constitution, some Federalists answered the de-
mand for a bill of rights with the argument that the specification of 
rights would inevitably be incomplete and might imply that the rights 
not specified were unprotected.136  When Madison introduced the Bill 
of Rights in the House he acknowledged that “[t]his was one of the 
most plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of 
a bill of rights” but observed that it “might be guarded against” by en-
actment of the Ninth Amendment.137 
Commentators have disagreed about the precise meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment.138  There is no need to rehearse that dispute 
 
132  See Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257 
(2009); Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 73, 75 (2000). 
133  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
134  See U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, ACTS OF CONGRESS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN WHOLE 
OR IN PART BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-10.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).  The 
first case was Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).  As early as 1943, the 
Court narrowly construed a federal statute so as to avoid free speech difficulties.  See 
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 132 (1943) (“[B]ecause of our firmly root-
ed tradition of freedom of belief, we certainly will not presume in construing the natural-
ization and denaturalization acts that Congress meant to circumscribe liberty of political 
thought by general phrases in those statutes.”). 
135  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
136  See, e.g., FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 445–46 (Alexander Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST, supra 
note 28. 
137  I ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
138  Compare Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 
(1988) (advocating for an individual rights view), with Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original 
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here.  For present purposes, the key point is that on all interpreta-
tions, the amendment reflected widespread skepticism that a written 
constitution could sufficiently constrain government power.  Im-
portantly, the Amendment guards against the disparagement of other 
rights—that is, rights other than those specified in the Constitution.  
What, precisely, were these other rights?  No doubt, people in the 
founding generation had opinions about what they were, but the 
Ninth Amendment amounts to a concession that it was impossible to 
reduce these opinions to constitutional text.  Put differently, the 
Ninth Amendment embodies skepticism that any constitutional doc-
ument can fully capture the norms that should govern a society.  It is 
an express disavowal of Justice Iredell’s ambition to write a Constitu-
tion that “define[d] with precision the objects of the legislative pow-
er, and [restrained] its exercise within marked and settled bounda-
ries.”139 
4. The Special Case of Thomas Jefferson   
Although Thomas Jefferson was not in Philadelphia and did not 
participate directly in either the ratification struggle or the adoption 
of the Bill of Rights,140 he occupies iconic status in the standard story 
of American constitutionalism.  According to that story, Jefferson was 
a “strict constructionist” who strongly supported constitutional 
restrictions on federal power and constitutional protections for 
individual rights.  As he once wrote, “[o]ur peculiar security is in 
possession of a written Constitution.  Let us not make it a blank paper 
by construction.”141  Jefferson’s  unsuccessful opposition on 
constitutional grounds to the creation of a national bank while in the 
Washington Administration,142 his secret authorship of the Kentucky 
Resolutions opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts while Vice 
President,143 his principled refusal to endorse internal improvements 
 
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment,  83 TEX. L. REV. 331, 331 (2004) (advocating for a feder-
alism view).  For my own view, see Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Ninth Amendment: 
An Essay on Unenumerated Rights and the Impossibility of Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2129 
(2010). 
139  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). 
140 See II DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 162 (1951). 
141  VIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 247 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892–1897). 
142 MALONE, supra note 140, at 342–43. 
143  See ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON:  THE GREAT COLLABORATION 185–87 
(1950). 
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without a constitutional amendment,144 and his life-long devotion to 
religious liberty145 all contribute his image as a fastidious 
constitutionalist. 
This story is not false.  Jefferson was a strict constructionist, a be-
liever in limited government and individual rights, and a defender of 
constitutional fidelity.  But Jefferson was also an immensely compli-
cated figure.  Never a particularly systematic thinker, his writings and 
career are full of contradictions and ambiguities that have puzzled 
and enraged historians ever since.  As Joseph Ellis aptly characterizes 
him, he has become “the enigmatic and elusive touchstone for the 
most cherished convictions and contested truths in American cul-
ture,” and “the Great Sphinx of American history.”146  It is therefore 
not surprising that there is another side to Jefferson’s constitutional 
thought, much less often recognized and virtually never celebrated:  
Throughout his life, Jefferson was a constitutional skeptic. 
This skepticism took a variety of forms.  First, and most dramati-
cally, Jefferson denied the legitimate power of the authors of consti-
tutions to bind the future.  His first statement of this view seems to 
have been in a letter to his friend, Madison shortly after the Constitu-
tion was ratified.  There, he defended the principle that “‘the earth 
belongs in usufruct to the living’ that the dead have neither powers 
nor rights over it.”147  From this “self evident”148 proposition, Jefferson 
derived his theory of generational limits on constitutional obligation.  
On his view, “by the law of nature, one generation is to another as 
one independent nation is to another.”149  It followed that 
[Members of the living generation] are masters . . . of their own persons, 
and consequently may govern them as they please.  But persons and 
property make the sum of the objects of government.  The constitution 
and the laws of their predecessors extinguished them, in their natural 
course, with those whose will gave them being.  This could preserve that 
being till it ceased to be itself, and no longer.  Every constitution, then, 
 
144  See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 211 (1994) 
(noting that Jefferson proposed a constitutional amendment so as to permit internal im-
provements). 
145  See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON & CIVIL LIBERTIES:  THE DARKER SIDE 14–15 (1973) 
(observing that Jefferson’s ideas were “not always libertarian,” with regard to religious lib-
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146  JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX:  THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 10 (1997). 
147  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 19, at 3. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. at 8.  
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and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years.  If it be enforced 
longer, it is an act of force and not of right.150 
Jefferson seems to have held these views throughout his life.  After 
retirement, in a famous letter to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson pro-
posed amendments to the Virginia Constitution, including a built-in 
nineteen year expiration date, which, he argued, corresponded to the 
life-span of a single generation.  He again insisted on the right of 
“each generation . . . to choose for itself the form of government it 
believes most promotive of its own happiness; consequently, to ac-
commodate to the circumstances in which it finds itself, that received 
from its predecessors.”151  Eight years later, and only two years before 
his death, he wrote to John Cartwright that 
[a] generation may bind itself as long as its majority continues in life; 
when that has disappeared, another majority is in place, holds all the 
rights and powers their predecessors once held, and may change their 
laws and institutions to suit themselves. . . . Nothing then is unchangea-
ble but the inherent and unalienable rights of man.152 
Second, Jefferson was deeply skeptical of judicial power in particu-
lar and of any authoritative, hierarchical system of constitutional en-
forcement in general.  Jefferson’s hatred of John Marshall and his 
anger at the Marshall Court’s assertion of judicial power in Marbury v. 
Madison153 are well known.154  Early in his career, he seems to have 
been a supporter of judicial review,155 but his experience with a Fed-
eralist-dominated judiciary was enough to convince him that federal 
judges were a “corps of sappers and miners constantly working under 
ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric”156 
and that an independent federal judiciary was “a solecism, at least in 
a republican government.”157  At times, Jefferson suggested that there 
should be no federal judiciary at all.158 
Part of Jefferson’s skepticism about federal courts was grounded 
in his opposition to what he perceived as the nationalizing agenda of 
the federal judiciary.  But the skepticism was also grounded in a more 
 
150  Id. at 9.  
151  X THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 141, at 37. 
152  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Major John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in XVI THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 48 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903). 
153  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
154  See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 144, at 267. 
155  Id. at 257. 
156  X THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 141, at 169–170. 
157  Id. at 171. 
158  See MAYER, supra note 144, at 205 (noting that “the suppressive atmosphere of 1789 and 
1799 . . . [set the] stage for Jefferson’s near-complete parting of the ways with the federal 
judiciary and for his complete rejection of the doctrine of judicial review”). 
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theoretical opposition to granting any single branch of government 
authoritative power to enforce the Constitution.  The modern label 
given to Jefferson’s position is “departmentalist”—the view that each 
department of government had equal right to interpret and enforce 
the Constitution.159  For example, Jefferson believed that he had in-
dependent authority to determine that the Alien and Sedition Acts 
were unconstitutional when exercising his pardoning power.  In an 
explanation originally to be delivered to Congress, but ultimately de-
leted for political reasons, he wrote 
[o]ur country has thought proper to distribute the powers of [its] gov-
ernment among three equal & independent authorities, constituting 
each a check on one or both of the others, in all attempts to impair [its] 
constitution.  To make each an effectual check, it must have a right in 
cases which arise within the line of [its] proper functions, where, equally 
with others, it acts in the last resort & without appeal, to decide on the va-
lidity of an act according to [its] own judgment, & uncontrouled [sic] by 
the opinion of any other department.  We have accordingly, in more 
than one instance, seen the opinions of different departments in opposi-
tion to each other, & no ill ensue.160 
Later, in a letter to Abigail Adams justifying the pardons, he wrote 
[t]he judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sen-
tence of fine and imprisonment, because that power was placed in their 
hands by the constitution.  But the Executive, believing the law to be un-
constitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because that pow-
er has been confided to him by the constitution.  That instrument meant 
that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other.  But the 
opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are con-
stitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of 
action, but for the legislature and executive also in their spheres, would 
make the judiciary a despotic branch.161 
Today, many might accept the right of a President utilize his own 
constitutional judgment when exercising the pardon power,162 but Jef-
 
159  For discussions, see, for example, Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonju-
dicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?,  67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
105 (2004); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:  Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is,  83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutional-
ism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2004). 
160  MAYER, supra note 144, at 270. 
161  IV MALONE, supra note 140, at 155. 
162  See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia:  How Congressional Standing Can Solve 
the Enforce-but-not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 579–81 (2012) (arguing that 
the President may interpret the Constitution when exercising the pardon power, but may 
not disobey court orders); Johnsen, supra note 159, at 112 (noting that “relatively few ju-
dicial supremicists would contend that Presidents invariably must defer to Supreme Court 
interpretations with which they disagree—for example, in exercising the veto and pardon 
powers”).  But cf. Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 
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ferson’s devotion to decentralized constitutional authority extended 
well beyond this claim.  While serving as Vice President in the Adams 
Administration, he secretly authored the Kentucky Resolutions in 
protest against the Alien and Sedition Acts.163 
As originally drafted by Jefferson, the Eighth Resolution stated 
that each state had independent authority to determine whether the 
Constitution had been violated and what the remedy should be.  In a 
case where the federal government assumed unconstitutional powers, 
“a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy.”164  This was so be-
cause states had a “natural right . . . in cases not within the compact . . 
. to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others 
within their limits.”165 
The resolution ultimately adopted by the Kentucky legislature 
omitted the incendiary “nullification” language.166 The parallel Vir-
ginia Resolutions, authored by Madison, was also more temperate.167  
But when these less radical proposals failed to generate much north-
ern support, Jefferson proposed a still more extreme remedy.  In a 
letter to Madison, he urged that the dissenting states  threaten “to 
sever ourselves from the union we so much value, rather than give up 
the rights of self-government which we have reserved, & in which 
alone we see liberty, safety & happiness.”168 
There is a sense in which Jefferson’s radical views about interpre-
tive authority stemmed from his devotion to constitutional fidelity.  
Jefferson’s allegiance was to the Constitution itself, not to mistaken 
interpretations of the Constitution advanced by misguided judges or 
legislators.  From this perspective, it is modern believers in judicial 
supremacy who are unfaithful to the Constitution when they confuse 
mistaken Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution with the 
Constitution itself. 
In another sense, though, Jefferson’s views are in deep tension 
with our standard constitutional story.  That story rests crucially on 
the conflation of Supreme Court decisions with constitutional com-
mands.  Without an authoritative interpreter, “marked and settled 
 
CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1670 (2001) (arguing that there should be judicial review of some 
aspects of conditions imposed on pardons). 
163  See KOCH, supra note 143. 
164  VII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 141, at 301. 
165  Id. 
166  MAYER, supra note 144, at 207. 
167  For a discussion of changes in the language of the Virginia Resolutions that made them 
less radical, see KOCH, supra note 143, at 190–91. 
168  Jefferson’s letter to Madison advocating this course of action is reproduced in KOCH, su-
pra note 143, at 197–98. 
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boundaries” become impossible.  Instead of providing a settlement, 
constitutionalism becomes a site for conflict and dissension of the 
sort that marked the pre-Revolutionary period.169 
Of course, decentralized constitutional authority still requires all 
actors to remain loyal to their own, good faith understandings of con-
stitutional limits.  But not even this much can be said of the third 
branch of Jefferson’s constitutional skepticism.  It turns out that Jef-
ferson also believed that, under appropriate circumstances, the Con-
stitution, even as he himself understood it, should be disobeyed.  Jef-
ferson’s clearest statement of this belief came in a famous letter to 
John B. Colvin written two years after the end of his presidency. 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties 
of a good citizen, but it is not the highest.  The laws of necessity, of self-
preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obliga-
tion.  To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, 
would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those 
who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the 
means.170 
From this abstract statement, one might think that Jefferson be-
lieved in constitutional disobedience only in extreme circumstances 
when the very survival of the state depended upon it.  But Jefferson 
then went on to provide a “hypothetical case” suggesting that the 
Constitution might appropriately be violated in far less dire circum-
stances: 
Suppose it had been made known to the Executive of the Union in the 
autumn of 1805, that we might have the Floridas for a reasonable sum, 
that that sum had not indeed been so appropriated by law, but that Con-
gress were to meet within three weeks, and might appropriate it on the 
first or second day of their session.  Ought he, for so great an advantage 
to his country, to have risked himself by transcending the law and making 
the purchase?  The public advantage offered, in this supposed case, was 
indeed immense; but a reverence for law, and the probability that the ad-
vantage might still be legally accomplished by a delay of only three weeks 
were powerful reasons against hazarding the act.  But suppose it was fore-
seen that a John Randolph would find means to protract the proceeding 
on it by Congress until the ensuing spring, by which time new circum-
stances would change the mind of the other party.  Ought the Executive, 
in that case, and with that foreknowledge, to have secured the good to 
 
169  This point has been made repeatedly by modern opponents of departmentalism.  See, e.g., 
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 107, at 1362 (defending “judicial primacy without quali-
fication” in interpreting the Constitution). 
170  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in IX THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 141, at 279–80. 
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his country and to have trusted to their justice for the transgression of 
the law?  I think he ought and that the act would have been approved.171 
Two points are worth noting about this hypothetical.  First, the 
acquisition of “the Floridas,” while no doubt important, hardly rises 
to the level of “saving our country when in danger.”  Second, the hy-
pothetical suggests that Jefferson thought it appropriate to disregard 
Congress’s constitutional powers not just when it was impractical to 
consult with Congress, but also when opposition within Congress (“a 
John Randolph”—his cousin, incidentally172) would frustrate his goals.  
Taken together, these points suggest that Jefferson was much more 
ready to disregard constitutional obligation than his general language 
about necessity and self-preservation suggests. 
Jefferson presents this problem as if it were merely hypothetical, 
but in fact his administration was marked by significant decisions 
that, by his own lights, violated the Constitution.  We can put to one 
side his imposition of an embargo on foreign trade.  Many others 
thought that the embargo was unconstitutional,173 but there is no evi-
dence that Jefferson himself doubted its constitutional validity.  The 
same cannot be said, however, for the Louisiana Purchase, perhaps 
the most consequential act of self-conscious constitutional disobedi-
ence in our history. 
Early on in the negotiations with France over the vast Louisiana 
Territory, Jefferson seems to have agreed with his attorney general 
and secretary of the treasury that “there is no constitutional difficulty 
as to the acquisition of territory,”174 although he appears to have 
thought a constitutional amendment wise before any of the territory 
was granted statehood.175  But as negotiations proceeded, he began to 
have doubts.  In one private letter, he wrote that 
[o]ur confederation is certainly confined to the limits established by the 
revolution. . . The general government has no powers but such as the 
constitution has given it; and it has not given it a power of holding for-
eign territory, and still less of incorporating it into the Union. An 
amendment to the Constitution seems necessary for this. 176 
 
171  Id. 
172  For a discussion of Jefferson’s complicated relationship with his cousin, see ALF J. MAPP, 
JR., THOMAS JEFFERSON:  PASSIONATE PILGRIM 41–42 (1991). 
173  See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. 
REV. 949, 995 (1993) (noting Federalists’ constitutional objections to the embargo). 
174  See VIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 141, at 241 n.1. 
175  See id. 
176  Id. at 262. 
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Gradually, these doubts seem to have hardened into conviction.  
Jefferson wrote to a close friend: 
I cannot help believing the intention was to permit Congress to admit in-
to the union new states, which should be formed out of territory for 
which & under whose authority alone they were acting.  I do not believe 
it was meant that they might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &c. into 
it. 177 
Accordingly, Jefferson began drafting proposed constitutional 
amendments to legalize the acquisition. 
It soon became apparent, however, that constitutional scruples 
might prevent consummation of the purchase.  Both France and 
Spain looked like they might back out of the deal, and haste in ratify-
ing it became imperative.178  Faced with this difficulty, Jefferson con-
cluded that “the less that is said about my constitutional difficulty, the 
better; and . . . it will be desirable for Congress to do what is necessary 
in silence.”179  The proposed amendments were dropped, and Jefferson 
went forward with the transaction despite his own constitutional ob-
jections. 
Although Jefferson himself believed his actions were unconstitu-
tional, few contemporaries shared his doubts.180  In contrast, a se-
cond, albeit less consequential, action taken by Jefferson was unques-
tionably unconstitutional.  When the British attacked an American 
ship in 1807, Jefferson ordered the purchase of material to build gun 
boats without prior congressional authorization in clear violation of 
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution, which prohibits 
withdrawing money from the treasury without “Appropriations made 
by Law.”181  Only after the purchase did Jefferson ask for and receive 
congressional approval, albeit over the heated objections of the 
aforementioned John Randolph, who complained that the President 
had violated his constitutional obligations.182  In his letter to Colvin 
five years later, Jefferson was unrepentant: 
After the affair of the Chesapeake, we thought war a very possible result.  
Our magazines were illy provided with some necessary articles, nor had 
any appropriations been made for their purchase.  We ventured, howev-
 
177  Id. at 247. 
178  See MAYER, supra note 144, at 250. 
179  Id. 
180  See IV MALONE, supra note 140, at 320 (noting that “few other people appear to have ex-
pressed similar qualms before Congress met”). 
181  See MAYER, supra note 144, at 254; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
182  See MAYER, supra note 144, at 254. 
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er, to provide them, and to place our country in safety; and stating the 
case to Congress, they sanctioned the act.183 
How are we to reconcile Thomas Jefferson, the believer in limited 
government, strict constructionist, and defender of constitutional 
purism with Thomas Jefferson, the constitutional skeptic unwilling to 
accept the binding force of the Constitution on future generations 
and ready to disregard limits on his power when he viewed it neces-
sary to do so?  Jefferson had a long career and doubtless changed his 
mind about some things.  Not all his writings were fully thought out 
or grew out of deep, theoretical reflection.  Like all politicians, he 
sometimes sacrificed his more general convictions to the necessities 
imposed by specific events.  Ironically, his constitutional fastidious-
ness also contributed to his propensity to disregard constitutional 
limits.  Few of Jefferson’s contemporaries thought that there was a 
conflict between the Louisiana Purchase and constitutional com-
mands.  It was only because Jefferson read the Constitution so nar-
rowly that he had to face the hard choice about whether to violate 
it.184 
But one cannot study Jefferson’s career and writings without sus-
pecting a deeper source for his ambivalence.  Jefferson’s own career 
captured the contradiction at the core of constitutional origins.  Jef-
ferson was, after all, the principal author of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.  He was responsible for revolutionary defiance of legal au-
thority in 1776, but, when he was elected President of the United 
States in 1801, he became the embodiment of legal authority.  How 
could a reflective person who assumed both these roles possibly es-
cape contradiction? 
One side of that contradiction—the side that prized constitutional 
obedience and celebrated constitutional restraint—is central to the 
mainstream story about constitutionalism’s triumph.  But Thomas Jef-
ferson also had another side—a side that chafed at authority, ab-
horred stasis, and privileged deep moral convictions over positive law.  
That side, too, deserves attention and respect. 
C.  Nullification, Concurrent Majorities, Secession, and the Civil War 
On standard accounts, southern secessionism led to the greatest 
threat to constitutional governance in our history.  Southern radicals 
effectively seized control of almost half the country and mounted a 
 
183  XII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 141, at 419–20. 
184  See supra note 180. 
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treasonous war for human bondage and against the rule of law.  The 
North responded by fighting to preserve the Union, and its victory 
constituted a decisive repudiation of doctrines like interposition, nul-
lification, and a right of secession, which threatened the Constitution. 
In this Section, I intend to complicate this account.  Elements of 
southern secessionist thought did raise important doubts about con-
stitutional obligation, and many in the North did think of themselves 
as fighting to preserve the Constitution.  But drawing the battle lines 
in this simple way misses the irony and paradox embedded in the ar-
guments on both sides.  On the one hand, the case for nullification 
was grounded in constitutional obligation.  Even secessionists often 
insisted that their position was based on respect for, rather than defi-
ance of, the Constitution.  On the other hand, many northern aboli-
tionists flirted with secession and constitutional disobedience, and, 
when war finally came, Lincoln himself at least arguably privileged 
preservation of union and termination of slavery over strict constitu-
tional obligation. 
The more interesting point, though, is that both northern and 
southern argument blurred the line between constitutional fidelity 
and defiance.  The strength of our constitutional tradition forced 
both sides to cloak their stance in constitutional rhetoric, but some-
times the rhetoric did the work of justifying revolutionary insubordi-
nation.  Just as Jefferson was torn between his commitment to the 
Declaration of Independence and to the Constitution, so, too, north-
erners and southerners alike unselfconsciously mixed together the 
language of natural right and revolution with the language of legal 
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1. John C. Calhoun and the Theory of Concurrent Majorities  
John C. Calhoun, the most important and sophisticated 
theoretician of Southern resistance, developed elaborate arguments 
supporting the power of states as against federal authority.185  Today, 
many commentators have marginalized Calhoun.  On their view, his 
political position is ineradicably tainted by his support for slavery, and 
his theoretical position was decisively defeated in the Civil War.  In 
particular, his support for nullification—the view that states could 
“nullify” federal decisions that putatively violated the Constitution—
and the theory of concurrent majorities—the view that legal 
legitimacy required majority approval by subnational units—are 
treated as amounting to an antiquated and discredited rejection of 
constitutional supremacy.186 
There can be no doubt that Calhoun spent much of his career jus-
tifying an economic and social system built on totalitarian suppres-
sion, and it is deeply wrong to insulate his theoretical musings from 
the purpose to which he put them.  Still, the standard view radically 
oversimplifies Calhoun’s theories, and, by extension, the complicated 
interplay of constitutionalism and constitutional skepticism that pro-
vided the intellectual backdrop for the Civil War. 
To understand the complexity, we need to separate out three as-
pects of Calhoun’s thought:  His position on constitutional obedi-
ence, his position on the Constitution’s meaning, and his position on 
the appropriate means of constitutional enforcement. 
With regard to the first question, Calhoun unambiguously and 
consistently presented himself as a constitutionalist.  His argument in 
both the Disquisition and the Discourse, his two most important theo-
 
185  For classic critiques of Calhoun’s thought that nonetheless recognize his importance, see 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 
68 (1973) (Calhoun “set forth a system of social analysis that is worthy of considerable re-
spect”); LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA:  AN INTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 158–59 (1955) (conceding that 
Calhoun is “the philosophic darling of students of American political thought” but claim-
ing that he was “a profoundly disintegrated political theorist”).  See also RICHARD 
CURRENT, JOHN C. CALHOUN 128 (1963) (“In helping . . . to make Jefferson the light of il-
liberalism, Calhoun left his most important mark upon the development of American po-
litical thought.”).  For a sympathetic account of Calhoun’s thought, see H. LEE CHEEK, 
JR., CALHOUN AND POPULAR RULE:  THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE DISQUISITION AND 
DISCOURSE (2001). 
186  See CHEEK, supra note 185, at ix (noting that “most observers attempt to minimize the 
philosophical significance of [Calhoun’s] work by arguing that [he] was merely a cham-
pion of sectional interests or that his ideas were antiquated even during his lifetime”).  
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retical works,187 is shot through with assertions about the importance 
of constitutional governance as a means of controlling what Calhoun 
thought were dangerous tendencies toward individual willfulness 
that, in turn, translated into government tyranny.188 
Of course, support for constitutional obedience leaves open the 
question of what, precisely, the Constitution commands.  Calhoun’s 
position on the Constitution’s meaning was deeply rooted in a com-
munitarian model of politics, which he associated with the sovereign-
ty of individual states.  He thought that political identity was inextri-
cably wrapped up in community identity, which gave meaning to and 
appropriately constrained individual impulses.189 
The importance of community leads to resistance to centralized 
power that has the potential to override community autonomy.  Cal-
houn therefore favored a political system marked by what modern 
political scientists call “veto gates,” but that Calhoun referred to as a 
requirement of “concurrent majorities.”190  On this view, an overall 
majority throughout the polity is insufficient to justify impositions on 
minority communities.  Instead, there must be concurrent majorities 
in each affected community. 
Calhoun’s substantive theory has an obvious connection to stand-
ard Madisonian republicanism.  Like Madison, he thought that ma-
jority faction could be controlled by dividing power and requiring the 
approval of different institutions responsible to different constituen-
cies.191  He nonetheless departed from Madison in rejecting the claim 
that a large, geographically extended republic provided the best pro-
tection against faction.  Calhoun put more faith in the Anti-federalist 
commitment to localism and state autonomy.192 
This leads us, finally, to the question of constitutional enforce-
ment.  Because the greatest threat of majority tyranny came from the 
central government, it followed that constitutional enforcement 
could not be left to federal agents.  To maintain constitutional gov-
 
187  See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1851). 
188  See, e.g., id. at 11 (“[W]ithout a constitution—something to counteract the strong tenden-
cy of government to disorder and abuse, and to give stability to political institutions,—
there can be little progress or permanent improvement.”); id. at 81 (discussing how con-
stitutional federalism avoids tyranny). 
189  For a discussion of the communitarian strand in Calhoun’s thought, see CHEEK, supra 
note 185,  at 90–92. 
190  See CALHOUN, supra note 187, at 28. 
191  Cf. CHEEK, supra note 185, at 89–90 (noting that the Disquisition  and the Federalist Pa-
pers  both argued that popular rule must be restrained to avoid political excesses). 
192  See CALHOUN, supra note 187, at 111–18. 
Oct. 2014] AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SKEPTICISM 43 
 
ernment, the states had legitimate power to nullify unconstitutional 
acts by the federal government at least temporarily until supporters of 
federal action could secure an amendment to the Constitution con-
firming their interpretation.193  Put differently, on Calhoun’s view, it 
was the people willing to acquiesce supinely to federal usurpation 
who tolerated constitutional disobedience.  True constitutionalism 
required state resistance to unconstitutional federal action. 
Once all this is understood, it becomes clear that there is a sense 
in which Calhoun was not a constitutional skeptic at all.194  But his 
thought also demonstrates that there is no bright-line distinction be-
tween obedience and defiance and that skeptical impulses often lies 
buried within the rhetoric of obedience. 
The problem is produced by three, interlocking facts.  First, con-
stitutionalism has the potential to delegitimize as well as legitimize 
exercises of power.  An insistence on constitutional obedience can be 
put to revolutionary purposes.  Thus, for Calhoun, the Constitution, 
properly understood, provided grounding for southern resistance to 
northern power.  Second, the Constitution’s meaning is often con-
testable.  Calhoun interpreted the Constitution in a certain way, but 
others had different, conflicting interpretations.  Finally, constitu-
tional construction is always influenced by the intersection of theoret-
ical concerns on the one hand and political expediency on the other.  
For example, both Lincoln and Calhoun had ideas about tyranny, 
freedom, and minority rights that influenced the way in which they 
read the Constitution.  Both were politicians who used constitutional 
argument instrumentally to advance their positions. 
Taken together, these three points mean that there will often be 
an ambiguous line dividing constitutionalism from rebellion.  Be-
cause the Constitution’s meaning is contested and because it provides 
a platform from which one can attack current distributions of power, 
constitutional rhetoric can support destabilization as well as settle-
 
193  Id. at 279 (“[T]he several States, as parties to the compact, [have the right] of interposing 
for the purpose of arresting, within their respective limits, an act of the federal govern-
ment in violation of the Constitution . . . . Without such a right, all the others would be 
barren and useless abstractions.”). 
194  As one of his academic defenders put it,  
[t]hough a majority within the South were ready to exclaim, ‘A fig for the Consti-
tution! When the scorpion’s sting is probing us to the quick, shall we stop to 
chop logic?’, yet Calhoun and a small group of his followers were willing to re-
main constitutional logic-choppers in order to attempt the restoration of the 
original power of a minority to enforce constitutional limitations.   
  JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY 1789-1861:  A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 135–36 (1930). 
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ment.  Thus, to northern ears Calhoun’s constitutionalism sounded 
like rebellion because it was based upon what northerners thought 
was an egregious misreading of the Constitution.  From this perspec-
tive, Calhoun’s preferred method of enforcement—state nullifica-
tion—looked like a rejection of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI 
and outright defiance of legitimate constitutional authority.  From 
the perspective of Calhoun and his supporters, these same arguments 
were thought to serve the cause of constitutional obedience rather 
than defiance. 
Moreover, Calhoun himself contributed to the blurring of the line 
between constitutional fidelity and defiance.  Calhoun’s interpreta-
tion of vague and ambiguous language in the Constitution was influ-
enced by his particular conception of natural rights.  Given this inevi-
table overlap between constitutional interpretation and background 
theoretical assumptions, it was easy for him to combine a worked out 
theory of constitutional interpretation with an argument grounded in 
extra-constitutional political morality.  The Constitution was worthy 
of support precisely because it embodied principles that would sup-
port constitutional resistance if constitutional meaning were differ-
ent.195  There was therefore no contradiction in mixing the language 
of constitutional obedience with language that would support rebel-
lion against an unjust constitution. 
2. Secession   
Calhoun died in 1850,196 the year of the compromise that settled 
nothing but put off the Civil War for a decade.197  When the breakup 
finally came, there was no theoretician of his sophistication and 
ability to defend the South’s actions.198  Nonetheless, the justificatory 
rhetoric of secession was marked by the same ambiguity and 
contradiction that was central to Calhoun’s earlier work. 
Southerners often justified their act of supreme defiance in overt-
ly constitutional terms.199  For example, in a speech before Congress 
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as the Fort Sumter crisis unfolded, Jefferson Davis proclaimed that 
“[w]e claim our rights under the constitution; we claim our rights re-
served to the States; and we seek by no brute force to gain any ad-
vantage which the law and the Constitution do not give us.”200  Re-
markably, a few months later in his inaugural speech as he assumed 
office as the Confederacy’s first and only President, Davis again in-
voked the United States Constitution.  “The Constitution formed by 
our fathers,” he asserted, “is that of these Confederate States.”201  In 
Davis’s view, calling secession a revolution was “an abuse of lan-
guage.”202  Secession was, instead, an effort “to save ourselves from a 
revolution.”203 
Given this stance, it is no surprise that framers of the Confederate 
Constitution closely followed the text of the original United States 
Constitution.204  For many southerners, disunion, like nullification, 
was a method of constitutional enforcement that, they hoped, would 
bring the north to its senses and lead to reunion on a sound constitu-
tional footing.205  According to Davis, the collapse of union was not 
because of “the defect of the system,” the mechanisms of which were 
“wonderful, surpassing that which the solar system furnishes for our 
contemplation.”  Rather, the collapse was caused by “the perversion 
of the Constitution,” by, for example, efforts to suppress slavery in the 
territories and failure to enforce the Constitution’s fugitive slave 
clause.  The result, on his view, was the “substitution of theories of 
morals for principles of government.”206 
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The fact that the attempt to dissolve the Constitution could itself 
be justified in constitutional terms illustrates just how slippery the dis-
tinction is between constitutionalism and its opposite.  And indeed, 
southern rhetoric seamlessly integrated the language of revolutionary 
anticonstitutionalism with the language of constitutional fidelity.  In 
the same speech in which Davis claimed “our rights under the Consti-
tution,” he also invoked the natural right of rebellion. 
If I must have revolution, I say let it be a revolution such as our fathers 
made when they were denied their natural rights . . . Washington and 
Jackson . . . are often presented as authority against [revolution]—
Washington who led the army of the Revolution; Washington, whose 
reputation rests upon the fact that with the sword he cut the cord which 
bound the Colonies to Great Britain. . . Washington, who presided when 
the States seceded from the [Articles of] Confederation, and formed the 
union, in disregard of the claims of the States not agreeing to it; and 
Jackson, glorious old soldier, who, in his minority, upon the sacred soil of 
South Carolina, bled for the cause of revolution and the overthrow of a 
Government which he believed to be oppressive. 207 
Consider, as well, a remarkably sophisticated speech defending 
secession given by Judah P. Benjamin, who went on to serve in the 
cabinet of the Confederacy.  Benjamin effortlessly combined argu-
ments grounded in constitutional obedience with arguments 
grounded in constitutional skepticism.  Benjamin’s argument begins 
with an echo of Jefferson’s rejection of the ability of one generation 
to bind another: 
[T]he right of the people of one generation, in convention duly assem-
bled, to alter the institutions bequeathed by their fathers is inherent, in-
alienable, not susceptible of restriction; . . . [B]y the same power under 
which one Legislature can repeal the act of a former Legislature, so can 
one convention of the people duly assembled . . . .208 
But Benjamin apparently saw no contradiction between assertion 
of this “inalienable” right to disregard the Constitution on the one 
hand and assertion of rights derived from the Constitution on the 
other. 
[T]he President of the United States tells us that he does not admit [the 
right of secession] to be constitutional, that it is revolutionary.  I have 
endeavored . . . to show that [secession] . . . grows out of the Constitu-
tion, and is not in violation of it.  If I am asked how I will distinguish this 
from revolutionary abuse, the answer is prompt and easy.  These States, 
parties to the compact, have a right to withdraw from it, by virtue of its 
 
207  Id. at 128, 132. 
208  Id. at 103. 
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own provisions are violated by the other parties to the com-
pact . . . .[sic]209 
Southern schizophrenia on the legal and moral justification for 
secession should come as no surprise.  There is, after all, no necessary 
contradiction between an argument insisting that there is a constitu-
tional right to secession and an argument insisting that there is a nat-
ural right to secession whether the Constitution authorizes it or not.  
Yet if there is not a contradiction, there is at least a tension between 
the two positions.  If there is a natural right to ignore constitutional 
provisions when they invade rights, then, it would seem, there is a 
natural right to resist constitutionally protected secession if one 
thought that disunion invaded rights.210  This tension is built into the 
genetic material of a country founded on both the Declaration of In-
dependence and the Constitution.  It is the tension that has allowed 
both constitutionalism and constitutional skepticism to flourish 
throughout our history. 
3. The North  
The speeches and writings of Calhoun, Davis, and Benjamin are 
part of our constitutional tradition’s anti-canon.  They are 
marginalized, discredited, or ignored because, rightly or wrongly, 
they are thought to embody constitutional defiance.  In contrast, the 
words of northern abolitionists and defenders of union are part of 
the canon.  They are glorified because they are thought to embody 
the goodness and permanence of constitutional government.211  But 
just as it is too simple to characterize the South’s defenders as anti-
constitutionalists, so too northerners were not uniform and 
consistent defenders of constitutional obligation. 
We can begin with the fact that, long before the Civil War, many 
northerners openly flirted with secession.  According to one of his 
biographers, John Calhoun first learned of arguments favoring seces-
sion by listening to Timothy Dwight, the President of Yale College, 
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who was reacting to Jefferson’s election as President.212  Some leading 
Federalists went beyond talk and actually plotted to secede.213 
During the War of 1812, New England states took numerous 
measures to obstruct the war effort.  Gouverneur Morris, one of the 
key drafters of the Constitution, argued for an autonomous New Eng-
land confederacy.214  Toward the end of the war, Massachusetts con-
vened the Hartford Convention, attended by it and other New Eng-
land states, to consider secession.215  Moderates successfully controlled 
the Convention and, despite the adoption of some inflammatory 
rhetoric, the delegates stepped back from the precipice,216 but only 
after passing a resolution warning that if its demands were not met, 
“it will be expedient for the legislatures of the several States to ap-
point delegates to another convention to meet at Boston, with such 
powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may 
require.”217 
As tensions surrounding slavery mounted, the same schizophrenia 
about constitutional obedience that dominated southern rhetoric al-
so began to appear in the north.  A few intrepid abolitionist lawyers 
like Lysander Spooner and Alvan Stewart argued in court that the 
Constitution limited slavery, although their arguments had no dis-
cernible effect.218  Even abolitionist judges rejected the arguments, 
but they, too wrapped themselves in constitutional obligation when 
they upheld the claims of southern slaveholders.  On the other hand, 
more radical abolitionists embraced constitutional disobedience.  
William Lloyd Garrison chose Independence Day to publicly burn the 
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Constitution and denounced it as a pact with the devil.219  Although 
he eventually changed his mind, Frederick Douglas originally argued 
that for northern secession from the southern states.220  On the eve of 
the Civil War, Wendell Philips argued that “dissolution of the Union, 
sure to result speedily in the abolition of slavery, would be a lesser evil 
than the slow faltering disease.”221 
Even mainstream political figures on occasion embraced anti-
constitutional language.  During the debate over the Compromise of 
1850, Senator William Seward, later Lincoln’s secretary of state, ar-
gued that because “all men are equal by the law of nature and of na-
tions, the right of property in slaves falls to the ground,” and that if 
“the Constitution recognizes property in slaves,” it would be a suffi-
cient answer that “this constitutional recognition must be void, be-
cause it is repugnant to the law of nature and of nations.”222  Similarly, 
William Ellery Channing, the foremost Unitarian clergyman in the 
United States claimed that “[a] higher law than the Constitution pro-
tests against [the Fugitive Slave Act].”223 
Both abolitionism and constitutional disobedience remained mi-
nority positions well into the Civil War, yet as conflict with the South 
intensified, willingness to stretch or ignore the Constitution increased 
as well.  Many northerners participated in the effort to obstruct slave-
holders who attempted to exercise their constitutional right to cap-
ture slaves who had fled to the north, and a courageous few partici-
pated in the “underground railroad” that led to freedom.224  There 
was talk of nullification, and one northern radical wrote that “we have 
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got to come to Calhoun’s ground.”225  The Republican Party ran on a 
platform that promised a refusal to enforce the Dred Scott decision, 
and some state legislatures voted to nullify it.226  Although John 
Brown’s violent and illegal raid was widely condemned even in the 
North, a handful of northerners treated Brown as a hero.227 
4.  The Special Case of Abraham Lincoln 
On the spectrum of northern, Republican opinion, Lincoln was at 
best a moderate.  A lifelong opponent of slavery, he nonetheless re-
peatedly promised not to interfere with it in states where it already 
existed.  He acknowledged that southerners had the right to the re-
turn of escaped slaves and conceded that emancipation would have 
to be gradual and that slaveholders should be compensated for their 
loss.228  Although he appears to have changed his mind at the end of 
his life, until then, he believed that free African Americans could not 
successfully live with whites, and repeatedly backed a variety of 
schemes that would lead to their departure from the United States. 229 
Moreover, throughout his adult life, Lincoln presented himself as 
a fervent believer in constitutionalism and a defender of constitu-
tional government.  As a young man, he first gained notoriety with his 
“Lyceum Address,” which criticized “mob rule” and urged “every 
American . . . [to] swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to vio-
late in the least particular, the laws of the country; and never to toler-
ate their violation by others.”230  Over two decades later, he began his 
campaign for the Republican nomination for President with his fa-
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mous Cooper Union speech, where he made a remarkably lawyerly, 
constitutional argument against the result in Dred Scott. 231  He justi-
fied the Emancipation Proclamation as a constitutional exercise of 
his war power to seize enemy property, and he stubbornly and scru-
pulously declined to extend it to areas where, in his judgment, eman-
cipation lacked military, and therefore constitutional, justification.232 
But Lincoln’s constitutionalism, like Jefferson’s, was ambivalent 
and contradictory.  Exclusive focus on his belief in constitutional fi-
delity misses much of his complexity and greatness.  Consider, first 
the Lyceum Address.  There is no mistaking Lincoln’s fervent support 
for constitutionalism and the rule of law.  But just beneath the sur-
face is the same tension that has bedeviled constitutionalism 
throughout our history.  Could Lincoln have been completely una-
ware of the irony when he urged his fellow Americans to “swear by 
the blood of the Revolution” not to violate the law?  And what are we 
to make of this remarkable passage, which, in light of subsequent 
events, has puzzled and fascinated Lincoln’s many biographers?233 
After praising the courage and fortitude of the founding genera-
tion, he added: 
This field of glory is harvested, and the crop is already appropriated.  But 
new reapers will arise, and they too will seek a field.  It is to deny what the 
history of the world tells us is true, to suppose that men of ambition and 
talents will not continue to spring up amongst us.  And when they do, 
they will as naturally seek the gratification of their ruling passion, as oth-
ers have done before them.  The question then is, Can that gratification 
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be found in supporting and maintaining an edifice that has been erected 
by others?  Most certainly it cannot. . . Towering genius distains a beaten 
path. . . It thirsts and burns for distinction; and, if possible, it will have it, 
whether at the expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen.234 
Lincoln hastened to disown the subversive implications of this 
language.  In the very next passage, he makes clear that he does not 
admire “towering genius” of this sort.  On the contrary, “it will re-
quire the people to be united with each other, attached to the gov-
ernment and laws, and generally intelligent, to successfully frustrate 
his designs.”235  But in light of his subsequent career, it is hard to take 
this disclaimer at face value.  Early in life, Lincoln set for himself the 
goal of achieving the very sort of glory that he describes.236  Can it re-
ally be that the Great Emancipator himself meant to unambiguously 
condemn a “towering genius” who overcame “the government and 
laws” by “emancipating slaves”? 
The Cooper Union speech contains a similar ambiguity.  Lincoln 
began the speech rhetorically asking “what is the frame of Govern-
ment under which we live?” and responding that “[t]he answer must 
be:  ‘The Constitution of the United States.’”  It is constitutional obli-
gation, he tells us, that “furnishes a precise and an agreed starting 
point for a discussion between Republicans and that wing of the De-
mocracy headed by [his political opponent] Senator [Stephen] 
Douglas.”237 
Lincoln then proceeded to make a detailed, persuasive, and legal-
istic argument that the federal government had constitutional power 
to prohibit slavery in the territories.  He relied upon the standard 
tools of constitutional interpretation:  The Constitution’s language, 
the intent of the Framers, and historical practice before and immedi-
ately after the Constitution was ratified.238  This is unquestionably the 
language of American constitutionalism. 
But then, as the speech draws to a close, comes this: 
If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and constitutions against it, are 
themselves wrong, and should be silenced, and swept away.  If it is right, 
we cannot justly object to its nationality—its universality; if it is wrong, 
they cannot justly insist upon its extension—its enlargement.  All they 
ask, we could readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask, they 
could as readily grant, if they thought it wrong.  They thinking it right, 
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and our thinking it wrong, is the precise fact upon which depends the 
whole controversy.  Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame 
for desiring its full recognition, as being right; but, thinking it wrong, as 
we do, can we yield to them?  Can we cast our votes with their view, and 
against our own?  In view of our moral, social, and political responsibili-
ties, can we do this?239 
Lincoln’s answer is a resounding “no.”  The last lines of his speech 
are far removed from the claim that dry and disinterested constitu-
tional analysis will or should resolve the dispute over slavery.  Instead, 
he gave full-throated endorsement to the primacy of moral obliga-
tion:  “LET US HAVE FAITH THAT RIGHT MAKES MIGHT, AND 
IN THAT FAITH, LET US, TO THE END, DARE TO DO OUR 
DUTY AS WE UNDERSTAND IT.”240 
It turns out, then, that even if, as Lincoln claimed, constitutional 
meaning is a “precise and agreed starting point for discussion,” it is 
not the ending point.  After all the legal argument is finished, it is not 
the Constitution, but the moral status of slavery that is the “precise 
fact upon which depends the whole controversy.” 
The tension between Lincoln’s commitment to constitutionalism 
and his commitment to extra-constitutional morality extended be-
yond his rhetoric.  It marked his entire administration.  Consider first 
the actions Lincoln took unilaterally immediately after assuming of-
fice.  With Congress not in session and facing a military emergency, 
he suspended habeas corpus in particular areas.241  When a judge had 
the audacity to issue a writ requiring the release of an under-aged 
soldier who allegedly enlisted without the consent of his parents, the 
soldier’s commander refused to comply and arrested the lawyer who 
served the writ.  Not satisfied with even this result, Secretary of State 
Seward stopped payment on the judge’s salary.242  A few months later, 
Chief Justice Taney issued a writ ordering the release of a Confeder-
ate supporter, John Merryman, and ruling that Lincoln had acted 
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unconstitutionally by suspending the writ.243  Lincoln simply ignored 
the opinion.244 
The Constitution specifically provides for the suspension of habe-
as corpus when in “Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it[,]”245 but many scholars think that the President may 
not exercise this authority without congressional authorization.246  
Lincoln evidently disagreed, but the important point is that he 
thought he acted rightly even if he violated the Constitution.  In his 
famous speech to Congress on July 4, 1861, he argued that the Fram-
ers intended to allow the executive to suspend the writ, at least when 
Congress was not in session.  But he coupled this legal defense with 
the assertion that, even if his constitutional argument was incorrect, 
he had nonetheless done the right thing. 
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were 
being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one-third of the States.  
Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfect-
ly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some 
single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen’s liberty that 
practically it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a 
very limited extent be violated?  To state the question more directly, are 
all the laws but one to go unexecuted and the Government itself go to 
pieces lest that one be violated?  Even in such a case would not the offi-
cial oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown, when it 
was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?247 
Suspension of habeas corpus was not the only constitutionally du-
bious action Lincoln took during the 1861 crisis.  Like Jefferson be-
fore him, he spent unauthorized funds to raise troops, thereby violat-
ing not only Section 9, Clause 7 of Article I, which prohibits 
expenditures except “in Consequence of Appropriations made by 
Law,” but also Section 7, Clause 12 of Article I, which gives Congress 
the seemingly exclusive power to raise and support Armies.248  In his 
July 4 speech, he did not even try to defend the legality of these ex-
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penditures.  Instead he insisted that this action, “whether strictly legal 
or not,” was justified by “popular demand and a public necessity.”249 
Even this was not Lincoln’s most egregious legal violation.  In the 
immediate wake of the attack on Fort Sumter, he secretly ordered 
military officials to enter into private contracts for the supply of mili-
tary equipment in violation of appropriations measures and existing 
law.  Lincoln did not discuss these expenditures in his July 4 speech.  
They remained secret for months until Congress discovered them.250  
At that point, Lincoln made no effort to defend the legality of what 
he had done.  Instead, he confessed that his actions were “without 
any authority of law,” and acknowledged that he was responsible for 
“whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed.”251 
Throughout the War, Lincoln authorized many other actions that 
were constitutionally dubious.  For example, after former Congress-
man Clement Vallandigham gave a speech attacking pursuit of the 
War, he was arrested, tried, and incarcerated in seeming violation of 
his First Amendment rights.  A public outcry ensued, and Lincoln, 
unwilling to turn him into a martyr, responded by ordering Vallan-
digham’s expulsion from the United States.252  At least Vallandigham 
had a trial.  Thousands of other citizens were placed in executive de-
tention without the benefit of trial.253 
Most commentators treat these incidents as constitutionally justi-
fied but nonetheless regrettable at best, or as constitutional lapses 
perhaps excusable at worst.254  The Emancipation Proclamation is very 
different.  No one today apologizes for it or treats it as a source of re-
gret.  It is universally celebrated and widely thought to be among a 
handful of the greatest decisions ever made by an American Presi-
dent.  Accordingly, if the Proclamation counts as an example of con-
stitutional disobedience, it transforms the narrative of American con-
stitutionalism. 
Does it so count?  Any fair treatment of the Proclamation must 
acknowledge its ambiguous straddling of the border between the 
conflicting traditions of constitutional fidelity and constitutional 
skepticism.  Defenders of constitutional fidelity can point to the fact 
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that Lincoln himself never admitted that the Proclamation was un-
constitutional.  On the contrary, he strongly defended it as an appro-
priate exercise of his commander-in-chief power and, to the conster-
nation of some of his more radical allies, carefully cabined its 
geographical effect to locations where liberation advanced the war 
effort.255 
Despite these facts, there is strong reason to count the Proclama-
tion as an important—perhaps the most important—act of constitu-
tional disobedience in our history.  The skeptical account of the Proc-
lamation begins with the sheer audacity of what Lincoln did.  As his-
historian Richard Slotkin has written: 
At the stroke of the pen some $3.5 billion in property was legally annihi-
lated—this at a time when national GDP was less than $4.5 billion and 
national wealth (the total value of all property) was about $16 billion.  In 
purely economic terms, this was an expropriation of property on a scale 
approaching that of Henry VIII’s seizures of church properties during 
the Reformation, exceeded only by the nationalization of factories and 
farms after the Bolshevik Revolution.256 
Lincoln, together with almost everyone else in mid-nineteenth 
century America, thought that these property rights were constitu-
tionally protected, and he said so repeatedly.  In his most extensive 
speech on slavery before his election, delivered in Peoria in 1854, 
Lincoln denounced it as a “monstrous injustice,” but nonetheless 
acknowledged that the Constitution protected the rights of slave-
holders.  Northerners were obligated to adhere to the constitutional 
bargain “not grudgingly, but fully, and fairly.”  The rendition of es-
caped slaves was a “dirty, disagreeable job,” but because of the Fugi-
tive Slave Clause, Lincoln voiced support for “any legislation, for the 
reclaiming of their fugitives, which should not, in its stringency, 
be . . . likely to carry a free man into slavery.”257 
Similarly, in his first inaugural address, Lincoln made clear that 
he lacked constitutional authority to interfere with slavery258 and stat-
ed that he had no objection to the Corwin Amendment, which would 
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have permanently entrenched slavery.259  In his view, the Amendment 
did no more than restate slaveholder rights already implicit in the 
Constitution.260 
Even after the Civil War began, Lincoln demonstrated marked re-
luctance to interfere with slavery.  As late as 1862 he stated that 
“emancipation was a subject exclusively under the control of the 
states . . . .”261  He demonstrated little enthusiasm for the First Confis-
cation Act,262 which deprived slaveholders of their property right in 
slaves used to further the war effort.263  When General John Fremont 
declared martial law in Missouri and ordered emancipation of all 
slaves in the state as a means of weakening the enemy, Lincoln coun-
termanded the order and then removed Fremont from command.264 
The strictly legal question, then, is whether military necessity and 
the President’s commander-in-chief authority under Article II justi-
fied a massive, permanent, uncompensated destruction of private 
property and the negation of what Lincoln himself conceded would 
otherwise have been the constitutional rights of slaveholders.  There 
are strong reasons to doubt that the military necessity argument can 
do this work.  Indeed, Lincoln himself initially thought that it could 
not.  In a letter to Senator Orville Browning after the Fremont epi-
sode, Lincoln wrote that Fremont’s proclamation “is purely political, 
and not within the range of military law, or necessity. . . Can it be pre-
tended that it is any longer the government of the U.S.—any gov-
ernment of constitution and laws,—wherein a General, or a Presi-
dent, may make permanent rules of property by proclamation?”265 
 
259  The amendment provided that “no amendment shall be made to the Constitution which 
will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with 
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Of course, it is possible that changes in military circumstances 
made emancipation necessary when the Proclamation was issued even 
though it was not when Fremont acted.  But in fact, events occurring 
after Lincoln wrote this letter further weakened the military necessity 
argument.  If military necessity were really the reason for emancipa-
tion, one would have supposed that Lincoln would have ordered it 
when the North was losing the war.  Instead, Lincoln self-consciously 
delayed emancipation until the North won its first major victory on 
the battlefield.266 
Moreover, as noted above, the First Confiscation Act provided a 
mechanism to liberate slaves who were used to aid the Confederate 
war effort.  The Second Confiscation Act went further and provided 
such a mechanism for slaves owned by disloyal individuals whether or 
not the slaves were used to fight the war.267  By the time of the Proc-
lamation, then, the question had become whether there was a mili-
tary necessity justifying the emancipation of slaves not already subject 
to manumission by the Confiscation Acts—that is, slaves not being 
used to fight the war and held by slaveholders who were loyal to the 
Union.  It is hard to see how emancipation of these slaves served a 
significant military purpose.268 
The fact that the emancipation was permanent poses another le-
gal difficulty.  The Preliminary Proclamation, which warned of im-
pending emancipation if the South continued its revolt, declared that 
slaves would be “then, thenceforward, and forever free[.]”269  For rea-
sons that are somewhat mysterious, the final Proclamation left out the 
word “forever,”270 but Lincoln made clear that he would not rescind 
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the Proclamation even if southern states agreed to rejoin the union.271  
Yet, ironically, before he issued the Proclamation, Lincoln himself 
explained why permanent freedom could not be justified by military 
necessity.  In the Browning letter quoted above, he stated that 
[i]f a commanding general finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private 
owner . . . he has the right to do so, and to so hold it as long as the neces-
sity lasts; and this is within military law, because within military necessity.  
But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner or his heirs for-
ever; and this as well when the farm is not needed for military purposes 
as when it is, is purely political, without the savor of military law about it.  
And the same is true of slaves.  If the General needs them, he can seize 
them, and use them; but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix 
their permanent future conditions.272 
For these reasons, the legal argument supporting the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation is quite vulnerable.  Of course, clever lawyers can 
make and have made arguments on the other side, but focusing ex-
clusively on the legal argument misses the crucial point.  For purpos-
es of constructing a historical tradition, what matters most is not the 
technical legality of the Proclamation, but its cultural meaning. 
That meaning is directly linked to the fact that emancipation was 
not merely a military necessity.  To see this point, compare the Proc-
lamation to General William Tecumseh Sherman’s widespread de-
struction and seizure of civilian property during his infamous march 
through Georgia in 1864.  Perhaps the actions of Sherman’s troops 
were justified by military necessity, but no one today celebrates those 
actions as an iconic moment in American history.  The Emancipation 
Proclamation is celebrated precisely because people understood then 
and understand now that it was not merely a military tool, the use of 
which was necessary but nonetheless to be regretted.  Instead of ad-
vancing the North’s war aims, the Proclamation changed those aims.  
A war that was fought to preserve the Constitution became a war to 
dismantle the constitutional structures that protected tyranny and 
oppression. 
Both contemporary supporters and opponents of the Proclama-
tion had no doubt that this was its true meaning.  For example, the 
New York Herald, in an editorial opposing the Proclamation, warned 
that it would inaugurate a “social revolution.”273  The Springfield Repub-
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lican, in an editorial supporting the Proclamation, came to a remark-
ably similar conclusion, declaring that that “by the courage and pru-
dence of the President, the greatest social and political revolution of 
the age will be triumphantly carried through in the midst of civil 
war.”274  In a letter home, a Union soldier wrote that “though the 
President carefully calls [the Proclamation] nothing but a war meas-
ure . . . it is the beginning of a great reform and the first blow struck 
at the real, original cause of the war.”275  Perhaps Karl Marx, then 
working as a newspaper correspondent, put it best: 
[Lincoln] sings the bavura aria of his part hesitatively, reluctantly, and 
unwillingly, as though apologizing for being compelled by circumstances 
“to act the lion.”  The most redoubtable decrees—which will always re-
main remarkable historical documents—flung by him at the enemy all 
look like, and are intended to look like, routine summonses sent by a 
lawyer to party. . . His latest proclamation, which is drafted in the same 
style, the manifesto abolishing slavery, is the most important document in 
American history since the establishment of the Union, tantamount to 
the tearing up of the old American Constitution.276 
Indeed, Lincoln himself acknowledged as much.  Before the Proc-
lamation, in his first inaugural address, he made clear that he had 
“no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of 
slavery in the States where it exists.  I believe I have no lawful right to 
do so, and I have no inclination to do so.”277  If there should be war, 
he declared, the war would be fought to support the proposition that 
“the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States” as the 
Constitution commanded.  He added that he had no objection to a 
constitutional amendment “to the effect that the Federal Govern-
ment shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, 
including that of persons held to service.”278 
After the Proclamation, things were different.  The purpose of the 
war was not to ensure that the laws be “faithfully executed in all the 
States,” but to show that a nation “conceived in liberty and dedicated 
to the proposition that all men are created equal” could “long en-
dure.”279  Instead of acquiescing to a constitutional amendment that 
guaranteed the rights of slaveholders, Lincoln promised “a new birth 
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of freedom.”280  No longer content to merely stop the spread of slav-
ery, he declared that 
if God wills that [the war] continue until all the wealth piled by the 
bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, 
and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by anoth-
er drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it 
must be said “the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogeth-
er.281 
It is nonetheless true that Lincoln also supported formal, constitu-
tional change in the form of the Thirteenth Amendment, which le-
galized, regularized, and extended the Proclamation.  Yet even the 
struggle over the formal amendment process can be incorporated in-
to the skeptical narrative.  Opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment 
claimed that amendments contrary to the Framers’ original intent 
were illegitimate.282  Ultimately, proponents of the Amendment over-
came this opposition and, with it, the view that all major provisions in 
the Constitution were sacred and permanent.283  Proponents success-
fully argued that the Constitution was flawed in important respects—
a skeptical theme renewed by Justice Thurgood Marshall over a hun-
dred years later when, writing on the bicentennial of the Constitu-
tion, he observed that he did not “find the wisdom, foresight, and 
sense of justice exhibited by the Framers particularly profound.  To 
the contrary, the government they devised was defective from the 
start[.]”284 
More significantly, the Thirteenth Amendment itself would have 
been unthinkable but for the transformation in American political 
culture produced by the War, the Proclamation and the subsequent 
enlistment of two hundred thousand African American soldiers who 
fought gallantly on the Union side.  African American chattel slavery 
is the greatest injustice in our nation’s history.  For three quarters of 
a century, this injustice was protected by seemingly immutable consti-
tutional text.  When the injustice was finally rectified, the efficient 
cause of the change was not constitutional processes, which, on the 
contrary, made change seem impossible, but a bloody war that 
claimed over seven hundred thousand lives. 
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One hundred years later, this understanding of the Civil War and 
of the Proclamation remains vibrant.  Virtually no one today cele-
brates the Proclamation as a military measure reluctantly embraced 
only because otherwise sacred constitutional rights had to be ignored 
so as to defeat the enemy.  Instead, it symbolizes a constitutional 
transformation.  As President Obama stated in his own proclamation 
celebrating the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of Lincoln’s, 
with that document, President Lincoln lent new moral force to the war by 
making it a fight not just to preserve, but also to empower.  He sought to 
reunite our people not only in government, but also in freedom that 
knew no bounds of color or creed.  Every battle became a battle for liber-
ty itself.  Every struggle became a struggle for equality.285 
Can there be any doubt, then, that the story of emancipation 
should occupy a central place in the historical narrative of constitu-
tional skepticism? 
D.  Constitutional Skepticism and the Progressive Movement 
Defenders of the Progressive movement associate it with the mod-
ernization and rationalization of government, protection of popula-
tions made vulnerable by industrialization, reform of the party sys-
tem, and the beginnings of redistributionist legislation.286  Critics 
point to the racism of many Progressives, their disregard for civil lib-
erties, and the fact that many Progressive “reforms” shielded en-
trenched interests from the discipline of market competition.287 
Modern students of Progressivism on both sides of the debate are 
much less likely to emphasize the extent to which the movement of-
fered a deep and biting challenge to American constitutionalism.  Yet 
especially in its early years, constitutional skepticism played a central 
role in Progressive practice and theory.  Progressive politicians rallied 
popular support by railing against supposed constitutional restraints 
on regulatory legislation, and Progressive theorists over a range of 
disciplines developed important critiques of constitutionalism.288 
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1. Progressive Politics 
With the possible exception of the original Anti-federalists cam-
paign, no political movement in American history attacked constitu-
tionalism with as much gusto and persistence as the Progressives.  
The highpoint of the attack came in 1912, when Theodore Roosevelt 
ran for President on his fabled Bull Moose ticket.  Roosevelt’s consti-
tutional radicalism alienated long-time Republican supporters like 
Henry Cabot Lodge and doomed his chance for the Republican nom-
ination.289  Undeterred, he ran as a Progressive on a party platform 
that declared that “the people are the masters of the Constitution” 
and demanded “such restriction of the courts as shall leave to the 
people the ultimate authority to determine fundamental questions of 
social welfare and public policy.”290 
Roosevelt himself was convinced that creating a modern govern-
ment required the dismantling of separation of powers and of feder-
alism.291  He proposed that “the people shall themselves have the 
right to say whether their representatives in the Legislature and the 
executive office were right, or whether their representatives on the 
Court were right.”292  In a speech delivered in Columbus, Ohio, he ar-
gued that the American people must be “the masters and not the 
servants of even the highest court in the land” and “the final inter-
preters of the Constitution.”  Without this final authority “ours is not 
a popular government.”293  Despite this sweeping rhetoric, Roosevelt 
limited his programmatic suggestions to the recall of state judicial 
decisions.  But in a letter to fellow Progressive Herbert Croly, he stat-
ed that “one way or the other, it will be absolutely necessary for the 
people themselves to take control of the interpretation of the consti-
tution.  Even in national matters this ought to be, and in my opinion 
will eventually be done.”294 
Roosevelt was hardly alone in attacking standard versions of con-
stitionalism.  Woodrow Wilson, who ran against Roosevelt in 1912, 
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was much more restrained in his criticism, but Wilson had made his 
academic reputation years before with a book-length attack on the 
constitutional structure of the American government.295  In 1908, he 
wrote that constitutional government “does not remain fixed in any 
unchanging form, but . . . is altered with the change of the nation’s 
needs and purposes.”296  During the 1912 campaign, he joined Roose-
velt in arguing that Article V of the Constitution should be revised so 
as to make amendment much easier.297 
Robert LaFollette, perhaps the most important Progressive in 
Congress, called for the election and recall of judges.  He referred to 
judges who issued anti-labor decisions as “petty tyrants and arrogant 
despots” and argued that “we must put an ax to the root of this mon-
strous growth upon the body of our Government.”298  The great social 
reformers, Jane Addams and Herbert Croly, the founding editor of 
the New Republic and the most widely read journalistic voice for Pro-
gressivism, both insisted that social reform could be accomplished 
only by dismantling constitutional obstacles.299  Croly was especially 
biting, repeatedly decrying “the monarchy of the law and the aristoc-
racy of the robe” and arguing that “progressive democracy” should 
replace “worship of the Constitution.”300  On two occasions, the young 
Felix Frankfurter wrote in the pages of Croly’s magazine that the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should be 
repealed.301  As William Forbath has pointed out, leading Progressives 
like John Dewey thought that constitutional rights “seemed destined 
to ossify into impediments to practical change” and were “exactly 
what the laissez-faire jurists insisted:  A limit on democracy’s capacity 
to reconstruct its social environment by redistributive means.”302 
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2. Progressive Theory 
No doubt, these attacks on judicial enforcement of the Constitu-
tion and on the Constitution itself were politically situated.  Rightly or 
wrongly, Progressives believed that conservative judges stood in the 
way of reforms they thought best for the country.  They therefore had 
compelling instrumental reasons to delegitimize the basis of judicial 
power.  Tellingly, when control over the judiciary shifted in the late 
1930s, many Progressives changed their views. 
Still, political motivations should not obscure the important con-
tributions that Progressive intellectuals made to the ongoing debate 
about constitutionalism.  These contributions included worked out 
theories that served to undermine standard defenses of constitution-
alism.  The theories were as varied as the disciplines they came from.  
For example, Progressive historians—most prominently Charles 
Beard—offered an account of the Constitution’s drafting grounded 
in the narrow economic interests of the Framers.303  As Beard himself 
later conceded,304 some of his specific claims were hyperbolic, and 
most modern scholars think that a purely economic interpretation of 
the founding is far too simplistic.  Nonetheless, Beard’s more general 
thesis—that the Constitution was written at least in part to control 
and limit popular democracy that threatened important economic 
interests—as been widely accepted.305 
Philosophical pragmatists like William James, Charles Peirce, and 
John Dewey, many of whom were closely aligned with the Progressive 
movement, offered important arguments that attacked constitutional-
ism’s foundations.306  Pragmatists held a radical theory of knowledge 
that rested on social understanding, rather than correspondence with 
external truths.307  What we claimed to know about the world was al-
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ways contingently held, experimentally derived, and, as William James 
famously insisted, subject to test for its “cash value.”308  This epistemo-
logical view was, to say the least, in deep tension with the view that a 
written constitution could or should entrench supposed political 
truths for all time. 
The social orientation of Pragmatists also led naturally to a deep 
skepticism about individual rights.  As David Rabban has written, 
progressives of this stripe “challenged the idea of natural, prepolitical 
rights held by autonomous individuals in isolation from society, asso-
ciated law and constitutions with this erroneous conception, and re-
jected the related position that a laissez-faire government should do 
little more than protect individual rights.”309 
This critique was directed primarily against judicial protection for 
rights of property and contract, but importantly, leading Pragmatists 
did not confine their argument to this sphere.  For example, before 
and during World War I, John Dewey, repeatedly equated all individ-
ual liberties with “privileges based on inequality.”310  At the height of 
the War, he caustically attacked not only antiwar activists but also the 
civil libertarians who supported them for relying upon “early Victori-
an platitudes” about “the sanctity of individual rights and constitu-
tional guarantees.”311 
Legal scholars associated with American Legal Realism were close-
ly allied with the Pragmatists and built on Pragmatist insights to ad-
vance implicit, and occasionally explicit, attacks on constitutionalism.  
Realist scholars shared with Pragmatists a deep skepticism about de-
riving definite results from general values like liberty and equality.  
Even more specific legal rules and precedents could easily be manip-
ulated to produce a wide variety of results in litigated cases.  Judges 
were therefore inevitably pursuing contestable political or policy 
agendas when they decided cases.  Realists insisted that these agendas 
should be discussed openly and not be obscured by claims that judges 
were mechanically following the Constitution.312 
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This rule skepticism, distrust of abstractions, and obsession with 
instrumental rationality translated easily into criticism of the main 
tools of constitutionalism.  Most realists were convinced that judges 
who enforced supposed constitutional guarantees like freedom of 
contract or protection of private property were not acting out of con-
stitutional compulsion, but out of a set of deeply contestable political 
views that they were foisting on the rest of the country.   As Justice Ol-
iver Wendell Holmes wrote in his celebrated dissent in Lochner v. New 
York, courts should not decide cases based “upon an economic theory 
which a large part of the country does not entertain.”313  In the same 
opinion, Holmes, who was deeply influenced by the Pragmatists and a 
pioneer of Legal Realism,314 insisted that “[g]eneral propositions do 
not decide concrete cases[,]” because decisions “depend on a judg-
ment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise.”315  
For Holmes, it followed that there should be a sharply constrained 
role for judges enforcing supposed constitutional commands.  In par-
ticular, judges should be very reluctant to use the liberty protection 
of the Fourteenth Amendment “to prevent the natural outcome of a 
dominant opinion[.]”316 
Progressive economists like John Commons, Thorstein Veblen, 
Walton Hamilton, and Robert Hale, who pioneered an institutional 
approach, suggested still another line of attack on constitutionalism.  
Institutional economists insisted that the “laws” of economics were 
not autonomous.  Instead, market outcomes depended upon sur-
rounding institutions.317  Although all the institutionalists criticized 
the laissez-faire assumptions that lay behind much of Lochner-era  
constitutionalism, Hale, a Harvard-trained economist who spent most 
of his career at Columbia Law School,  offered a more far reaching 
critique that held the potential to undermine any sort of constitu-
tional guarantees.318 
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In a path-breaking article, Hale brought into question core consti-
tutional dichotomies like the difference between coercion and free-
dom or the public and private.319  As he pointed out, constitutional 
law treated government action as presumptively coercive and there-
fore requiring restraint and private action as presumptively free and 
therefore requiring protection.  In fact, though, virtually all market 
transactions could be characterized as coercive.  A worker who ac-
cepted low wages and bad working conditions did so only because the 
employer was able to threaten him with starvation if he did not com-
ply.  Government nonintervention did not make this worker free; in-
stead, it left him vulnerable to this private coercion, which the gov-
ernment could alleviate by restructuring the market.  It did not 
follow, however, that this restructuring would create a world of per-
fect freedom.  If the worker had more market power, then she could 
coerce the employer. 
The upshot was that the link between constitutional rights and 
freedom was severed.  Because coercion was everywhere, it was no 
longer a useful analytic category.  One might still favor public policies 
based upon their efficacy or upon who was empowered by them, but 
the goal of achieving universal freedom, and with it the notion of 
constitutional rights as a protection for individual autonomy, 
dropped out of the picture. 
Although Hale himself did not extend his argument, there was no 
obvious way to limit his analysis to market “freedoms.”  Just as “free-
dom” of contract permitted employers to coerce workers, so, too, 
“freedom” of speech, for example, allowed media owners to coerce 
people who wanted access to the means of effective communication.  
Of course, constitutions might still structure political outcomes, and 
people who favored certain outcomes would therefore favor the 
structures that produced them.  But if one took Hale’s ideas seriously, 
the historic conception of constitutional law as a neutral, apolitical 
protection for human liberty was no longer plausible. 
3. The Special Case of Franklin Roosevelt 
I know of no evidence that President Franklin Roosevelt was di-
rectly influenced by any of the Progressive thinkers discussed above.  
Unlike his cousin in 1912, the younger Roosevelt made no reference 
to constitutional reform in his election campaign of 1932.  Unlike 
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Lincoln and Jefferson, he never confessed to violating the Constitu-
tion.  Nonetheless his administration produced a constitutional revo-
lution that shook the foundations of standard constitutionalism. 
Although he attended Columbia Law School, the younger Roose-
velt was not especially well versed in constitutional law and seems to 
have thought little about the subject.320  Upon assuming office, how-
ever, he quickly became aware of the manner in which constitutional 
constraints might impede his effort to deal with the Depression.  
Roosevelt had little patience with abstractions or impediments to ef-
fective action321 and, so, little patience with these constraints.  His ef-
forts to overcome them so as to deal with the Depression and then 
with the War led him to positions that deviated sharply from standard 
constitutional doctrine and, ultimately, to an understanding of how 
constitutionalism might be refashioned in a nonlegalistic manner. 
The saga begins with Roosevelt’s first inaugural address, famous 
for his declaration that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”322  
Less famous, but more important to this narrative, was Roosevelt’s el-
liptical, but nonetheless unmistakable threat that if Congress did not 
act, he would assume extraordinary powers: 
Our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to 
meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement 
without loss of essential form . . . . 
It is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative 
authority may be wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before 
us.  But it may be that an unprecedented demand and need for unde-
layed action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance 
of public procedure. 
I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the 
measures that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may re-
quire.  These measures, or such other measures as the Congress may 
build out of its experience and wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitu-
tional authority, to bring to speedy adoption. 
But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two 
courses, and in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I 
shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me.  I 
shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the cri-
sis—broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great 
as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a 
foreign foe.323 
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This language is more important for the mindset that it revealed 
than for any immediate action that it presaged.  In fact, with the pos-
sible exception of his arguably illegal executive order declaring a 
bank holiday, Roosevelt made no early attempts to upset the basic 
constitutional structure.  A compliant Congress never put him to the 
test.324  The passage nonetheless reveals two crucial aspects of Roose-
velt’s thought:  His willingness to depart from widespread assump-
tions about constitutional limits when necessary to meet an emergen-
cy, and his ability to justify these departures by a rereading of the 
Constitution as a “simple and practical” document that did not im-
pose rigid restraints. 
Although Roosevelt did not establish the kind of dictatorship that 
some hoped for and others feared, there can be no doubt that the 
early New Deal upset standard conceptions of federalism and separa-
tion of powers.  Many New Deal reforms had antecedents in earlier 
legislation.  Still, when taken together, nothing in our constitutional 
experience rivaled them.  Never before had the national government 
assumed such comprehensive power over the economy, and never be-
fore had Congress delegated so much authority and discretion to the 
executive branch. 
Not surprisingly, these measures elicited constitutional challenge.  
In meeting that challenge, Roosevelt never expressly asserted his 
right to violate the Constitution.  Indeed, he often asserted his rever-
ence for the document.  But that reverence was based on an idiosyn-
cratic reading of it that combined a departmentalist assertion of his 
independent authority to interpret the Constitution with a substan-
tive interpretation that eliminated virtually all occasions for violation. 
Roosevelt’s departmentalism was reflected in decisions made from 
the beginning to the end of his presidency.  Early on, when it ap-
peared that the Supreme Court might invalidate legislation that al-
tered contracts providing for payment in gold, he made plans, never 
executed because the Court upheld the legislation, to utilize extraor-
dinary measures that would circumvent the Court’s decision.325 
Later, when the Court did invalidate some important New Deal 
programs and threatened to invalidate more of them, Roosevelt con-
sidered and ultimately decided against the remedy of constitutional 
amendment.  He seems to have rejected this course in part because 
he insisted on the correctness of his own interpretation of the Consti-
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tution under which no amendment was necessary.  Instead, he sought 
to discipline the Court by increasing its size.  At first, he disingenu-
ously argued for Court packing on the ground that it was necessary to 
relieve the workload of superannuated justices, but eventually he 
acknowledged what was obvious to everyone— that the legislation was 
designed to privilege his own constitutional interpretation over the 
views of the judiciary.326 
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan failed, but he ultimately managed 
to transform the Court through the power of appointment.  But even 
after the Court was populated by Justices he himself had appointed, 
Roosevelt continued to insist on his independent right to interpret 
the Constitution.  When German saboteurs were caught on American 
territory during World War II, Roosevelt arranged for the men to be 
tried before a hastily convened military commission.  He also made 
clear that he would adhere to these procedures no matter what a 
court said.  As Attorney General Francis Biddle later recounted, he 
announced that “I want one thing clearly understood, Francis.  I 
won't give them up . . . I won't hand them over to any United States 
marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus.  Understand?”327  Faced 
with the prospect of being ignored, the Supreme Court caved.  It an-
nounced a per curiam decision upholding Roosevelt’s actions the day 
after oral argument, and did not get around to releasing its opinion 
in the case until after the men had been executed.328 
Roosevelt’s substantive view of the Constitution was unorthodox to 
say the least.  Broadly speaking, there were two branches to his think-
ing:  A rejection of technical, constitutional limitations on govern-
ment power, and an embrace of affirmative rights.  His first inaugural 
briefly invoked the first view when he spoke of the Constitution as a 
“simple and practical” document.329  He argued for this position in 
more detail in his Constitution Day speech of 1937, one of the great-
est yet least remembered major speeches of his Presidency. 
The speech came in the immediate wake of the defeat of his 
Court packing plan and on the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of 
the Constitution.  Speaking to a huge throng from the base of the 
Washington Monument,330 Roosevelt declared that “[t]he men who 
wrote the Constitution were the men who fought the Revolution” and 
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“had watched a weak emergency government almost lose the war.”331  
They created “a layman’s document,” he insisted “not a lawyer’s con-
tract.”332  It “cannot be stressed too often,” he claimed, that “Madison, 
most responsible for it, was not a lawyer; nor was Washington or 
Franklin, whose sense of the give-and-take of life had kept the Con-
vention together.”333  The Constitution, therefore was a “charter of 
general principles, completely different from the ‘whereases’ and the 
‘parties of the first part’ and the fine print which lawyers put into 
leases and insurance policies and installment agreements.”334 
It naturally followed from this conception of the Constitution that 
the Supreme Court should not have the last word in enforcing it.  
“Contrary to the belief of many Americans, the Constitution says 
nothing about any power of the Court to declare legislation unconsti-
tutional.”335  Instead, “[a]gain and again the Convention voted down 
proposals to give the Justices of the Court a veto over legislation.”336  
Roosevelt saw himself as participating in the latest skirmish in a one 
hundred fifty year-old battle between “those who would preserve this 
original broad concept of the Constitution as a layman’s instrument 
of government” and the judges and lawyers “who would shrivel the 
Constitution into a lawyer’s contract.”337  Ultimately, he insisted, the 
American people would be victorious over “those who professionally 
or politically talk and think in purely legalistic phrases” and “cry ‘un-
constitutional’ at every effort to better the conditions of our peo-
ple.”338 
Superficially, these assertions look like claims about how the Con-
stitution should be read, rather than arguments for why it should be 
disobeyed.  Once again, however, the line between constitutional in-
terpretation and constitutional defiance is indistinct.  A constitution 
that is not “legalistic,” that contains only broad principles to structure 
discussion, and that is flexible enough to meet current needs (ac-
cording to whom?) need not be disobeyed.  This reading of constitu-
tional text turns Realist rule skepticism into a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Roosevelt’s simple and flexible constitution was open-ended enough 
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to support whatever he wanted to accomplish, especially when it was 
yoked to a decentralized system of enforcement that deprived courts 
of final interpretive authority. 
For just this reason, Roosevelt saw no contradiction between con-
stitutional obligation on the one hand and revolutionizing American 
government on the other.  His constitution was capacious enough to 
support not only pervasive national regulation of the American econ-
omy and the creation of the administrative state, but also the intern-
ment of Japanese Americans339 and prosecution of dissenters against 
the War.340 
The second branch of Roosevelt’s theory of the Constitution 
flipped the historic association between constitutionalism and nega-
tive rights.  Drawing on a generation of Progressive thought, Roose-
velt argued that the Constitution required the subordination of the 
private sphere to government regulation, rather than the protection 
of the private sphere from government overreaching. 
Focus on Roosevelt’s battle with the Supreme Court has tended to 
obscure this truly radical branch of New Deal jurisprudence.  The ar-
gument over the constitutional validity of the New Deal turned on the 
extent of the political branches’ discretionary powers, and Roosevelt’s 
ultimate victory loosened constitutional constraints.  But Roosevelt 
was not satisfied with merely discretionary power.  He argued that the 
Constitution compelled government intervention—the very thing that, 
the Constitution was conventionally interpreted to prohibit. 
There were hints of this position going back to his original 1932 
campaign,341 but Roosevelt spelled out his theory most clearly when 
he proposed a “second bill of rights” in a speech to Congress in early 
1944.342  In his view, the first Bill of Rights had “proved inadequate to 
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assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness.”  This was so because 
“true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and 
independence.”343  Accordingly, the country needed a new bill of 
rights which included the right to “a useful and remunerative job,” 
the right to “earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and 
recreation,” the right to “a decent home” the right to “a good educa-
tion,” and the right to “adequate medical care and the opportunity to 
achieve and enjoy good health.”344 
There is an obvious tension between these two branches of Roose-
velt’s constitutional jurisprudence.  If the Constitution was not a le-
gally enforceable document, how did it create a legal right to the pos-
itive goods that Roosevelt listed?  The tension is lessened, although 
not completely resolved, by the fact that this Second Bill of Rights 
was, apparently, to be implemented by legislation rather than judicial 
decree.345  By labeling them a “Bill of Rights,” Roosevelt seemed to 
imply that Congress was under an obligation to enact the measures 
he proposed.  But by remitting the question to the political sphere, 
he emphasized yet again that for him constitutional “rights” were a 
starting point for political negotiation, not fixed and inflexible legal 
commands. 
The more serious tension, though, is between the Second Bill of 
Rights and the standard tools of constitutional analysis.  That analysis 
treated private markets as a baseline closely associated with individual 
liberty.  On this view, speech was free so long as Congress made no 
laws, and the people were secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects so long as the government conducted no unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights dissolved this link and, so, left 
constitutional law without grounding from which rights deprivations 
could be measured.  If true constitutional freedom required not just 
the protection from government but also the protection of govern-
ment, then how were we to evaluate government coercion that in-
creased the freedom of some by depriving others of freedom?  On a 
view like this, the internment of Japanese Americans or suppression 
of wartime dissent might be not just constitutionally permissible, but 
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actually constitutionally mandatory if they were necessary to vindicate 
the positive right to government protection. 
Moreover, once the link between the private sphere and freedom 
was severed, “rights” could no longer be treated as absolutes.  There 
were inevitably rights on both sides of the ledger.  Enforcement of 
rights meant balancing some claims against others.  Balancing, in 
turn, requires assigning relative values to the claims to be balanced 
against each other.  Because these values are not specified in the 
Constitution, the process of value assignment is inevitably political ra-
ther than legal. 
Roosevelt succeeded in remaking the Supreme Court and open-
ing the discretionary space for economic regulation, but the truly 
radical implications of his constitutional thought and, more broadly, 
the general Progressive critique of constitutionalism, never gained a 
firm foothold.  By the time he spoke in 1944, Progressive skepticism 
was already beginning to fall into disrepute.  The rise of fascism in 
Europe gave a different cultural meaning to claims that law reflected 
no more than power,346 and the repopulation of the Supreme Court 
with Roosevelt-appointed judges made Progressives themselves more 
at ease with judicial enforcement of constitutional norms.  Moreover, 
the formation of a New Deal coalition that included racial, religious, 
and political minorities turned support for civil rights and civil liber-
ties protections into a political necessity. 
The upshot was the Carolene Products settlement under which the 
recently empowered Roosevelt Justices distinguished sharply between 
property rights, indefensibly privileged by the so-called Lochner Court, 
and civil and political rights, justifiably privileged by the new, and 
newly-enlightened Roosevelt Court.347  The settlement ultimately 
proved unstable because, as an earlier generation of Progressives un-
derstood, both civil and political rights on the one hand and property 
and contract rights on the other depended on the specification of a 
baseline formed by market transactions.348  Eventually, the settlement 
unraveled.  Before it did, however, it laid the groundwork for the 
emergence of the Warren Court and the brief flourishing of a mod-
erate-left version of constitutionalism. 
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E.  The Warren Court 
Mid-twentieth century constitutionalism provides support for both 
constitutionalists and constitutional skeptics.  Some commentators 
remain nostalgic for the Court that gave us Brown,349 Miranda,350 and 
Reynolds351 and believe that its achievements demonstrate the unreal-
ized possibilities of liberal constitutionalism.352  But the more domi-
nant modern view is that the Warren Court’s obvious failures serve as 
a cautionary tale about the limits of judicially centered constitutional 
power.353  On this view, the Court’s history is part of a narrative that 
emphasizes what Mark Tushnet has aptly called the “chastening of 
constitutional aspiration.”354 
1.  The Civil Rights Revolution   
The struggle over the Second Reconstruction offered a replay of 
the fusion of constitutional and anti-constitutional rhetoric that 
marked the antebellum period.  Both sides used standard constitu-
tional tools to advance their positions, but, when necessary, both 
sides also resorted to tactics and arguments that challenged constitu-
tional norms. 
The efforts of southern opponents of racial equality were less in-
teresting because the theories were less original.  Instead of develop-
ing new constitutional theories, they recycled old ones.  Nullification, 
interposition, and states’ rights made new appearances, and John 
Calhoun’s theoretical musings gained new popularity.  Once again, 
these arguments were supplemented with extra-constitutional rheto-
ric and actions.  While lawyers made sophisticated legal arguments in 
court, thugs coupled revolutionary rhetoric with violence in the 
streets.355 
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350  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
351  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
352  See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH & LEE L. 
REV. 5 (1993). 
353  See, e.g.,  LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); FRED P. 
GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 485–501 (1970) (characterizing certain of the 
Warren Court’s decisions as “self-inflicted wounds” that would “leave permanent scars” 
and impose unwanted precedents on future courts). 
354  See generally Mark Tushnet, Foreword:  The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Con-
stitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29 (1999). 
355  For accounts, see GEORGE LEWIS, MASSIVE RESISTANCE:  THE WHITE RESPONSE TO THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 27–122 (2006); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE  STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 330–34, 350–55 
(2004). 
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In contrast, opponents of racial segregation pioneered new legal 
and extralegal tactics,356 but the division between and paradoxical 
conjunction of constitutional and skeptical arguments was not new at 
all.  The division is neatly, if overly simply, personified by the rivalry 
between Thurgood Marshall and Martin Luther King.  Marshall led a 
legal campaign insisting on respect for the rule of law.  Like Marshall, 
King grounded his arguments in constitutional rhetoric, but he 
deemphasized detailed legal argument before courts.  Instead, he 
pursued a strategy of civil disobedience and direct action.357  Even a 
half-century later, historians argue about which strategy was more 
successful.  The ambiguity is symbolized by the Montgomery Bus Boy-
cott.  King’s leadership of the boycott galvanized advocates of civil 
rights across the country, but the boycott came to a successful conclu-
sion only after Marshall secured a holding from the Supreme Court 
that segregated public transportation was unconstitutional.358 
Doubtless both Marshall and King contributed to the change in 
public attitudes that ultimately produced change on the ground.  
Importantly, however, when the change finally came, it was not the 
direct product of the judicial constitutionalism of the 1950s.  Instead, 
it came about because of political changes that culminated in the 
Johnson Administration’s forceful support for civil rights in the 
1960s.359 
The question of causation is made still more complicated by the 
fact that neither King nor Marshall drew a sharp distinction between 
legal and political struggle.  King pursued the struggle in the streets, 
but, like many before him, he linked constitutional and natural rights 
rhetoric.360  Moreover, as the Montgomery example illustrates, he 
sometimes depended on legal intervention to sustain the movement.  
 
356  See generally MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004). 
357  See MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:  THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME 
COURT, 1936–1961, at 305 (1994) (“[Marshall] was . . . reported to have called King a 
‘first-rate rabble-rouser,’ and complained about always ‘saving King’s bacon.’”). 
358  See id. at 302–04; DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS:  MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND 
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 11–82 (1986). 
359  See KLARMAN, supra note 355, at 363 (“The 1964 Civil Rights Act, not Brown was plainly 
the proximate cause of most school desegregation in the South.”). 
360  For example, in his famous Letter from a Birmingham Jail, King asserted that “We have wait-
ed for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God given rights” and that “an or-
dinance becomes unjust when it is used to maintain segregation and deny citizens the 
First–Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and protest.”  Martin Juther King, Jr., 
Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available at mlk-kpp01. stanford.edu/index.
php/resources/article/annotated_letter_from_birmingham/. 
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Marshall pursued victories in court, but clearly understood that the 
litigation campaign was a tool for political mobilization.361 
Importantly, the Warren Court itself also straddles the divide be-
tween our constitutional and skeptical traditions.  On the one hand, 
Brown constitutes a remarkable reformulation of constitutional law to 
advance the cause of racial liberation.  On the other, there is evi-
dence that at least some of the Justices voted for the result out of 
moral and political conviction, rather than because they thought it 
was legally justified.362  That fact is hardly surprising given the shaky 
support for the result in standard constitutional materials.  Brown was 
almost certainly inconsistent with the original expected application of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and with decades of precedent.363  In-
stead of utilizing the usual tools of constitutional analysis,364 Chief Jus-
tice Warren relied upon social science evidence of dubious relevance 
and reliability.365 
 
361  See TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 357, at 42 (“The NAACP’s legal work 
was directed at eliminating segregation, and its lawyers understood that ending segrega-
tion required a mobilized African-American community.”). 
362  See, e.g., id. at 189, 191 (stating that, for Justice Robert Jackson, segregation cases posed 
question of politics rather than law); id. at 211 (quoting Jackson as saying that “this is a 
political question,” that the problem for segregation’s opponents was “to make a judicial 
basis for a congenial political conclusion,” and that “as a political decision, I can go along 
with it”).  See also KLARMAN, supra note 355, at 296 (quoting Jackson as saying that “[there 
is] [n]othing in the text that says this is unconstitutional.  [There is] nothing in the opin-
ions of the courts that says it’s unconstitutional.  Nothing in the history of the 14th 
amendment [says it’s unconstitutional].  On [the] basis of precedent [I] would have to 
say segregation is ok”); id. at 295 (concluding that “[w]hat [Justice Felix] Frankfurter 
found compelling was the moral, not the legal, argument against segregation in the na-
tion’s capital”); id. at 298 (concluding that “if [Justice Hugo Black] is to be taken at his 
word about his method of constitutional interpretation [his] personal views about segre-
gation, not his legal interpretation, must explain his vote”). 
363  At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, five northern states excluded Afri-
can Americans from public schools and eight additional northern states had segregated 
schools.  KLUGER, supra note 356, at 633–34.  There is no indication that those ratifying 
the Fourteenth Amendment thought that these practices would have to change because 
of the Amendment.  Id.  The same Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment 
passed legislation permitting segregation in District of Columbia schools.  Drafters of the 
1866 Civil Rights Act, which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to constitutional-
ize, specifically stated that the Act did not interfere with segregated education.  See CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117–18 (1866) (statement of James Wilson).  But see Mi-
chael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (ar-
guing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to outlaw school segrega-
tion). 
364  The Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment’s history was “inconclusive” and 
stated, “we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted.”  
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483, 492 (1954). 
365  See id. at 494 n.11 (1954) (citing social science studies for the proposition that segrega-
tion had a detrimental psychological effect on African American children).  On the dubi-
ous nature of the evidence, see Mark Yudof, School Desegregation:  Legal Realism, Reasoned 
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Moreover, even if Brown, itself, can be constitutionally justified, 
the Court’s other decisions around the same period fit more easily 
within the skeptical tradition.  On the same day that Brown was decid-
ed, the Court held that segregation in the District of Columbia violat-
ed the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause despite the fact that 
the clause was written at a time when it was reasonably clear that the 
Constitution protected slavery.366  The Justices’ conference notes 
make clear that Brown II’s “all deliberate speed” equivocation was the 
result of a political compromise dictated by the felt need to avoid vio-
lent resistance, rather than by constitutional law.367  Brown had an-
nounced that school segregation was unconstitutional because of the 
special role of education and because of its effects on the hearts and 
minds of school children,368 but, to the dismay of constitutionalists,369 
the Court, without explanation, announced that the same rule ap-
plied in contexts that had nothing to do with children or educa-
 
Elaboration and Social Science in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978) 
(concluding that “[v]irtually everyone who has examined the question now agrees that 
the Court erred” in relying on the social science data). 
366  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  For doubts about the legal, as opposed to politi-
cal, underpinnings of Bolling, see KLARMAN, supra note 355, at 341.  See also  Michael 
McConnell,  McConnell, J., concurring in the judgment, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID  158, 166 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (stating that the hold-
ing in Bolling that segregrated schools violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment “is without foundation”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 21 (1980) (stating that Bolling’s holding is “gibberish both 
syntactically and historically”); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth 
Amendment,  64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 147 (1988) (stating that “no satisfactory theory” 
justifies Bolling).  But see David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and 
Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L. J. 1253 (2005) (defending Bolling); Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its 
Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon:  Bolling v. Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protec-
tion Component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, 92 VA. L. REV. 1879 (2006) (same). 
367 See TUSHNET, supra note 357, at 220 (noting that concern that “‘passions’ associated with 
desegregation  might lead to violent resistance . . . substantially affected the Court’s de-
liberations”). 
368  See Brown, 347 U.S. at  493 (supporting the Court’s holding on the ground that “it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.”) 
369  See, e.g., John Hart Ely, If at First You Don’t Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time?  Group 
Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 
218 (1998) (“[I]t seems rather transparently the case that Chief Justice Warren’s remarks 
about how segregated schools can impede the learning opportunities of black children, 
eloquent as they were, had little if any bearing on the per curiam orders that came down 
almost immediately thereafter, desegregating buses, golf courses and beaches, without 
any psychological buttresses of the sort that were at least attempted in Brown.”); Alexan-
der M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:  The Lin-
coln Mills Case,  71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1957) (“This is not to say that the per curiam or-
ders were wrong.  Nor is it to say that they could not be founded in reason, only that the 
Court made no effort to do so.”). 
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tion.370  When the Court was faced with a challenge to anti-
miscegenation laws in the immediate wake of Brown, it disposed of 
the case in a manner that most commentators consider lawless.371  In-
ternal materials regarding the Justices’ deliberations make clear that 
that its actions were motivated by the desire not to intensify southern 
resistance rather than by constitutional fidelity.372 
All of these decisions suggest that the Justices saw their role as po-
litical rather than legal.  Of course, when the Constitution served 
their purposes, they used constitutional rhetoric.  It does not follow, 
though, that the Justices were ultimately motivated by constitutional 
obedience.  When constitutional obligation got in the way, they ex-
hibited a remarkable readiness to override legal constraints. 
2.  The Warren Court’s Legacy  
In addition to its support for civil rights, the Warren Court revolu-
tionized criminal procedure,373 significantly expanded free speech 
protections,374 provided important guarantees for voting rights,375 and 
took tentative first steps toward providing constitutional protection 
 
370  See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 
(1955) (municipal golf course); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (pub-
lic beaches and bathhouses). 
371  See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (finding without explanation that the case was de-
void of a properly presented federal question).  For the leading example of criticism by 
commentators, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1964). 
372  For example, Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that the legal challenge could “not be re-
jected as frivolous” but that “moral considerations” for dismissing the appeal “far out-
weigh[ed] the technical considerations in noting jurisdiction”  because deciding the case 
would risk “thwarting or seriously handicapping the enforcement of [Brown].”  KLARMAN, 
supra note 355, at 322.  For an account of the Justices’ desperate efforts to get rid of the 
case, see id. at 322–23. 
373  See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel in criminal cases applies to felony defendants in state courts); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional 
search is inadmissible); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that custodial 
interrogations of suspects are not admissible unless police provided sufficient warnings 
against self-incrimination to suspects). 
374  See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects the publication of all statements about public officials except those made mali-
ciously); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (finding that speech can be 
prohibited when it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action”). 
375  See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that state legislature districts had 
to be as close to equal in population as possible); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663 (1966) declaring Virginia’s poll tax clause unconstitutional under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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for the poor.376  If one includes the early years of the Burger Court in 
the historical reckoning, then the protection of reproductive rights377 
and guarantees of gender equality378 should be added to the list of ac-
complishments. 
Commentators argued then, and continue to argue now, about 
the extent to which these decisions were manifestations of constitu-
tional fidelity.  Even on the assumption that they were, though, the 
more important question for present purposes is what the relation-
ship is between the Warren Court experience and the skeptical tradi-
tion.  On the one hand, it might be argued that the Warren Court 
experience demonstrates that judicially enforced constitutional obli-
gation can serve the interests of justice and progress.  There can be 
no doubt that the Court used the Constitution to eradicate the worst 
forms of racial subjugation.  Other Warren era decisions have also 
shown surprising resilience.  Miranda warnings are now part of our 
culture,379 the one-person, one-vote rule remains a touchstone in leg-
islative districting,380 and despite significant erosions in law381 and 
practice,382 the abortion right remains mostly intact.383 
 
376  See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that it was unconstitutional to deny 
a defendant the right to an appeal because he was unable to pay a fee for the trial tran-
script); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (finding that a one-year residency re-
quirement for a state welfare program was unconstitutional because it restricted interstate 
movement and there was no compelling state interest for the regulation); Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that states must give public aid recipients a pre-
termination evidentiary hearing before discontinuing their aid).  
377  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman’s right to an abortion 
falls within the right to privacy); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) 
(finding certain restrictions on the sale and advertisement of contraceptives unconstitu-
tional). 
378  See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that a probate law giving men manda-
tory preference was unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that 
a law permitting women over the age of 18 to buy nonintoxicating beer but prohibiting 
the sale of such beer to men under 21 constituted an unconstitutional gender classifica-
tion). 
379  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda and ac-
knowledging that Miranda warnings “have become part of our national culture”). 
380  See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 7 (2009) (acknowledging that “[i]t is common 
ground that state election-law requirements . . . may be superseded by . . . the one-person, 
one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution”). 
381  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding ban on “partial birth” abor-
tion). 
382  See Abortion Restrictions Enacted By States, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2014/01/03/us/abortion-restrictions-passed-by-states.html?_r=0 (noting 
that states enacted 70 new abortion restrictions in 2013). 
383  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (af-
firming the “core” of Roe). 
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But there is another side to the story.  Writing in the immediate 
wake of the Warren years, Alexander Bickel argued that the Court 
would ultimately be judged by its ability to predict the future.  He 
thought that the Court had failed to do so,384 and, now that the future 
has arrived, it seems that he was largely correct.  The point is not so 
much that Warren Court precedent has been overruled, although 
some of it certainly has been,385 as that it has become irrelevant.  For 
example, the effort to end segregated schools was mostly undone by 
neighborhood school policies superimposed upon residential segre-
gation.386  Warren Court criminal procedure reforms failed to prevent 
historically unprecedented increases in incarceration rates387 and a 
growing racial disproportion in those rates.388  Some commentators 
think that Warren Court decisions have actually worsened these 
trends.389  Similarly, the widespread implementation of political ger-
rymandering has made a mockery of the notion that one-person-one-
vote could produce political fairness.390  The Court’s hints that eco-
 
384  See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 115–181 
(1970). 
385  See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (overruling Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U.S. 410 (1969)); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (overruling Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391 (1963)). 
386  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KNAUSS, STILL SEGREGATED, STILL UNEQUAL:  ANALYZING THE 
IMPACT OF NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ON AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS (2007) (noting that 
by 2003, 73% of African American students were attending predominantly  minority 
schools, and that 38% of such students were attending schools that were over 90% minor-
ity). 
387  From 1970 to 2009, the number of people incarcerated in the United States grew from 
196,429 to 2.25 million, an increase of more than 1000%.  Compare MARGARET WERNER 
CAHALAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HISTORICAL CORRECTION 
STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES 1850–1984, at 35, 76 (1986), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/102529.pdf (showing 196,429 incarcerated persons in U.S. in 
1970), with Heather C. West, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 5 (2010), available at http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf (showing 2,297,400 incarcerated persons in 
U.S. in 2009). 
388  Black men are more than six times more likely to be imprisoned than white men.  See 
West, supra note 387, at 2.  Twenty percent of African American men born between 1965 
and 1969 had been imprisoned by the time they reached their early thirties.  See Becky 
Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course:  Race and Class Inequality in 
U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 151 (2004).  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, 
THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS (2010) (de-
scribing how the criminal justice system has become a contemporary system of mass racial 
control). 
389  See, e.g.,  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 220–43 
(2011). 
390  See, e.g., Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html (dis-
cussing how in the 2012 House elections, Democrats received 1.4 million more votes than 
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nomic injustice might be subject to constitutional attack were still-
born.391 
On a more general level, the Warren Court had at best limited 
success in convincing the country that judicial power legitimated by 
constitutional text dictated broad based social reforms.392  Today, 
many Warren Court decisions seem not so much legally wrong as po-
litically naïve.  In this sense, attitudes toward the Warren Court mir-
ror contemporary views about the 1960s as a whole.  Many contempo-
rary Americans think of the era as marked by well-meaning and even 
exhilarating efforts to achieve change, a few of which produced last-
ing contributions, but many of which backfired or fizzled. 
Some of the Warren Court’s difficulties were doctrinal.  As heirs 
of the Progressive tradition, the Justices often used Progressive analyt-
ic techniques to advance their constitutional arguments.  Since these 
techniques were originally developed to criticize constitutionalism, it 
is not surprising that the fit between them and the Court’s constitu-
tional agenda was awkward. 
For example, many Progressives criticized standard constitutional 
analysis that celebrated government neutrality and constraint.  They 
pointed out that standard conceptions of freedom and coercion were 
dependent on a baseline formed by government actions that shaped 
the market.  Government neutrality overlaid on market outcomes, 
themselves produced by background legal norms, empowered some 
private actors to coerce other private actors. 393 
Progressives made these arguments in service of criticizing consti-
tutional decisions, but the Warren Court tried to build on them to 
justify these decisions.  Most prominently, Brown refused to accept the 
facial neutrality of the separate but equal doctrine.  Even though 
both blacks and whites were equally barred from attending each oth-
er’s schools, when the doctrine intersected with a pervasively racial-
ized social system, it had the effect of producing a racial hierarchy.394  
 
Republicans, but because of gerrymandering, Republicans controlled the House by a 
margin of 234–201). 
391  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
392  The statement in text assumes that the Court’s exercise of judicial power was legitimated 
by constitutional text.  Of course, the Court’s many opponents denied that this was true.  
Either way, the Warren Court experience can be conceptualized as part of the skeptical 
tradition. 
393  See supra text accompanying notes 289–319. 
394  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“Segregation with the sanction of 
law . . . has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro 
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] in-
tegrated school system.” (quotation marks omitted)).  Cf. Charles Black, The Lawfulness of 
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The Warren Court thought that the government had an affirmative 
obligation to eliminate that effect—an obligation that could not be 
met by facial neutrality alone.  This positive rights orientation became 
increasingly apparent as the Court, faced with massive resistance, 
mandated remedies that required affirmative, race-conscious efforts 
to desegregate schools.395 
Some of the Court’s other well-known decisions demonstrate a 
similar refusal to take market baselines enforced by common law 
property allocations as a given.  For example, cases like Gideon v. 
Wainwright396 and Douglas v. California,397 guaranteeing a right to coun-
sel in some criminal cases, imposed an affirmative obligation on the 
state to provide lawyers to people who lacked the funds to pay for 
them.  These decisions rejected a facially neutral policy that denied 
free lawyers to rich and poor alike in favor of an affirmative duty to 
relieve at least this disadvantage produced by market allocations.  
Similarly, the Court’s public forum cases398 required governments to 
provide what amounted to a subsidy to speech activities by mandating 
the free use of public property.  New York Times v. Sullivan,399 which 
sharply limited common law libel rules, can also be conceptualized as 
mandating a free speech subsidy by permitting the press to inflict un-
compensated harm on public figures in the interest of increasing the 
amount of speech. 
The problem for the Court was that, just as some Progressives 
thought, the abandonment of common law baselines left constitu-
tional rights untethered from anything that could give them deter-
minate content.  Instead of clear and absolute limits on government 
power, rights became questions of degree and subject to balancing. 
For example, if the state had an affirmative obligation to desegre-
gate schools, then questions naturally arose about how much deseg-
regation was required and at what cost?  If lawyers had to be provided 
to indigent criminal defendants, how skilled did the lawyer have to 
be?  If the First Amendment required a subsidy for speech, how much 
 
the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J. 421, 424 (1960) (segregation was “set up and contin-
ued for the very purpose of keeping [African Americans] in an inferior station”). 
395  See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that “freedom of choice” 
plan did not satisfy Brown unless it produced actual desegregation). 
396  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
397  372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
398  E.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (recognizing the availability of a library as a 
public forum that can be regulated only in an equal, reasonable, non-discriminatory 
manner); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (overturning criminal convic-
tions based on vague and indefinite prohibitions against use of public forums). 
399  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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speech was constitutionally sufficient?  These are questions that can-
not be answered by simple fidelity to a constitutional text.  They ulti-
mately rest on politically contestable judgments about the compara-
tive worth of different goods.  But if that is all the Court’s decisions 
amounted to, why should they not be within the domain of ordinary 
politics? 
It would be foolish, though, to suppose that the Warren Court’s 
main problem was doctrinal.  Instead, its ultimate failure rested on a 
political miscalculation.  The Justices thought that they could harness 
constitutional obligation to produce meaningful social change.  They 
seemed to think that people would be motivated to do things that 
they would not otherwise do just because an elite institution told 
them that the Constitution required this action.  It turned out, 
though, that the rhetoric of obligation was insufficiently powerful to 
convince large numbers of people to accept change that they did not 
want.  Instead, as the political winds shifted and the composition of 
the Court changed, Warren Court interpretations were met with op-
posing interpretations that mandated different results that were more 
popular.400  The upshot is an experience that strongly reinforces skep-
tical doubts whether constitutional law can effectively combat the so-
cial, political, economic, and cultural forces that are the ultimate de-
terminates of public policy. 
F.  The Modern Period 
Today, no revered ex-President defends his own constitutional vio-
lations, raises questions about intergenerational obligation, or argues 
that Supreme Court decisions should be reversed by popular refer-
endum.  No one of consequence is burning the Constitution or call-
ing it a pact with the devil.  A handful of people well outside the 
mainstream still advocate secession, but no one takes them seriously.  
Instead, we are treated to the spectacle of members of Congress read-
ing the Constitution aloud before the beginning of a session and of a 
new requirement that every piece of legislation be accompanied by a 
defense of its constitutional validity.401  Liberals and conservatives 
alike are fully engaged in constitutional argument.  Even some legal 
academics associated with the left have embraced constitutional 
 
400  See generally POWE, supra note 353; GRAHAM supra note 353. 
401  Jennifer Steinhauer, Constitution Has Its Day (More or Less) in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 
2011, at A15. 
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originalism.402  At least superficially, it seems that the skeptical tradi-
tion has run into a dead end. 
In this Section, I argue that this conclusion is indeed superficial.  
Skeptical arguments no longer receive the kind of overt and boister-
ous support they once did, but one does not have to look very far be-
neath the surface to see that constitutional skepticism is nonetheless 
alive and well. 
1.  Popular Skepticism   
The public’s attitude toward constitutionalism is deeply conflict-
ed.  Many Americans profess unquestioning allegiance to the Consti-
tution,403 and commentators regularly make constitutional arguments 
on all sides of public policy issues.  But this seeming devotion to the 
Constitution is married to a deep cynicism about the role that consti-
tutional argument actually plays.  The cynicism finds clear expression 
in the media’s regular identification of judges and Justices with refer-
ence to the party of the president who appointed them.  It is on full 
display at judicial confirmation hearings, which have turned into un-
disguised political warfare.404  According to polling data, most Ameri-
cans believe that political considerations play at least some role in 
Supreme Court decision-making.405  It escapes almost no one’s atten-
tion that politicians regularly use constitutional arguments about, for 
example, health care, crime prevention, and voting rights to support 
conclusions that they would come to anyway. 
 
402  See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (endorsing, by way of originalism, what 
are typically considered to be “liberal” interpretations of the Commerce Clause, the Four-
teenth Amendment, and other historically divisive parts of constitutional text). 
403  See supra note 1. 
404  See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS:  CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 10 (1994) (discussing what had in the past few decades become 
systematic “vicious assaults on nominees”); cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme 
Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381. 
405  According to a poll conducted by CBS News and the New York Times in 2012, three quar-
ters of all Americans believe that Supreme Court Justices do not decide cases solely based 
on legal analysis, but rather “sometimes let their personal or political views influence 
their decisions.”  See Supreme Court/Judiciary, POLLING REPORT, http://www.pollingreport.
com/court.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).  In another poll, conducted by the Public Reli-
gion Research Institute in 2013, 55% of those surveyed thought that Supreme Court Jus-
tices were influenced by their own political views in making decisions “a lot,” and another 
32% thought that they were influenced “a little.”  Only 8% thought that the justices were 
influenced “not at all.”  See Religion & Political Tracking Poll, PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH 
INST. (May 23, 2013), available at http://publicreligion.org/site/wp-content/uploads/
2013/05/May-Religion-Politics-Topline1.pdf. 
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This combination of outward devotion to the rhetoric and rituals 
of constitutionalism with inner doubt and despair is bound to be un-
stable.  The situation is made only worse by the Supreme Court’s own 
ambivalence.  Consider, for example, two recent decisions exhibiting 
the two, rival forms of constitutional analysis currently in vogue.  In 
District of Columbia v. Heller,406 both sides conspicuously deployed 
originalist methodology.  Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the 
Court, found that the original public meaning of the Second 
Amendment made the District’s gun control statute unconstitutional.  
Justice John Paul Stevens, using the same techniques, found that the 
original public meaning of the amendment was consistent with the 
statute.407 
Both Justices filled scores of pages of the United States Reports 
with a detailed analysis of the linguistic structure, dictionary mean-
ings, and popular contemporary understanding of the amendment.  
Remarkably the upshot was a near standoff.  Five Justices thought that 
the statute was clearly inconsistent with the amendment, while four 
Justices thought that it was clearly not. 
Of course, all methods of analysis produce disagreement, but two 
additional facts about the Court’s performance make the outcome in 
Heller especially troubling.  First, the difference of opinion over sup-
posedly apolitical matters like semantics and dictionary meaning pre-
cisely tracked the ideological differences on the Court.  Somehow, all 
five of the conservative Justices read the amendment one way, while 
all four of the liberal Justices read the same language the other way. 
Second, virtually all of what the Justices on both sides of the ques-
tion wrote was deeply irrelevant to the important public policy ques-
tion that ought to concern us.  Gun control poses hard questions 
about which reasonable people can disagree.  Does any sensible per-
son suppose that these questions should be answered by determining 
what some people thought over two centuries ago in a society that was 
radically different in culture, technology, and geography? 
Many people who think that this is not a sensible way to decide 
questions like this adhere to the “living constitution” theory of inter-
pretation.  On this view, judges should not be limited by the original 
understanding of constitutional language, but instead should strive to 
 
406  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
407  Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (relying on 18th century meaning of “bear arms” to con-
clude that the amendment was violated), with id. at 646–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rely-
ing on 18th century meaning of “bear arms” to conclude that the amendment was not vi-
olated). 
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give it modern meaning.408  Although Justice Anthony Kennedy did 
not identify it as such, he used this approach in United States v. Wind-
sor,409 where he wrote for the Court to invalidate the Defense of Mar-
riage Act.410  Justice Kennedy’s opinion made no effort to uncover the 
original meaning of constitutional text or the specific intent of its 
framers.  Indeed, he barely identified the text he relied upon.  In-
stead, his opinion consisted of an extended sermon on the virtues of 
tolerance and respect for individuals. 
In their angry dissenting opinions, Justices Scalia and Samuel 
Alito were entirely correct in pointing out that Kennedy’s opinion 
rested on an implicit, nonconstitutional moral premise—that gay sex 
and marriage were, at worst, morally neutral and at best an important 
means of human expression.411  One might suppose from this attack 
that the conservatives stood for principled neutrality in what Justice 
Scalia has referred to as our “culture war.”412  Unfortunately for them, 
however, their own votes and opinions in racial affirmative action 
cases rest on a similarly contestable moral premise.  Like Kennedy’s 
opinion in Windsor, the opinions written by conservatives in cases 
about so-called racial preferences never investigate original public 
meaning.  Instead, they rest exclusively on moral and sociological 
judgments about the supposed evil of racial categorization.413 
Hypocrisy of this sort is too obvious to miss.  Nor does it require 
deep analysis to discover that the votes in Windsor and in affirmative 
action cases once again precisely track the Court’s political divisions.  
Given these facts, it is not surprising that many members of the gen-
eral public have difficulty taking the Court’s constitutional preten-
 
408  See, e.g., DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (advocating for an increased 
use of fluid common law and precedent, and asserting that the purpose of the Constitu-
tion is to provide common ground from which to derive solutions to disagreements 
among the American people about how the common law should evolve); STEVEN G. 
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2008). 
409  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
410  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
411  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2710–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2718–20 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing). 
412  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
413  I have found no case where Justices opposing affirmative action have discussed the origi-
nal public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For examples of these Justices rely-
ing instead on their moral and political views, see, for example, League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.”); Grutter v. Bol-
linger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(voting to invalidate a university’s racial admissions preference in part because “I believe 
blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university 
administrators”). 
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sions seriously.414  Perhaps more importantly, though, a surprisingly 
large number of Americans think that it is a good thing when the 
Court does not decide cases based solely upon the Constitution.  For 
example, a CBS News Poll conducted in 2013 asked respondents 
whether, when the Supreme Court decides an important constitu-
tional case, it should consider only the legal issue or also “what a ma-
jority of the public thinks about that subject.”  Forty-seven percent of 
respondents thought that the Justices should confine themselves to 
the legal issue, but forty-five percent thought that they should also 
consider public opinion.415  According to another poll, although sixty-
nine percent of respondents agreed with the statement that “[t]he 
United States Constitution is an enduring document that remains 
relevant today,” twenty-eight percent rejected the statement and 
agreed, instead, with the view that “[t]he United States Constitution 
is an outdated document that needs to be modernized.”416 
2.  Academic Skepticism   
Virtually all modern scholars of constitutional law begin with some 
kind of commitment to constitutional fidelity.  Only a tiny handful of 
legal academics overtly raise questions about constitutional obliga-
tion.417  But despite this fact, constitutional skepticism plays a central 
role in contemporary constitutional scholarship. 
Sometimes, it shows up in quite surprising places.  Consider, for 
example, the “Constitution in exile” movement.  Some conservative 
judges and scholars have argued that much of modern government, 
including the entire apparatus of the administrative state, violates the 
Constitution.418  Of course, their fervent complaints about this state of 
affairs are grounded in constitutional fidelity.  If one looks beneath 
the surface, however, their argument also supports the skeptical posi-
tion.  After all, if it is really true that for years, broad swaths of legal 
doctrine have been infected by blatant constitutional violation, then 
it cannot also be true that constitutional obedience plays a central 
 
414  See supra note 405. 
415  See id. 
416  See GFK ROPER PUB. AFFAIRS & CORPORATE COMMC’NS, supra note 1. 
417  I am one of them.  For my thoughts on the topic, see SEIDMAN, supra note 18.  See also Mi-
chael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997); Michael J. Klarman, What’s So 
Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145 (1998). 
418  See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1 REG. 83, 84 (1995) (noting that “for 
60 years, the nondelegation doctrine has existed only as part of the Constitution-in-
exile, . . . and Commerce Clauses”).  See generally Symposium, The Constitution in Exile:  Is it 
Time to Bring it in From the Cold?, 51 DUKE L. J. 1 (2001). 
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role in maintaining the stability of our government and culture.  In a 
backhanded way, the claims of the “Constitution in exile” proponents 
support the skeptical argument that constitutional obedience is un-
necessary to hold the country together. 
Moreover, if the “Constitution in exile” proponents are correct, 
we are faced with the daunting question of what to do about it.  Re-
turn to original constitutional understandings might, among other 
things, permit the revival of overt gender discrimination,419 and allow 
states to outlaw interracial marriage.420  A few diehards are prepared 
to accept this and more, but even most originalists find these out-
comes too much to swallow.  Accordingly, they avoid these results 
with transparent dodges like reliance on stare decisis or on the same 
sort of tendentious, result-driven arguments that they (rightly) accuse 
their opponents of using.  In obvious ways, the use of both techniques 
supports the skeptical position.     
Other conservative judges and academics are much more straight-
forward in endorsing aspects of constitutional skepticism.  For exam-
ple, natural law advocates like Hadley Arkes reject the proposition 
that we should rely on the Constitution if it is not supported by sound 
moral principles.421  Richard Posner, perhaps the best known lower 
federal court judge in the country and once the darling of conserva-
tives, maintains that the United States Supreme Court is political in 
its orientation and denies that constitutional law, at least as conven-
tionally understood, explains or justifies what judges do.422  J. Harvie 
Wilkinson, another distinguished conservative jurist, purports to dis-
agree with Posner but apparently shares his view that no theory of 
constitutional law is satisfactory.423  In a series of important works, 
 
419  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments,  
1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 161 (“Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from 
the original understanding is required to tie the fourteenth amendment’s equal protec-
tion clause to a command that government treat men and women as individuals equal in 
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.”).  But see Steven G. Calabresi & Julia Rickert, 
Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011) (countering that an 
originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment supports gender equality as well as ra-
cial equality). 
420  See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Were Separate-But-Equal and Antimiscegenation Laws Constitutional?:  
Applying Scalian Traditionalism to Brown and Loving, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 285 (2003). 
421  See HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990). 
422  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword:  A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 34 (2005). 
423  See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:  WHY AMERICANS ARE 
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 10 (2012). 
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Adrian Vermeule has advanced sophisticated arguments against use 
of the conventional tools of constitutional adjudication.424 
Scholars on the left are, if anything, even more receptive to skep-
tical positions.  For example, academics associated with Critical Legal 
Studies, including Mark Tushnet,425 Duncan Kennedy,426 and Peter 
Gabel427 have attacked the very concept of constitutional rights.  More 
recently, Tushnet,428 together with Larry Kramer429 and Jeremy Wal-
dron,430 have argued against the assumption that judges should en-
force the Constitution.  Tushnet has coupled this attack with an en-
dorsement of a “thin”431—some would say “anorexic”432—constitution 
limited to the ideals expressed in the Constitution’s preamble and 
the Bill of Rights.  In two important books,433 Sanford Levinson has 
written in detail about the Constitution’s many deficiencies and 
called for a new constitutional convention to correct them.  Bruce 
Ackerman434 and his colleague Akhil Amar435 have argued that the 
Constitution can be and has been changed outside the formal 
amendment process.  Mark Graber436 and J.M. Balkin437 have written 
 
424  See, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Originalism and Emergencies:  A Reply to Lawson,  
87 B.U. L. Rev. 313 (2007) (arguing against reliance on originalism to determine the 
scope of executive power in national emergencies); Vermeule, supra note 39 (arguing 
that even if originalism is theoretically a first-best approach, it should not be used in the 
real, second-best world). 
425  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984) (championing a 
“liberal theory of [positive] rights” over a theory of negative constitutional rights). 
426  See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (championing 
various critiques developed by critical legal studies). 
427  See generally Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the With-
drawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984). 
428  See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
429  See generally KRAMER, supra note 28. 
430  See. e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J. 1346 
(2006); Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Power and Popular Sovereignty, in MARBURY VERSUS 
MADISON:  DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 181 (Mark A. Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 
2002). 
431  See TUSHNET, supra note 428, at 11. 
432  See Saikrishna B. Prakash, America’s Aristocracy, 109 Yale L. J. 541, 553 (1999) (reviewing 
TUSHNET, supra note 428). 
433  SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED:  AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:  WHERE 
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
434  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) (arguing generally that “higher lawmaking” 
has always required acting beyond the bounds of Article V). 
435  See generally Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited:  Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
436  See generally MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 
(2006). 
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more generally about the problem of “constitutional evil.”  Girardeau 
Spann has argued that constitutional judicial review systematically 
harms racial minorities,438 and Gary Peller has attacked the standard 
integrationist view, which dominates constitutional treatments of 
race.439  Their colleague, Robin West, has maintained that constitu-
tionalism, especially when associated with judicial review, stunts mor-
al imagination.440 
Finally, scholars not closely associated with either the left or the 
right have seized on a variety of skeptical arguments.  For example, 
Michael Klarman441 and Gerald Rosenberg442 have both shown that 
judicial enforcement of constitutional text has been relatively unim-
portant in producing social change.  Barry Friedman has demon-
strated that constitutional decisions by judges usually conform to 
public opinion.443  Daryl Levinson has argued that constitutional obli-
gation plays an unimportant role in preventing political actors from 
abusing their power.444  Cass Sunstein has defended a “judicial mini-
malism” grounded in a deep distrust of constitutional litigation as a 
means of achieving broad scale social justice.445 
In short, reports of the death of constitutional skepticism are 
greatly exaggerated.  Of course, every generation refashions skeptical 
arguments to suit its own needs, just as every generation has its own 
version of constitutionalism.  The skepticism of early twenty-first cen-
tury America is not the same as the skepticism of the Founders, or of 
the antebellum period, or of the Progressives.  Yet amidst all of the 
celebration of the American Constitution and denigration of its crit-
ics, something identifiable as a skeptical tradition connected to cru-
cial political events throughout our history continues to survive and 
flourish. 
 
437  See generally J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1703 (1997). 
438  See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT:  SUPREME COURT AND 
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993). 
439  See generally GARY PELLER, CRITICAL RACE CONSCIOUSNESS:  RECONSIDERING AMERICAN 
IDEOLOGIES OF RACIAL JUSTICE (2011). 
440  See, e.g., Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1992). 
441  See generally Klarman, supra note 118. 
442  See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE?  (1991). 
443  BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367 (2009). 
444  See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics:  The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
445  Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword:  Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996). 
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II.  DISAGGREGATING AND REINTEGRATING THE VARIETIES OF 
SKEPTICISM 
As the last Part demonstrates, at one time or another, a large 
number of scholars and politicians have endorsed constitutional 
skepticism.  It has been a feature of some of the most important polit-
ical movements of our history and has fueled arguments of both the 
right and the left.  It might nonetheless be thought that this history 
exaggerates the influence of the skeptical argument because there is 
not really a single skeptical position, but, instead, a variety of quite 
different views misleadingly grouped under a single rubric. 
One response to this criticism is to point out that the mainstream 
constitutional tradition is similarly fragmented.  People who label 
themselves constitutionalists also believe a wide variety of different 
things, not all of which are consistent with each other.  Respect for 
constitutional text (interpreted in a variety of inconsistent ways446), 
for judicial decisions whether faithful to text or not,447 for various ver-
sions of tradition,448 and for philosophical understandings,449 all pass 
for constitutional commitment.450  If we do not expect unity from 
constitutionalism’s defenders, there is no reason to expect unity from 
its opponents. 
Perhaps this is answer enough, but in this Part, I nonetheless ex-
plore the question whether the various skeptical arguments I have 
discussed in Part I have a common core.  In Section A, I separate out 
the various strands of skepticism.  Section B argues that that these 
strands do indeed have something in common and that they are con-
nected to a deeply American belief in the possibility of right answers 
to moral and political questions. 
 
446  Compare Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) 
(arguing that discerning the original public meaning of a constitutional provision is the 
appropriate interpretational course), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Krakash, “Is that 
English You’re Speaking?”  Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 967 (2004) (contending that the original intent of speaker is instead preferable). 
447  See, e.g., Alexander & Schauer, supra note 107 (arguing that the Supreme Court should 
have final interpretive authority). 
448  Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (arguing for use of tradi-
tion at “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protec-
tion to, the asserted right can be identified”), with id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing for a broader conception of tradition.) 
449  See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 23 (arguing for interpretations based on the philosophically 
best reading of the legal materials). 
450  Cf. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism,  59 DUKE L. J. 239, 239 (2009) 
(arguing that “originalism is not a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional inter-
pretation, but is rather a disparate collection of distinct constitutional theories that share 
little more than a misleading reliance on a common label”). 
94 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
A.  Varieties of Skepticism 
In this Section, I attempt to disentangle the various strands of 
skepticism while simultaneously offering the beginnings of a defense 
for each variety. 
1.  Constitutional Evil 
The starting point for most skeptical arguments is a perceived gap 
between constitutional commands on the one hand and some other 
source of normative authority on the other.  If a constitution, or a 
particular provision in a constitution, is evil, why should anyone obey 
it?451  The argument that one shouldn’t was made most persuasively 
and directly by antebellum abolitionists.  If constitutional protection 
for slavery was indeed a pact with the devil, why adhere to it?452 
A believer in constitutionalism might respond that skeptics should 
not be so doctrinaire.  I might believe that a particular provision is 
evil but still choose to obey on the grounds that most other people 
believe it to be good.  After all, how can I be so sure that I am right 
and they are wrong?453 
Unfortunately, though, normative humility does not solve the 
problem of constitutional evil.  Of course, people should be open-
minded and wonder about the rightness of their own judgments 
when many others disagree.  Initial judgments should be corrected to 
account for these and other facts.  But the question remains:  Why 
should I obey a constitutional provision when it conflicts with my cor-
rected judgment? 
At first, one might think that constitutional evil poses a problem 
only if the constitution is in fact evil.  If the constitution is not evil, or 
if it is more good than evil, or if it is more good than the likely alter-
natives, then, one might think, the problem does not arise.  It turns 
out, though, that at least on the conceptual level, constitutional evil 
creates a problem for even good constitutions. 
 
451  Of course, one answer is that the Constitution, taken as a whole, is better than any likely 
alternative.  This argument was successfully pressed during the ratification debates by 
Federalists, who managed to frame the issue as a choice between an unamended constitu-
tion and the status quo.  See supra note 3.  But the answer is unsatisfying if one believes 
that particular evil provisions can be excised without jeopardizing the overall agreement 
or if one believes that the evil of some provisions outweighs the good done by others. 
452  See supra text accompanying notes 220–26. 
453  Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review:  A Comment on 
Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1997) 
(arguing that respect for the opinions of others and a willingness to suspend belief in the 
correctness of one’s own judgments is an essential element of responsible judging). 
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The problem reemerges when one focuses on what it means to 
“obey” a constitution.  Acceding to a constitutional provision because 
of accidental overlap between the provision and a binding norm is 
not obedience.  No one would say that Orthodox Jews are obeying 
Koranic law when they refuse to eat pork or that Americans who ab-
stain from armed robbery are obeying the laws of Finland, even if Fin-
land asserts universal jurisdiction for its laws.  In order for authentic 
obedience to take hold, the command in question must make a dif-
ference.  If the command does no work—if one would engage in the 
same conduct whether or not the command existed—then the need 
for obedience simply does not arise. 
It follows that constitutional evil is a problem for even the good 
constitution.  It is true that if one believes that a constitution is good, 
one need not lose sleep over whether to follow its terms.  But follow-
ing those terms is contingent on that belief.  If an independent belief 
in the goodness of constitutional provisions is the only ground that 
supports a duty to comply, then the duty will disappear whenever one 
disagrees with what the constitution says.  Moreover, even if a lucky 
individual happens to live in a jurisdiction where there is no gap be-
tween a constitution and other commitments, there remains the diffi-
culty of what stance to take toward others who disagree with constitu-
tional provisions.  How can I in good faith insist that you must obey 
provisions that you find odious when my own compliance is contin-
gent on my substantive agreement with the provisions? 
For similar reasons, this understanding of obedience undermines 
the common observation that, despite some bad provisions, the good 
in the United States Constitution outweighs the bad.  Perhaps it does, 
but that observation does not explain why we should not adhere to 
the good provisions while ignoring the bad.  Maybe selective obedi-
ence is impossible because the Constitution is somehow a package 
deal.  Still, acceptance of the package is again contingent on a belief 
based on nonconstitutional norms that the good outweighs the bad.  
Following a constitution in these circumstances rests not on obedi-
ence, but on a contingent overlap between constitutional commands, 
taken as a whole, and one’s nonconstitutional conception of the 
good.  A test for authentic obedience arises only when the balance is 
struck the other way.  People who reject constitutional skepticism 
must explain why in these circumstances, we should adhere to consti-
tutional commands. 
A more promising solution plays off the similarity between the 
problem of constitutional obligation and the more general problem 
of political obligation.  Of course, constitutions can be evil and, obvi-
ously, when they are, political theory faces difficult dilemmas.  But 
96 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
ordinary law can also be evil, and theorists over several millennia have 
struggled with the problem of general political obligation.  It comes 
as no surprise that an anarchist who believes that all these efforts 
have been unsuccessful will also be a constitutional skeptic.  But most 
people are not anarchists.  The challenge for nonanarchists who are 
also constitutional skeptics is to explain why constitutional obligation 
is especially problematic.  Put differently, they must explain why con-
stitutions are different from ordinary law.  The next Section provides 
one answer to that challenge. 
2.  The Dead Hand Problem 
One difference between constitutions and ordinary law is that 
constitutions tend to be more entrenched against change.  Perhaps 
comparative entrenchment is not a conceptually necessary feature of 
constitutions, but it is at least empirically associated with them.  As it 
happens, the association is especially important in the United States, 
which has the most entrenched national constitution in the world.454 
Entrenchment raises skeptical doubts about why a society should 
feel bound by decisions made long ago.  Even if ordinary laws should 
be obeyed, why obey judgments that are relatively immune to 
change?  This version of skepticism consists of two related worries.  
First, constitutions that are old are bound to have provisions that fit 
poorly with current social and technological realities.  It is far from 
clear that decisions about, say, privacy, press freedoms, or guns made 
hundreds of years ago in a small, mostly rural republic that had never 
heard of television, the Internet, or semiautomatic weapons also 
make sense today.  Progressives, writing in the wake of the industrial 
revolution repeatedly pressed a version of this argument,455 as did 
Franklin Roosevelt when he complained that the Supreme Court was 
enforcing a “horse and buggy” version of the Constitution.456 
 
454  Article V makes the requirement of equal suffrage in the Senate—the requirement, in 
other words, that both California and Wyoming have two senators—legally unamendable.  
There is no absolute legal barrier to amending the rest of the document, but the re-
quirement of approval by either two-thirds of each House or by a constitutional conven-
tion followed, in either case, by approval of three-fourths of the states often makes 
amendment a practical impossibility. 
455  See, e.g., Robert M. La Follette, Introduction to GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY 
VI (1912) (attacking courts for “fossilized precedent” and “detachment from the vital, liv-
ing facts of the present day”). 
456  See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference (May 31, 1935), available at http://newdeal.
feri.org/court/fdr5_31_35.htm (arguing that “[t]he country was in the horse-and-buggy 
age when [the Commerce Clause of the Constitution] was written”). 
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Second, entrenchment raises questions about democratic legiti-
macy.  Why should people long dead “outvote” people alive now who 
should have the right live their own lives?  As we have seen, this was 
the problem that preoccupied Hume,457 Paine,458 and, especially, Jef-
ferson.459  Constitutions are often defended as acts of political auton-
omy.  Skeptics argue that the autonomy of dead generations comes at 
the price of subservience of living generations. 
One response to both branches of the argument is that en-
trenchment derives not from ancient command but from present 
choice.  Modern Americans are not forced, kicking and screaming as 
it were, to follow constitutional commands.  After all, the Framers 
have no actual power over us.  We obey the Constitution because we 
have made a current choice to obey. 
On reflection, however, this response dissolves into arguments 
that have already been addressed.  If one means by it that Americans 
today obey the Constitution only because they believe that it is sub-
stantively good, then, for reasons discussed above, they are not en-
gaged in authentic obedience.  Perhaps instead, the point is, that, 
whether rightly or wrongly, modern Americans simply think that they 
have a duty to accede to what the Framers wrote even when they disa-
gree with it.  But if this is all the argument amounts to, then the posi-
tion engages rather than refutes the skeptical tradition.  Skeptics will 
respond that before making a decision to blindly obey, Americans 
need to think about the skeptical arguments against doing so.  It 
makes no sense to short circuit a discussion about skepticism with the 
bare assertion that people presently reject it. 
Finally, a constitutionalist might respond that Americans who dis-
agree with some constitutional provisions nonetheless feel bound to 
them because political community must exist over time, and our con-
stitutional tradition defines who we are as a nation.460  But this asser-
tion merely raises the central issue to which this Article is addressed.  
Assuming arguendo that the point about political communities is 
correct, we nonetheless need to decide how to define our political 
tradition.  The burden of my argument is that skepticism offers an at-
tractive alternative to the standard story. 
It turns out, then, that entrenchment poses a serious problem for 
constitutionalists and provides a reason why people who accept gen-
eral political obligation might nonetheless reject constitutional obli-
 
457  See supra text accompanying note 61. 
458  See supra text accompanying notes 68–71. 
459  See supra text accompanying notes 149–52. 
460  See supra text accompanying note 20. 
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gation.  Of course, it is true that ordinary statutes are also entrenched 
to some extent.  No sane government could operate under a system 
where laws expired as soon as they were enacted.  The need for plan-
ning, settlement, and certainty have some claim upon us, and it 
would be wildly inefficient—in fact, impossible—to constantly rethink 
every political decision we have made. 
But this fact demonstrates only that the distinction between stat-
utes and constitutions is a matter of degree rather than kind.  So long 
as constitutions are relatively entrenched when compared to ordinary 
law, then, skeptics insist, constitutionalists must justify the extra mar-
gin of entrenchment.  Put differently, our ordinary laws should strike 
the right balance between stability and change.  Constitutionalists 
must explain why the ordinary balance is inappropriate in the case of 
constitutional provisions. 
3.  Indeterminacy 
Of course, entrenchment would hardly matter if the entrenched 
provisions did not bind us to anything.  One way to understand the 
claims made by eighteenth century American constitutionalists461 and 
by Franklin Roosevelt almost two hundred years later462 is that consti-
tutional commands are deeply indeterminate.  Perhaps they set out 
fixed ideals or general goals, but the ideals and goals are so vague 
that they can only structure discussions, not dictate outcomes. 
The indeterminacy point is double-edged.  On the one hand, 
American Legal Realists utilized it as a skeptical cudgel against rule-
of-law conservatives.  They argued that the decisions of Lochner era 
judges were not a scientific and logical explication of clear rules.  In-
stead, they were manifestations of regressive political choices that, 
because they could not be honestly defended, were obfuscated by le-
gal rhetoric.463  Critical Legal Studies has made the same point in our 
own time.464 
On the other hand, indeterminacy also provides a kind of defense 
against skeptical accusations.  How can the Constitution possibly be 
 
461  See supra text accompanying notes 65–75. 
462  See supra text accompanying notes 329–37. 
463  See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound,  44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1931) (identifying legal realism with “[d]istrust of traditional 
legal rules . . . insofar as they purport to describe what . . . courts . . . are actually doing,” 
and exploration of “the theory of rationalization” for what light it can give to “the study of 
opinions”). 
464  See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down:  A Critique of Interpretivism and Neu-
tral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (defending indeterminacy thesis). 
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evil if it allows us to do whatever we want?  In what sense are we 
bound by the Framers’ dead hands if their language is infinitely plas-
tic? 
Skeptics can offer a layered response to constitutionalist coopta-
tion of the indeterminacy argument.  First, some provisions of the 
Constitution are not indeterminate.  The text is clear that the Presi-
dent does not have a lifetime appointment and that measures passed 
by the Russian Parliament are not thereby the laws of the United 
States.  These particular examples of textual clarity hardly matter, but 
other provisions—for example entrenching representation in the 
Senate that is wildly disproportionate or allowing a President to be 
elected while losing the popular vote—are quite consequential. 
A thoroughgoing believer in the indeterminacy thesis might deny 
that even these results are inevitable.  A clever enough lawyer, she will 
insist, can get around any constitutional language.  Perhaps, for ex-
ample, equal protection principles as applied to the federal govern-
ment through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause465 outlaw 
both our system of Senate representation and the Electoral College.466 
This point is undoubtedly correct as a conceptual matter.  All lan-
guage is conventional.  Given sufficient change in cultural assump-
tions, the meaning of words can change dramatically.  But although 
accurate as far as it goes, the point ignores the fact that language has 
undeniable meaning once one specifies a surrounding culture.  It is 
simply a fact that despite theoretical linguistic underspecification, 
people effortlessly understand which interpretations make sense and 
which do not.  I would not write this Article but for the hope that 
others will understand what I mean, and judges and other decision-
makers unquestionably sometimes have the internal experience of 
feeling bound by legal language.467  The fact that these understand-
ings are not built into the internal structure of language—and even 
the fact that they may be conditioned by exercises of social power—
does not undermine this point.  For whatever reason, words some-
times bridge the gap between persons. 
All this suggests that the indeterminacy thesis, at least in its ex-
treme and global form, is incorrect.  But if the thesis is wrong, how 
 
465  See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying equal protection provisions to 
the federal government). 
466  But cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574 (1964) (distinguishing malapportionment in 
the Houses of Congress on the ground that the malapportionment “is one ingrained in 
our Constitution, as part of the law of the land” and “[i]t is one conceived out of com-
promise and concession indispensable to the establishment of our federal republic”). 
467  Cf. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION:  FIN DE SIÈCLE (1997). 
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can it be part of a skeptical critique?  Here we come to the second 
layer of the skeptical argument.  Of course, some constitutional lan-
guage is relatively determinate, but other language is quite indeter-
minate.  At least given today’s culture, we think we know what it 
means when the Constitution says that each state shall be represented 
by two senators, but it is anybody’s guess what constitutes “equal pro-
tection of the laws” or a “Republican form of Government.”468  The 
problem, then, is this:  To the extent that Constitutional language is 
determinate, we confront the constitutional evil and dead hand prob-
lems.  To the extent that it is indeterminate, we confront the problem 
of who will have the final authority to declare its meaning. 
Moreover, whatever body is given this authority is bound to exag-
gerate the size of the determinacy domain.  This tendency is built in-
to the very structure of constitutional obligation.  Because the legiti-
macy of the decision maker rests on constitutional obligation, the 
decision maker cannot admit that the decisions are based on non-
constitutional considerations.  The result is a kind of systematic mis-
representation.  Just as the Legal Realists claimed, people who believe 
in constitutional obligation are tricked into acceding to commands 
that are not really dictated by the Constitution. 
4.  Judicial Supremacy 
On the conventional view, Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court have final interpretive authority.469  Many skeptics throughout 
our history, including Jefferson, Lincoln, and Theodore and Franklin 
Roosevelt, have rejected this axiom.470  Oddly, though, it takes some 
work to explain why the axiom is part of the skeptical tradition at all. 
There are two reasons why the case against judicial supremacy fits 
uneasily within the skeptical tradition.  First, whatever its other prob-
lems, judicial supremacy does not contribute to the dead hand or 
constitutional evil difficulties.  If judges did not enforce the Constitu-
tion, and if we are not to give up altogether on constitutional obliga-
tion, then constitutional commands would have to be enforced by 
some other institution.  But whatever institution did the enforcing 
would be obligated to privilege opinions held by people long dead 
 
468  This distinction roughly parallels the distinction many “new originalists” make between 
constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction.  See, e.g., Lawrence B. So-
lum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
469  See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (asserting the Supreme Court’s final inter-
pretive authority). 
470  See supra Part II. 
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over opinions held by Americans today and, so, would implicate the 
dead hand problem.  If these provisions were evil, then people alive 
today would still be confronted with the daunting question why they 
should respect those provisions rather than their present, all-things-
considered judgment. 
Second, there is a sense in which judicial supremacy is at war with 
constitutionalism rather than with constitutional skepticism.  Judicial 
supremacy privileges the dictates of judges over constitutional com-
mands.  Put differently, when judges get it wrong, judicial supremacy 
mandates constitutional disobedience. 
The attack on judicial supremacy can nonetheless be formulated 
in a fashion that makes it an important part of the skeptical tradition.  
It is again useful to distinguish between constitutional provisions with 
determinate and indeterminate meaning. 
Suppose first that the meaning of a constitutional provision is suf-
ficiently indeterminate that it fails to resolve a contested case.  Then, 
as explained above, when judges have final authority, their decision 
must be based on something other than constitutional law.  At first, it 
might seem strange for opponents of constitutional obligation to 
complain about this fact.  After all, their core objection is to the privi-
leging of constitutional text.  The problem, though, is that judges 
regularly claim that they are not actually exercising power, but are in-
stead merely doing what the Constitution requires.  To the extent 
that the public believes that this is so, the decisions of judges have 
more prestige than they deserve.  Moreover, even if the public does 
not believe a word of it, the decisions are systematically less subject to 
a democratic check than those of other officials. 
One might suppose that these problems do not arise if the text is 
determinate.  Even if it is, though, judges might simply refuse to do 
what the text requires.  When this happens, we run into the problem 
that worried Hobbes and Madison. 471  The central promise of consti-
tutionalism is that agreement on a set of principles, usually incorpo-
rated in a constitutional text, can settle otherwise destabilizing disa-
greement at the political level.  Unfortunately, though, as soon as 
people begin to complain that others are ignoring constitutional text, 
this promise can no longer be kept.  Obviously, settlement will not be 
achieved if everyone can insist on her own version of the Constitu-
tion.  Hence, the need for an authoritative interpreter.  But if the in-
terpreter is in fact authoritative, then we are not committed to consti-
tutional obedience after all, but instead to the hierarchical order 
 
471  See supra Part I.A.1. 
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produced by obedience to the dictates of the interpreter—dictates 
that might actually violate the Constitution. 
5.  Realizability 
The dilemma of judicial supremacy leads directly to the final 
strand of constitutional skepticism—the problem of implementation.  
Even if constitutions are good, and even if they are somehow demo-
cratically legitimate, how are they to be enforced?  Social stability 
demands public institutions powerful enough to coerce recalcitrant 
individuals who want to reject collective judgments.  But once em-
powered, how are these institutions to be restrained?  To paraphrase 
Madison, public spirited officials require no constitutional con-
straints, while officials who are more willful and self-interested are un-
likely to respond to them.472  In either case, it seems doubtful that 
constitutional obligation makes much of a difference. 
One might suppose that this worry is refuted by facts on the 
ground.  We do not see American presidents regularly jailing their 
political opponents or cancelling elections.  Congress does not pass 
statutes that establish an official religion, and the Supreme Court 
does not hold people in contempt when they criticize its opinions. 
But this overlap between official behavior and constitutional 
commands does not demonstrate causation.  To prove that constitu-
tions are effective, constitutionalists must show not just that the be-
havior of public officials corresponds to what constitutions require, 
but also that the officials behave this way because of the constitution-
al requirement.  Put differently, they would have to show that officials 
who had the power and the motive to do something that the Consti-
tution prohibits regularly abstain from this behavior just because of 
the constitutional prohibition.473 
In fact, there are many constraints on public officials that have 
nothing to do with constitutional obligation.  Consider all the things 
that the Constitution permits but that officials nonetheless abstain 
from doing.  Congress does not refuse to appropriate money paying 
the salary of the President’s press secretary or reduce the size of the 
Supreme Court to two justices.  The President does not threaten to 
veto every bill that Congress enacts unless he gets his way.  Supreme 
Court Justices do not campaign for political candidates and have, on 
 
472  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 99, at 269 (“If men were angels, 
no government would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary.”). 
473  This point is elaborated on at length in Levinson, supra note 38. 
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occasion, made extraordinary efforts not to interfere with a sitting 
president’s domestic programs.474  These actions are not prevented by 
constitutional obedience because the Constitution does not prohibit 
them.  (In fact, in the case of judicial efforts to avoid confrontation 
with a president, the Court’s actions may be in tension with constitu-
tional obligation as the Justices themselves understand it).  Instead, 
the restraint comes from some combination of political calculation, 
habit, moral inhibition, and fear of retaliation.  Why should we sup-
pose that the same forces would not prevent other kinds of over-
reaching even if there were no Constitution? 
In recent years, inhibitions against extraordinary measures of this 
kind have begun to erode as a more Manichean conception of Amer-
ican politics takes hold.475  Perhaps the inhibitions will eventually col-
lapse completely.  If they do, though, it is foolish to suppose that con-
stitutional text will save us.  Ultimately, a political community 
requires forbearance, compromise, empathic connection, and a sense 
of a shared fate to survive.  Once these disappear, ancient words sub-
ject to radically different interpretations and with doubtful connec-
tion to our present circumstances are unlikely to save it. 
B.  The Common Core of Constitutional Skepticism 
In the previous Section, I arranged the various skeptical argu-
ments in a fashion designed to demonstrate an overlap between 
them.  At the very least, the varieties of skepticism share a family re-
semblance.  In this Section, I hope to go beyond this claim and 
demonstrate that they also share a common core.  My strategy is to 
start by exploring the relationship between constitutional skepticism 
and a more global skepticism about the possibility of right answers to 
political and moral problems.  Although not logically required, as a 
contingent historical fact, American constitutional skepticism has of-
ten been associated with a rejection of global skepticism.  That link-
age, in turn, unifies the various strands of skeptical argument and 
connects them to American optimism about the possibility of moral 
progress. 
 
474  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., 
alternative holding) (“The Government asks us to interpret the [health care] mandate as 
imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution.  Granting the Act the full 
measure of deference owed to federal statutes, it can be so read . . . .”). 
475  See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004) (explaining 
the emergence of a new political practice by which actions are taken that technically fit 
within the bounds of constitutional doctrine but nonetheless come in tension with exist-
ing pre-constitutional understandings). 
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1.  Constitutional and Global Skepticism 
Global moral and political skepticism takes a variety of different 
forms.  Some skeptics doubt the possibility of objective moral truth 
and think of moral assertions as having the same status as claims 
about tastes and wants.  Others, who concede at least arguendo, the 
possibility of moral truth doubt the possibility of reliably discovering 
it.  Still other skeptics think that moral truths lack the kind of uncon-
troversial foundation that would allow us to discuss them and come to 
agreement on what they are.476 
Whatever form this global skepticism takes, there is an apparent 
link between it and constitutional skepticism.  After all, if there is no 
good reason to believe that any action is morally required, how can 
one believe that constitutional obedience is so required?477  Converse-
ly, one might link constitutionalism to moral realism.  For example, 
one might think that there is a moral obligation to obey the Constitu-
tion because the method by which it was adopted demands our re-
spect.478 
People who insist on these linkages are not making a logical mis-
take.  Viewed from a certain angle, there is indeed an association be-
tween moral and constitutional skepticism.  But although the associa-
tion is a permissible one, it is not compelled.  It is also possible to 
base constitutional skepticism on a rejection of global skepticism. 
Two of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ most famous dissents illus-
trate how global skepticism can point in opposite directions.  Justice 
Holmes’ traumatic experiences during the Civil War left him with a 
deep suspicion of claims to immutable moral truth.479  In his dissent-
 
476  This is not the place for a sophisticated exploration of the various skeptical positions.  For 
a useful taxonomy, see Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424, 
2433–36 (1992). 
477  Cf. Amy Gutmann, How Liberal Is Democracy, in LIBERALISM RECONSIDERED 37 (Douglas 
MacLean & Claudia Mills eds., 1983) (arguing that moral skepticism cannot support de-
mocracy because a moral skeptic must be skeptical of the worth of democracy). 
478  I am grateful to Deborah Hellman for helping me to see this point. 
479  See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:  LAW AND THE INNER SELF 
82 (1995)  Thomas Corcoran, who served as his secretary, quotes Justice Holmes as saying 
that “the only other guy who really knew what he was here for was [Chief Justice Edward] 
White.”  When Corcoran asked for an explanation, Holmes replied, 
I fought in The Civil War on the Union side.  White fought on the Confederate 
side.  He and I knew that the Court should never lend status to any faction which 
might push us toward another conflict.  My style was never to write anything ex-
cept about the particular case under consideration.  No generalization, no phi-
losophizing.  I wrote so short you couldn’t understand it and White wrote so long 
that you couldn’t understand it. 
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ing opinion in Lochner v. New York, this skepticism led him to reject 
the effort to constitutionalize freedom of contract.  Claiming that 
“[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases,” and that legal 
decisions “will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than 
any articulate major premise,” he doubted that one could reason to 
this constitutional outcome.  Because the Constitution was “made for 
people of fundamentally differing views,” judges should be slow to 
“prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion.”480  Yet in his 
dissent in Abrams v. United States, this same skepticism led Holmes to 
constitutionalize protection for speech freedoms.  Just because “time 
has upset many fighting faiths,” therefore “the ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas.”481 
John Dewey’s evolving ideas about constitutionalism demonstrate 
the same point.  Dewey’s adherence to Pragmatism left him skeptical 
about permanent, noninstrumental conceptions of truth.  Early in his 
career, this skepticism led him to denigrate constitutional protection 
for individual rights.482  After World War I, the same skepticism about 
deep moral foundations caused him to celebrate civil liberties and 
the openness of American society.483 
The writings of Dewey and Holmes demonstrate that there is no 
necessary association between global and constitutional skepticism.  
Global skepticism might cause one to be skeptical about constitution-
al obligation, but it also might cause one to substitute “local 
knowledge” or norms within a conventional practice for moral foun-
dations.  Put differently, if there is no foundational truth that all must 
accept, then all we are left with are norms for particular communities 
like those contained in a national constitution.  Conversely, moral re-
alism is compatible with the view that there is a foundational, moral 
obligation to obey a constitutional text, but it might also cause one to 
disobey the text if one thinks that the text is inconsistent with founda-
tional moral obligations. 
As a contingent, historical fact, many constitutionalists have been 
moral skeptics of one kind or another, and many constitutional skep-
tics have believed in the possibility of moral truth.  Consider first the 
global skeptics who endorse constitutionalism.  In his famous article 
 
  John S. Monagan, Pawtucket Irishman and Magnificent Yankee, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Feb. 1987, at 
16. 
480  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
481  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
482  See supra text accompanying notes 310–11. 
483  See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 200–207 (1973) 
(describing Dewey’s post-war position). 
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defending constitutional originalism,484 Robert Bork began with the 
premise that moral philosophy could not resolve important issues of 
public policy.  On his view, there was “no principled way to prefer any 
claimed human value to any other” or to “decide that one man’s grat-
ifications are more deserving of respect than another’s or that one 
form of gratification is more worthy than another.”485  A person insist-
ing on the right to sexual intimacy with her spouse had the same sta-
tus as an electric company insisting on providing low cost power by 
polluting the air, he claimed.  It was just because there was no way to 
make these differentiations, Bork insisted, that judges acted illegiti-
mately when they tried to discover fundamental moral values and 
were obligated instead to enforce “neutral” constitutional text.486 
Bork’s contemporary, John Hart Ely, developed a very different 
but similarly influential version of constitutionalism.487  Whereas Bork 
emphasized constitutional text, Ely recognized the indeterminacy of 
text alone and attempted to fill the lacuna by reference to the overall 
spirit and aims of the Constitution.  In his view, the Constitution was 
mostly about fair procedures.  Courts acted appropriately when they 
read the document to require such procedures, but not when they 
read into it their own moral conceptions.488  Strikingly, although his 
conclusions are very different, Ely’s analysis began precisely where 
Bork’s does.  He wrote: 
If there is such a thing as natural law, and if it can be discovered, it would 
be folly . . . to ignore it as a source of constitutional values.  It's not nice 
to fool Mother Nature, and even Congress and the President shouldn't 
be allowed to do so.  We know it won't work, though.  The idea is a dis-
credited one in our own society, and for good reason.  “[A]ll theories of 
natural law have a singular vagueness which is both an advantage and 
disadvantage in the application of the theories.”  The advantage, one 
gathers, is that you can invoke natural law to support anything you want.  
The disadvantage is that everybody understands that.489 
Once again, it is just because argument about natural law solves noth-
ing that, on Ely’s view, we should instead resolve our differences by 
reference to the Constitution. 
 
484  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
485  Id. at 8, 10. 
486  Id. 
487  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) 
(recognizing the inadequacy of both bare originalism and reliance on legislative intent 
and instead advocating constitutional interpretation that takes into account the broad 
values and aims, or the “spirit,” instilled within the Constitution). 
488  Id. at 44–48. 
489  Id. at 50. 
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Still a third highly influential version of constitutionalism, John 
Rawls’s theory of political liberalism, is similarly grounded.490  Rawls 
did not attack moral truth per se, but he despaired of the ability of 
people in a diverse society to have reasoned discussions of what he 
called “comprehensive doctrines.”491  If we are to have civic peace 
rooted in justice, he claimed, we must forego moral discussions of 
this sort and rely instead on an overlapping consensus, which he as-
sociated with standard, western constitutionalism.492 
Many constitutional skeptics have had a very different conception 
of moral truth and the possibilities for moral argument.  As discussed 
above, most skepticism is rooted in the problem of constitutional evil, 
which, in turn, presupposes an ability to know and debate moral 
truth.  The point is most obvious with regard to the antebellum aboli-
tionists.  Abolitionism was closely associated with the Second Great 
Awakening, the large-scale religious revival that gripped mid-
nineteenth century America.493  Abolitionists infused their rhetoric 
with claims to moral truth.  Garrison insisted that the Constitution 
was a “pact with the devil,”494 and Julia Ward Howe was confident that 
the slaves would ultimately be freed because God’s “truth is marching 
on.” 
Similarly, Jefferson, Lincoln and both Roosevelts had no qualms 
about using religious and moral rhetoric to support their programs 
when they were in tension with constitutional obligation.  Jefferson 
had eccentric views about religion, but his defense of rebellion rested 
crucially on the “self evident truth” that all men were “endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”  For years, while Lin-
coln temporized about slavery, he presented himself as a constitu-
tionalist.  But the Lincoln we remember is not the figure who in his 
first inaugural insisted on his constitutional obligation to protect 
slavery where it already existed.  It is, instead, the Lincoln of the se-
cond inaugural who invoked not the Constitution, but the will of God 
to justify the bloody struggle against slavery: 
The Almighty has His own purposes.  “Woe unto the world because of of-
fenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by 
 
490  See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
491  Id. at 242–43. 
492  Id. (“[D]iscourse can seem shallow because it does not set out the most basic grounds on 
which we believe our view rests. . . .  But it is only in this way, and by accepting that poli-
tics in a democratic society can never be guided by what we see as the whole truth, that we 
can . . . live politically with others in the light of reasons all might reasonably be expected 
to endorse.”). 
493  See, e.g., ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 65 (1980). 
494  See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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whom the offense cometh.”  If we shall suppose that American slavery is 
one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, 
but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills 
to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as 
the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein 
any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living 
God always ascribe to Him?  Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, 
that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away.  Yet, if God wills 
that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred 
and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of 
blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, 
as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said “the judg-
ments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.”495 
Theodore Roosevelt began his 1912 campaign with the claim that 
“We stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord.”496  In his first 
inaugural address, Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed that “The money 
changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civiliza-
tion. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The 
measure of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social 
values more noble than mere monetary profit.”497 
2.  Skepticism’s Common Core 
This association of constitutional skepticism with claims to moral 
truth helps to link what might otherwise seem like disparate skeptical 
arguments.  At bottom, constitutional skepticism rests on a rejection 
of the idea that constitutional text can bridge moral disagreement.  
People have an obligation to investigate moral truth for themselves, 
and, when they do so, they may discover that there is a gap between 
what the Constitution commands and moral obligation.  Hence, the 
problem of constitutional evil.  Because this obligation cannot be 
delegated to others, there is no just reason to give definitive weight to 
the mistaken views of prior generations.  Hence, the “dead hand” 
problem.  Nor can moral disagreement be bridged by open-ended 
constitutional language (the indeterminacy problem).  Indetermi-
nate language cannot provide settlement without a final interpreter 
(the judicial supremacy problem), and there is no more reason to ac-
cede to mistaken judgments by such an interpreter than to mistaken 
judgments by prior generations.  The upshot is that constitutional law 
 
495  Lincoln, supra note 281. 
496  See Theodore Roosevelt, A Confession of Faith—‘We Stand at Armageddon, and we battle 
for the Lord’ Progressive Party Convention—Chicago, Ill. (Aug. 6, 1912), available at 
http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/speeches/trarmageddon.pdf 
497  See Roosevelt, supra note 322. 
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simply cannot make good on its promise to resolve disagreement and 
hold the country together (the realizability problem). 
This is the negative side of constitutional skepticism.  There is also 
a positive side.  Skeptics claim not just that the Constitution is ineffec-
tive, but also that it is unnecessary.  They have a deep faith that we 
can in fact make moral progress and come to moral agreement if on-
ly we listen carefully enough to each other and spend enough time 
and effort deliberating about what is to be done. 
It is a mistake to suppose that belief in the possibilities of moral 
judgment and argument are necessarily associated with intolerance 
and absolutism, although that is surely a risk.  Constitutional skeptics 
believe that the risks on the other side are more serious.  The Ameri-
can Constitution has encouraged intolerance of views that cannot 
easily be reconciled with a very old text.  In a world where we did not 
have a constitution to hold us together, we would be obliged to de-
velop habits of tolerance, compromise, and critical introspection that 
are necessary to live with others of different views. 
Ultimately, perhaps counter-intuitively, constitutional skepticism 
rests on an optimistic view of human freedom and sociability.  Skep-
tics claim that we do not need the authoritarian commands of outsid-
ers to know right from wrong or live in peace with each other.  In-
stead, we have the capacity and duty to make our own judgments in a 
way that is loyal to our deepest commitments while also respecting 
our fellow citizens and maintaining political community. 
It is easy to see how someone might view these ideas as naïve, fool-
ish, dangerous, or even incoherent.  It is much harder to claim that 
they are un-American or have played no role in our history and tradi-
tion.  On the contrary, for better or worse, they are central to (one 
version of) who we are. 
III.  EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL SKEPTICISM 
What are we to make of this skeptical argument?  The purpose of 
this Article is to lay the groundwork that would make possible a de-
bate about constitutional skepticism, not to actually conduct that de-
bate.  For that reason, and because I have laid out my views in detail 
elsewhere,498 this Part is very brief.  Nonetheless, it is possible to sug-
 
498  See SEIDMAN, supra note 18; Louis Michael Seidman, Political and Constitutional Obligation, 
93 B.U. L. REV. 1257 (2013); Louis Michael Seidman, Why Jeremy Waldron Really Agrees with 
Me, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 159 (2014), available at http://harvardlawreview.org/
2014/02/why-jeremy-waldron-really-agrees-with-me/. 
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gest few tentative conclusions that might be helpful in structuring the 
debate. 
The history I recount above puts the lie to the argument that for 
better or worse, the American Constitution is essential to legitimate 
and stable government in the United States or that without it, civil 
liberties would disappear.  Constitutional skeptics have been around 
as long as we have had a Constitution.  The Constitution has regularly 
been denigrated, defied, and ignored.  Yet we have not yet seen the 
collapse that many predict. 
Of course, there are also important episodes in our history where 
civil liberties, at least arguably protected by the Constitution, have 
been violated.  There is good reason to celebrate constitutional de-
partures by Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, but few peo-
ple today admire President Richard Nixon’s abuse of executive power 
during the Watergate episode, the incarceration of opponents of 
World War I, McCarthyism’s assault on free speech rights, or, indeed, 
Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese Americans.  The George W. Bush 
Administration’s assertions of untrammeled executive authority to in-
tercept phone calls between Americans and indefinitely incarcerate 
enemy combatants with no access to judicial review are still a recent 
memory. 
Opponents of each of these programs and actions marshaled con-
stitutional arguments against them.  It must be remembered, howev-
er, that advocates for the actions and programs had constitutional ar-
guments of their own, some of which were endorsed by the Supreme 
Court.499  The important question is whether the country was well 
served by having these advocates and their critics debate the issues in 
terms of constitutional obligation. 
There is little evidence that the bare assertion that, say, the prose-
cution of World War I dissenters violated constitutional language was 
effective in convincing people who otherwise favored these prosecu-
tions that they were wrong.  Rather than changing position, advocates 
of the prosecutions simply advanced constitutional interpretations of 
their own—interpretations that, as it happened, were endorsed by the 
 
499  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (the national interest in protect-
ing against espionage outweighs the individual’s interest in being free from detention 
based on race or ethnicity); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (the “clear and 
present danger” presented by vocal advocates of Communism outweighed those advo-
cates’ free speech rights); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (the government’s 
interest in preventing speech encouraging resistance to World War I and military service 
outweighed Debs’ free speech interests in speaking out against the war). 
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Supreme Court.500  When the country was eventually convinced that it 
had made a mistake, the efficient cause of the change was almost 
surely the waning of emergency conditions, rather than constitutional 
argument.  To the extent that argument mattered at all, the argu-
ment that worked was not about mere constitutional obligation, but 
about the importance of free speech, dissent, open debate, and toler-
ance.  These virtues are crucial, whether or not the Constitution 
commands them. 
In any event, whatever the historical record shows, there is good 
reason to believe that main danger that we face today comes from 
constitution worship rather than from constitutional skepticism.  The 
danger takes two contradictory forms.  First, just because people reg-
ularly translate their ordinary political disagreements into constitu-
tional rhetoric, constitution worship inflames political discourse.  
People who have different views about, say, national healthcare or 
federal power are not just wrong, they are traitors who reject the very 
idea of America as embodied in its sacred constitution. 
The second source of danger comes from the opposite direction.  
As discussed above,501 the use of hyperbolic constitutional rhetoric 
coexists with widespread cynicism about the politicization of constitu-
tional discourse.  Even while they accuse their enemies of violating 
the constitutional compact, many Americans also understand that 
constitutional law is regularly used for partisan political purposes.  
Why else would the news media regularly identify Justices and lower 
court judges with reference to the president who appointed them, 
and why else would nomination hearings turn into pitched political 
battle?502 
So constitution worship gives us the worst of both worlds.  On the 
one hand, it inflames political rhetoric.  On the other, it leads to disil-
lusionment about the very possibility of transcending immediate po-
litical struggle. 
This is not to say that constitutionalism always and necessarily 
plays these roles.  In certain times and places, constitutions can be a 
 
500  See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (the government’s interest in con-
ducting wartime operations outweighed an individual’s free speech right to distribute an-
ti-draft leaflets); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (the government’s inter-
est in protecting its wartime forces and recruitment operations outweighed an 
individual’s free speech right to publish anti-war editorials); Debs, 249 U.S. at 211; Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (the government’s interest in protecting its wartime 
operations outweighed an individual’s interest in distributing leaflets opposing interfer-
ence in the Russian Revolution). 
501  See supra text accompanying notes 403–05, 414–16. 
502  See supra text accompanying note 404. 
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goad to political reform, a rallying cry for the dispossessed, or a 
means of forging a nation out of disparate groups.  We need to make 
contextual judgments about the value of constitutionalism and of the 
skeptical arguments that oppose constitutionalism.503 
Nor is it to say that a change in attitude toward the Constitution 
would solve all of our political dysfunction.  There are many reasons 
why our politics has become polarized and gridlocked.  Still, there is 
reason to think that we would benefit from a revival of constitutional 
skepticism.  The skeptical tradition insists that we come to grips with 
our political disagreements without trying to shut down opposing ar-
gument with what amounts to an authoritarian insistence that one is 
obligated to act in a certain way whether or not one agrees just be-
cause someone else has so commanded.  It emphasizes the fact that it 
is for us, the living, to decide what kind of country we want, that it is 
deeply wrong to deny our own freedom to make these decisions, and 
that we cannot look to others long dead to solve our problems.  This 
freedom in turn gives rise to an obligation to understand and com-
promise with our political adversaries.  Constitutional skepticism, tak-
en seriously, has the potential to energize our politics while helping 
us to respect our opponents 
CONCLUSION 
The most powerful argument for constitutionalism rests on the 
need all political entities have to tell a coherent story about them-
selves over time.  Thus, the United States is not just a collection of 
people who happen to inhabit the same physical space.  We are a na-
tion—a People—and not just a random collection of people.  To be a 
People, we need a common history and, it is said, the Constitution is 
at the center of our history. 
There is, of course, some truth to this story, but the key to the 
skeptical argument is the recognition that there are other stories as 
well.  Suppose we grant that a People needs a common history ex-
tending over time.  This history is not just something that exists.  It is 
constructed and reconstructed through political struggle.  There is a 
version of our history that emphasizes constitutional obedience, but 
there is also a version, more than adequately supported by actual his-
torical events, that emphasizes continual struggle against constitu-
tional authority.  We have a choice as to which version to embrace. 
 
503  I have set out this argument at length in Louis Michael Seidman, Acontextual Judicial Re-
view, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1143 (2011). 
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I have said that this realization is a prelude to discussion, rather 
than discussion itself.  Still, it is also true that once one understands 
that there really is a choice, in some sense the choice has already 
been made.  The argument for constitutional obedience ultimately 
rests on a perception of powerlessness.  The Constitution is just there; 
we are stuck with it, whether we like it or not, because it is part of the 
history that defines who we are.  Once one sees that we in fact have 
power to define for ourselves who we are, this argument collapses. 
All that remains, then, is to summon the courage to use the power 
that we have always already had. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
